temporizing with the fappers of government invite them to join in the grand caufe of liberty, and explain to them the maxims of the modern, sory, grounded on that fyftem of politicks, which is to guard the throne from a corrupt ministry, and to maintain the rights of the people againft every fyftem of power, which has, or may oppofe them. F. Q

No. 4. SATURDAY, August 30th, 1755.

Having gained the power they became fuch tyrants, that the reign of former oppreffors feemed a golden age, when compared with the arbitrariness and exaction of thefe pretended deliverers; which made the Sicilians think them much more happy, who expired in flavery, than thofe, who lived to fee fuch a difmal freedom.

BR

PLUT. Life of Timoleon.

RITONS, no lefs than the Sicilians, have frequently been reduced to bemoan the approaches of arbitrary power, and to complain of a ufurpation on their rights and privileges by corrupt minifters. Can any people remain filent, when their reprefentatives prostitute the power, committed to them by their conftituents for the public fafety, to the bafe purposes of enriching themselves, by facrificing their trust to

the

the will of a weak or wicked statesman ? fuch an unnatural traffic with their liberties, leaves only the name of freedom; while, by flow degrees, it brings on a lafting flavery. Or, can a free conftitution be out of danger, where one part of it lays wait to deftroy the energy of another? or where the legislative power is, or may be corrupted by the executive? a free people may, for a while, be reduced to a neceffity of fubmitting to the hard circumftances of the Sicilians, when their freedom has been fo artfully invaded, as not to be prevented; or fo forcibly, as not to be immediately refifted: But hiftory will inform us, that fuch invafions feldom go unrevenged. There are no people that ever bound themselves over to the power of another, without referving a natu ral right to refift violent aggreffors; and to use every legal method to maintain and recover their liberty, and to punish thofe, that would opprefs them, according to the nature of their offence. Nor am I obliged to foreign writers; our own nation will furnish too many examples, in which there have been minifters of ftate, who, without any regard to the true intereft of the king and fubject, and the honour of the nation abroad; and, indeed, without confulting the fatal confequences thereof, have ventured to try the dangerous experiment: dangerous to themfelves; fatal to the throne, when a majority could not be fecured; and always ruinous to their country: the reigns of Charles I, and James II, will afford fufficient proof.

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BUT,

BUT, if the miniftry of those unfortunate kings had been expert in the practice of splitting and multiplying employments, and instead of one lord treasurer had found out the neceffity of having five or fix lords of the treasury; and seven lords of the admiralty instead of one lord high admiral, obfequious to the mandates of the court; we might never have heard of a minister, who lost his head for attempting to establish arbitrary power; nor of a king brought to the block; or of one obliged to abdicate three crowns, for ufurping prerogatives, to which they were not intitled by the laws of the realm. It was not the fword, but the conqueror's engagement to govern the people of England according to their ancient laws, which confirmed him upon the throne. Alfred the founder of the monarchy had declared, that the English nation was as free as the thoughts of man: and shall it be recorded of this enlightened age, that there has been a time when Britons were fo degenerate and regardless of their freedom, as to fell it for a price? or to prefer retirement and cafe to a vigorous defence of their liberty and property? Who can, without indignation, relate the original attempt of the miniftry under, James I. to pack a parliament, as the most infallible method to deprive the people of their liberties, and to establish arbitrary power in the prince? could they have gained a majority of place-men or penfioners to the crown, their scheme might have been very eafily carried into execution. For, what could prevent a wicked

minister,

minister, guarded with plenipo's, confuls, agents, admirals, generals, commiffioners, directors, captains; and, even fo low as, with clerks in fome public offices, to invade the liberties, and to drain the property of the fubject, under the political cant of ferving the king? by this means the executive would ufurp the legislative power, contrary to the great charter of the peoples rights and privileges. And fuch an unconstitutional union first brings on difaffection among the oppreffed; then penal laws; and fometimes a standing army to quell their fpirits, and to force them to fubmit to the minifterial yoke. Therefore,

THEY, who have thus been attacked by a corrupt administration, always diftinguished between that way of governing, which, by art and power, tends to the deftruction of the conftitution; and that regal government, which gives life to the refolutions of the great national council: and not only discountenances, but delivers up to the refentment of the people, thofe court harpies, who make a prey of majefty, and devour the subject under fair pretences; and thofe traiterous, infinuating parafites, who endeavour to infpire into his facred breaft an unworthy jealousy of his people.

A fovereign thus qualified is always in poffeffion, not only of the crown, but of the fortunes and hearts also of his fubjects. And the prince that regards not the injuries of his people, nor gives himself concern about the mal-practices of his minifters, is no lefs a tyrant, than one, who

rules

rules by his own will, and feeks an opportunity to make them flaves. I need not enumerate the fatal confequences of fuch a government; neither can I harbour fo bad an opinion of the prefent ministry, as to apprehend any defign to copy after the worst of times, when kings have been reduced to a neceffity of fubmitting to the impofitions of their minifters; when a parliament was chiefly compofed of place-men and penfioners; when the public money was fquandered away in petty alliances, and a war carried on with the iniquitous view, not to curb our enemies, nor to revenge injuries; nor for the glory of our country, and defence of our property, but to confume the riches of the people; when trade was not only neglected, but cramped by penal laws; and forced to give way to our rivals in foreign markets, for want of due encouragement at home; when bribery had feized upon every post of honour, every avenue to the throne, and' corrupted many hearts entrusted with the liberties of the people; and when tyrannical governors, cowardly admirals, partial judges, time-ferving fheriffs, and unchriftian bishops, oppreffed the colonies, difgraced the British flag, perverted juftice, made falfe returns, and enacted laws for the toleration of Judaifm. This I muft declare, that it would be better to expire in fervitude, than to live and fee fuch a difmal freedom.

Now, as a Freeholder, I fhall give a word of advice concerning the manner of preferving that freedom, to which we afe intitled by the confti