tion. The Siberian Railway track was doubled, thus increasing its capacity for transportation.

In addition to these defensive measures, she also adopted a more conciliatory attitude in her dealings with China and Japan. In the Harbin case of 1907, although she had at first insisted on the Russian administration of the municipality in that place, she nevertheless came to a compromise with China in 1909, and arranged for partnership and coöperation on a basis of equality.20 Regarding Japan, she also entertained a more chastened spirit. She entered into the first agreement with Japan on July 30, 1907,27 pledging to preserve the status quo of their respective special interests in China, and later on July 4, 1910,28 promising mutual coöperation in case of foreign interference with their respective in- Y terests in Manchuria, and lastly, in July, 1916, forming a secret alliance with Japan.29; 30

Pursuing this defensive policy, Russia soon seized another opportunity to strengthen further her own defense. In 1911 the Revolution had plunged China into civil turmoil. Taking advantage of the situation, she detached Outer Mongolia from China and made it a buffer state between China and Russia,-though nominally under the suzerainty of China. To repeat what has been said, on November 3, 1912,31 she concluded a convention with Mongolia, pledging to assist the latter in maintaining the régime of autonomy, thus breaking away from the grip of the Peking Government, and putting a prohibition on the admission of Chinese troops and colonization of the land by the Chinese. A year later, by the convention with China, on November 5, 1913,32 she exacted from China the recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia and pledged not to send any troops thereto, nor to colonize the territory. By a subsequent agreement, on September 30, 1914,33 she obligated Outer Mongolia not to grant any railway concession in Outer Mongolia without first consulting Rus

sia. Finally, to complete the entire process of making a buffer state of Outer Mongolia, and to bring about a definite understanding concerning the relationship between Russia, Outer Mongolia and China, the tripartite agreement was concluded, on June 7, 1915.34 Russia and China recognized the autonomy of Outer Mongolia (Art. 2), while Outer Mongolia recognized the SinoRussian Convention of November 5, 1913 (Art. 1) and also the suzerainty of China (Art. 2). Outer Mongolia was to have no right to conclude any international treaty with foreign powers respecting political and territorial questions (Art. 3). As regards questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government was obligated to come to an agreement with the Russian Government through negotiation in which the authorities of Outer Mongolia should participate (Art. 3). Thus, by these successive conventions, Russia made Outer Mongolia a buffer state between China and herself. By prohibiting Chinese colonization and military establishment in Outer Mongolia, she succeeded in holding off the contact and therefore the conflict between the Chinese and the Russians at arm's length. By requiring mutual agreement as to questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia, she established herself as a co-overlord or joint suzerain over Outer Mongolia, and further paved the way for future expansion or annexation, the opportunity presenting itself, as in Japan's case in 1885, when she required of China previous notice for the dispatch of troops to Korea.

When, however, the Soviet Revolution of 1917 came, the Russian policy was fundamentally changed. As the Soviet rule was the antithesis of the Czar régime, so the policy of the Russian Soviet Government in China was just the opposite of the Czar Government. Instead of seeking territorial, or political, or economic gains, it sought justice and restitution in China. Instead of hold

ing China at a distance, it attempted to befriend China. In the telegram of March 26, 1920, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs offered to the Chinese Government 35 the restoration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the cancellation of the Boxer indemnity, the abolition of the Russian extraterritorial rights in China, and the abrogation of all those treaties, the object of which was to encroach upon the Chinese territorial rights.36 The Soviet telegram read in part as follows: 37

66

. . . The Soviet Government offered at that time to the Chinese Government to enter into negotiations on the subject of annulling the Treaty of 1896, the Protocol of Peking, 1901, and all the agreements concluded with Japan from 1907 to 1916. That is to say to return to the Chinese people all that has been taken from them by the government of the Czar, either by authority of, or through an understanding with Japan and the Allies.

"The government of the Soviet returns to the Chinese people without demanding any kind of compensation the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as all the concessions, mineral, forestry, gold mines and others, which have been snatched from them by the government of the Czar, the government of Kerensky and the brigands, Holtvath, Semenoff, Koltchak, the Russian ex-generals, merchants and capitalists.

