of our dominions, and the employment of commanders, whofe refolution, courage, or conduct has never incurred reproach, moft affuredly will convince them of that wisdom and integrity, which should always be found, where a national confidence is expected to be placed.

THE burden of a war must be borne by the people, which gives them a right to complain, when they are neglected; much more when they are ill treated by thofe entrusted with their property; and when they fee their treasure misapplied and confumed in penfions, fubfidies, and the defence of foreign powers. And the minifter that treated them with contempt, has always repented of his conduct: even that father of corruption, who placed his fecurity in a ftanding army, and a p--1--m--nt of place-men and penfioners, could not maintain his poft; but fell a facrifice to thofe very merchants he had threatened with beggary and deftruction.

THEREFORE, if a war is refolved on to ref cue our colonies out of the danger, to which they have been fo long expofed, and to protect our trade: If the miniftry expect to be fupported in a proper manner; let them banish all thoughts of tranfporting armies into Flanders, and of fquandering away the nation's treasure upon hireling forces. Shall England never fee through the mistake of neglecting our own colonies, and in a manner abandoning them to hoftile invafions; while her armies are employ ed in the defence of ftates that never flipped

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an opportunity to injure our trade, and never fcrupled to join our enemies, when in hopes thereby to gain the leaft advantage? To whofe account are we to place our debt of eighty millions? Not to thofe wars which have been neceffary to maintain the internal tranquillity, the trade, the property, honour, and dignity of Great Britain; but to fuch engagements and connections with Holland, and other states on the continent, which may ferve to continuė and increase our taxes, but can never help us in distress.

I must confefs, that the prefent armament gives great expectations of better things. And it is to be hoped, where there are no wicked pufillanimous fchemes to be fupported, merit will always receive its due, and the enemy muft then yield to more equitable terms. Let us only refer back to the conclufion of the last war, when, by a happy turn, men of experience and valour fucceeded the minions of the laft minifter. Though the French had over-run Flanders, and nothing could prevent their marching to the gates of Amfterdam, our fleets, by obstructing their navigation, and ruining their trade, stopped the refources of all their riches, and forced them to relinquish the imaginary advantages of their conquefts.

THE policy of France is greatly altered within this century: an invasion of Flanders is a meer bugbear, and a contrivance to make us draw off thofe forces, and to fpend that money, which

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ought to be employed in more effectual fervices, to defend a number of towns and a length of fea coaft, which, when taken, the French are not able to garrison, and which it was never their intention to annex to their crown. Their

real scheme is to conquer a fpot of land fomewhere about the middle of the North American coaft, by whose produce, in tobacco, might be faved to their nation upwards of one hundred thousand pounds per annum, while they amuse us with invafions and conquefts; the defign of which we idly imagine, is to fecure to themfelves fettlements in Europe. This is fo palpable, that the very Dutchmen themfelves are convinced of it, or they cannot reconcile with good policy, the withdrawing of their garrisons out of the barrier towns, and thereby expofing their borders to the incurfions of the grand monarch.

LET France raise four hundred and fifty thousand men; what must be the confequence of such a numerous army? They must be paid; and where will they raife the money, if their trade is ruined? thofe very forces, which are fo often boasted of, to over-awe their neighbours, muft live upon the vitals of their own country, or difband themfelves for want of employment; could Britain be once refolved to depend on their naval power, and to ftrengthen the hands of their colonies, fo as to enable them utterly to extirpate thofe perfidious neighbours, that

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can be content with nothing less than our expulfion from those most valuable poffeffions. As for the ftale argument, that the German princes muft fall under the Gallic power, unlefs protected by Great Britain; it deferves no confideration. It is even begging the question; Have they ever been put to the trial. Let them fight a little, pro aris & focis, as the Dutch did against Philip II. of Spain: and there cannot be the leaft doubt, but that all the powers on the continent (if neceffary) will unite against fuch a reftlefs and ambitious neighbour, and enter into a league for that purpose, which, cemented by felf-prefervation, will bind them much firmer together than the largest British fubfidies.

THERE is yet another confideration, and a weighty one too, why we should prefer a fea, to a land-war on a foreign continent. The large fums of money, which are applied for the payment of hirelings, or of our own national troops, fent abroad, never return into this nation: whereas, most of the money expended on the marine, and obtained by prizes, is laid out at home, and circulates amongst our own people. Therefore a fea-war is moft eligible; it is what the nation has long wifh'd for, and is most ready to support; because, thereby we expend leaft; reap the greatest advantage to ourselves; and do the greatest damage to our enemies: to this kind of war we are indebted for Gibraltar and Port-Mahon: and I am forry that I cannot find out one D 4

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foot of land on the continent, belonging to Great Britain, that has been either conquered or preferved at fuch a vaft profufion of British money, and British blood, as have been lavishly thrown away in our former land-wars.

THAT these and the like confiderations have had their due influence on our prefent councils, there is great reafon to hope from that vigour and activity, with which our naval force is commiffioned to annoy, and strike terror into a daftardly people, who triumph in their perfidy, who confide in their deceit, invade us in time of peace, and cut our throats under the name of friends; I fay, there is reafon to hope that they are not to be deceived, nor to be made ridiculous and contemptible, by prolonging negotiations about our undoubted rights, established by the law of nature, as well as by particular treaties: and as long as this fhall appear to be the object of their arming, there can be no doubt of a cheerful and effectual fupport from the people. Did they not contribute willingly under an adminiftration that gave them great reafon to doubt of fuccefs? what then may be expected towards the fupport of a war not only commenced at their own request, but carried on in fuch a manner, as they apprehend will beft promote their public intereft; and a minister, who is afraid of throwing himself upon the affections of the people, or of making himself popular by fubmitting to their judgment, where their property is chiefly concerned, must be

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