Germany, by the great and powerful Duke of Wolfenbuttle, at twenty-five thousand pounds per annum for four years certain; on condition he kept five thousand men in Germany. If this scheme of contracting for fubfidies be continued, I doubt not but in fubfequent treaties, every other little contractor for human flesh in Germany, as well as the Elector of Saxony, will tell us of his patriot fentiments, and urge them as the only motive for his condefcending. to accept British money.

As to the capacity of the nation, which is to pay fubfidies; we need fay very little. That argument is more felt, than I can poffibly illuftrate it. Our debts: our innumerable taxes: the neceffity of providing for the fecurity of our plantations, and our trade: and to prepare at all events for a fea-war, inform us, that our ministry will have enough to do, to find ways and means for the expediences of the year; and that it is no time to hunt a war upon the continent; and to throw away our money in the hire of foreign troops, which can do us no fervice.

THE taking of fuch troops into British pay, without the advice and confent of parliament, is enough to awaken and alarm every honeft Briton. And a minister that could be bold enough to advise fuch a measure, may be fufpected to be wicked enough to advise their importation. But let them be where they will,

they

they fuck the blood and vitals of this kingdom; and as they drain us, they muft neceffarily deprive us of that power of refiftance, which every Englishman is intitled to, whenever his property shall happen to be invaded.

P.

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No. 12. SATURDAY, October 25th, 1755.

T

Et penitùs totos divifos orbe Britannos.

VIRG.

HOUGH I won't pretend to say, that Virgil wrote this in a political fense, or that it may not be applicable to other iflands; yet there must be allowed an emphasis in the conceit, that shows he intended it for an encomium, as did alfo Mr. Waller, in the following lines;

'Tis not fo hard for greedy fools to spoil
Another nation, as to touch OUR foil.

A nation separated as Britain, from all the world, is formed by nature fo, as neither to stand in need of foreign aid to fight its battles, nor to dread a foreign invafion. The access to the British fhore is fo difficult, that the very poet compares it to a departure from the world. And before the Aborigines of this ifland could be supposed expert in naval affairs,

the

the greatest men of Rome gloried in every little advantage gained over the uncultivated Britons. Cæfar, who only peep'd into Britain, and was driven off with confiderable lofs, acquired more praise by the discovery, than by all the battles he had won in Gaul.

FROM that time the fenate and emperors of that people, who for many ages gave law to all the world, refolved upon the conqueft of this island, to plant their laurels beyond the limits of the earth. Its conqueft was decreed in the fenate, and the legions were appointed to reduce it into a Roman province. Yet the Britons, in their native state, refifted the greatest power on the continent, and baffled the moft political enemy for more than three hundred years and at laft may be faid, rather to have fubmitted voluntarily to Conftantine the Great, as their native prince, than to have been overcome.

WHAT did Cæfar in his two invafions? It does not appear that he conquered one county. The Britons difputed every inch of ground with the legions; and more of their princes accepted of his friendship, through fear, envy, or ambition, than were reduced by force. Had the petty kings near the coaft exerted their strength; had they not retained fome inward grudge againft, or by joining a foreign power proposed their advancement over, their neighbouring fovereigns, it would never have been faid by Ho

гасе.

Divus

Divus habebitur Auguftus,

Adjectis Britannis imperio.

THE memory of Cafaubeline, Boadicia, and Caraufius, without mentioning a croud of other ancient British worthies, fhould convince us, that Britain was rather the grave than the conqueft of the Romans. No lefs than twenty emperors attacked this nation in their own perfons, that they might glory in the title, Britannicus: but they never gained one decifive battle; though the Britons neither kept up a numerous army to prey upon their own bowels, in the time of peace; nor confumed the public money, by feeking a hazardous, or at leaft, a fruitless aid from the continent. Their ftrength and fafety confifted, as it ftill continues, in the cement of felf-prefervation, backed with the difficulty their enemies laboured under before they could land and then to fecure a retreat (from a country, which nature has detached from all the world) in cafe of need.

SHOULD the Saxons and Danes be faid to have effected what the Romans could not. It is granted. But what circumftances concurred to favour these adventurers in their invafion of the British throne? were not the people of the ifland changed? had not the Romans imported their vices ? corrupted them with luxury? and left them difarmed both by fea and land? and, what was worst of all, Vortigern their fovereign, raised to the throne, by the election of the people, in preference to Ambrofius, being naturally prone

to

to fear his friends more than his enemies, called over an army of Saxon auxiliaries to fupport his encroachments upon the liberties of his fubjects. No doubt, but that impolitic tyrant coloured his fubfidiary contracts with Saxony, under the fpecious pretence of the neceffity of the times, and his great care for preferving the nation from fome

hoftile invafion or infurrection. The motions of the Picts, and the diffatisfaction of his fubjects, furnished him with plaufible reasons for this measure, which ended in his own ruin and the nation's destruction. Did not the nakedness of the land, and the weakness of the King give the Saxons, in British pay, an opportunity to ufurp the dominion? Thus fell Britain under the yoke of the Saxon auxiliaries, as the eastern empire fell a prey to the Saracens, whom the Greek emperor had hired to fight his battles. Many are the examples of ftates and potentates, who dated their ruin from a neglect of thofe means, which providence had allotted for their peculiar defence; and trufting in that staff of foreign aid, which has always run into the hands of those who leaned thereon. I hope never to fee the time when Britain fhall again truft to an army defcended from that perfidious race. They may condefcend to take our money, but should never be admitted to any truft and confidence. And should they or any fuch fubfidiary troops be called into the bowels of our island, who can answer for their behaviour? may not a like opportunity produce a fimilar effect? Our liberties

are