X. To engage in no foreign alliances, where the interest of Britain is not immediately and effentially concerned: and, when alliances may be judged neceffary, and any foreign fubfidies are to be granted; to prefer alliances with Ruffia, the Emprefs Queen, the King of Pruffia, the King of Sardinia, and other great powers, to thofe with petty German princes, who have always failed us, and to proportion the fubfidies to the abilities of our own nation, and not to the wants of thofe, who apply for them.

XI. To affert the dominion of the fea by a large and well ordered navy; to place our chief dependance in fuch a navy; to keep din conftant pay, in time of peace, as well as war, a powerful body of feamen; and for their encouragement, and to avoid, as far as 'tis poffible, the odious, as well as unconftitutional method of preffing; to invite them into the publick fervice by bounties, and to pay them with the fame punctuality and regularity, which is observed in the payment of the land forces. XII. To cherish and fupport our colonies thofe finews of our naval ftrength, on which avowedly the very being of this kingdom depends to define and fettle the rights and privileges of the fubjects, refiding in thofe colonies; to model them more agreeable to the fyftem of liberty,

maintained in their mother country; and to contrive a better and more effectual method, than the present, of curbing and punishing licentious, arbitrary, and tyrannical governors.

XIII. To promote a fœderal union amongst the Northern Colonies in America; and to govern them in fo gentle a manner, as not to provoke them to caft off their allegiance.

XIV. To arm the people by a temperate and practicable militia-law; and in the mean time to allow the present number of standing forces, by a law made from year to year; in hopes, that when his majesty or his fucceffors fee themselves abfolutely established in the univerfal affection of their fubjects, he, or they, may be graciously induced not to ask them in time of peace; as they always fofter up a jealousy in the minds of the people, by their danger to liberty and more especially, as the number of ftanding forces, now in pay, are not fufficient for our defence against a foreign enemy; and yet would be too formidable a body under the direction of a violent and tyrannical king: befides, the reduction of our expences, by such a measure, would greatly increase the national stock.

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XV. To give every poffible encouragement to the trade of this kingdom, and for that

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purpose

purpose to discountenance all kind of monopolies, and to encourage our manufacturies, both at home, and in our colonies.

B.

CON

No. 3. SATURDAY, August 23. 1755.

When either the electors, or ways of election are altered, without the confent, and contrary to the common intereft of the people, there alfo the legiflative is altered. For, if others, than thofe, whom the fociety bath authorized thereunto, do chufe, or in another way than what the fociety bath prescribed, thofe chofen are not the legislative appointed by the people.

TH

LOCKE on Civil Government.

HE prefervation of property being the chief end of men's uniting themselves into commonwealths, and putting themselves under fome particular government, it became neceffary to the enjoyment of that property in peace and fafety, to establish a legislative power; and to establish it upon fo certain and firm a foundation, that whilft the conftitution or form. of government continued the fame, the legislative fhould continue unaltered. For whether men by their original compact, or at their first formation into a regular fociety for their mutual and common benefit, place that legislative

power

power in the hands of one only; or in the hands of ten, thirty, five hundred, or five thoufand, it makes no difference. A conftitution of fome fort or other will be formed; a legiflative power will be established; they will go hand in hand, ftand or fall together; and an alteration in the one will be attended with the fure and infallible deftruction of the other.

THE frame of our government is made up of the king, lords, and commons, which put together make but one entire government; though with refpect to each other, they are feparate parts of the conftitution. And the prefervation of this form of government in England, when the liberties of our neighbours have been long fwallowed up by arbitrary power, is owing to the care of our predeceffors, who kept these three conftituent parts of the political body close to the rules of their original inftitution, by reftraining each to its proper bounds. However these three parts may in other refpects be confidered, yet in regard to the legislative, they muft act in conjunction. The affent of each to the making of laws is effentially neceffary; but the manner of giving this affent is different in the people, from what it is in the king and in the lords. The people, by reafon of their number cannot be perfonally prefent at the making of laws; their affent can no otherwife be fignified than by their reprefentatives. The dif advantage the commons are under, in this respect, is in fome fort made up to them by the C 2

care

care taken in forming our government; that they should be truly and fairly reprefented.

BUT can it be faid, that the people are truly and fairly reprefented, fo long as that rotten part of our conftitution, the fmall boroughs, expose their voices to fale; fo long as a few drunken alehoufe-keepers, nay, a fingle farm shall be enabled to fend as many representatives to the great affembly of the nation convened in parliament, as the moft opulent and extensive county in the kingdom? Is this the original intention of a house of commons? which was at the beginning, and ftill ought to be the reprefentative of the whole people; and in a proportion as equal, as poffible. But fince that pernicious scheme, adopted by late minifters, of placing the fuccefs of their administration, and fecurity of their perfons, not in promoting the public welfare; but in fecuring a majority in the house of commons to approve their meafures, to fupply them with public money, and to screen them from national refentment, is continued, where shall we hope to find a remedy for this evil? thefe boroughs, in the power of a minister of ftate, have so often protected and authorized the most ruinous acts, that there is great reafon to fear the fatal confequence of their continuance: nor do I foresee lefs danger from that modern doctrine in politicks, eftablished by the managers, and by thofe, who fupported the iniquitous fuppofition of a right in copyholders to vote for members of

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