"The government of the Soviet renounces the contribution due from China for the insurrection of Boxers in 1900. . . .

"The government of Soviet abolishes all special privileges, all the concessions to Russian tradesmen in Chinese territory. No Russian official, priest or missionary, should dare interfere in Chinese affairs. If they commit a crime, they ought to be judged according to local laws and local justice.

"Beyond these principal points, the government of Soviet is ready to negotiate with the Chinese people represented by its plenipotentiary, all other questions, and to liquidate once for all, all the acts of violence and

injustice which have been committed against China by the former Russian Governments in concert with Japan and the Allies." 38

This telegram China did not answer, having as yet not recognized Soviet Russia, but following this, by a Presidential Mandate of September 23, 1920,39 the Chinese Government terminated all official relations with the old régime, withholding official recognition from the Russian minister at Peking and the Russian Consuls in China, and proclaiming that China would act as temporary trustee of Russian interests in China, pending the establishment of a National Government in Russia. This, however, did not abrogate the Sino-Russian Treaties, nor cancel the extraterritorial rights of the Russians.40

Thus, we can conclude, in recapitulation, that the policy of Russia up to the Russo-Japanese War, was preeminently one of territorial expansion under the guise of friendship and alliance and the advantage of critical opportunities, as evidenced by the session of the Amur and Maritime regions in 1858 and 1860, and the acquisition of the western parts of Ili (1871-1881), and the seizure of Port Arthur and Talienwan during the general scramble of 1898, and finally the attempt to absorb Manchuria during and following the Boxer Uprising. We can also safely say that after the Russo-Japanese War, the policy of Russia in China was mainly conciliatory and defensive, changing, however, to aggressiveness only during and following the Chinese Revolution, as evidenced by its creation of Outer Mongolia as a buffer state. It is to be observed, however, that when the Soviet Revolution came, the Russian policy was radically changed into that of International Brotherhood and Soviet Propaganda. As to what the future of the Russian policy may be, it will depend largely upon the duration of the Soviet régime.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia, p. 224.

2. E. J. Harrison, Peace or War East of Baikal?, p. 21.

3. Ibid., pp. 23-25.

4. Lancelot Lawton, The Empires of the Far East, Vol. II, p. 1291.

5. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1291.

6. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. I, p. 477.

7. Hertslet, Vol. I, No. 82, p. 461 et seq.

8. Patrick Gallagher, America's Aims and Asia's Aspirations, p. 130; cf. Count Witte, My Dealings with the Li Hung Chang, World's Work, January, 1921.

9. Count Witte, My Dealings with Li Hung Chang. Article published in the World's Work, January, 1921, p. 302 et seq. 10. Ibid., p. 302.

11. Patrick Gallagher, op. cit., App. B., pp. 456-457; Lancelot Lawton, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1295-1296; Far Eastern Review, January, 1921, p. 23.

12. Lancelot Lawton, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1296.

13. W. F. Mannix, Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, 1913, p. 118. 14. Count Witte, My Dealings with Li Hung Chang, p. 307

16. Morse, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 321.

17. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 305.

18. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 341 et seq.

19. Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 166-167, China, No. 2, 1904, No. 5, January 4, 1901; vide supra, Chapter on the International Struggle for Concessions.

20. Asakawa, op. cit., p. 174, The Times, February 28, 1901; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 6, No. 14, No. 25 and No. 42; vide supra, Chapter on the International Struggle for Concessions.

21. Vide supra, Chapter on the International Struggle for Concessions.

22. Hertslet, op. cit., No. 90, pp. 509-512.

23. Count Okuma, Fifty Years of Japan, p. 117; Japan's Foreign Relations, by T. Soyishima; Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 242-244; China, No. 2, 1904, No. 94.

24. Asakawa, op. cit., pp. 303-304; vide supra, Chapter on the International Struggle for Concessions. For a full account of the Russo-Japanese Negotiations leading to the war, see Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 296-362.

25. W. R. Thayer, The Life of John Hay, Vol. II, p. 368. 26. Lancelot Lawton, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1300 et seq.

27. MacMurray, Treaties with and Concerning China, 1907/11.

28. MacMurray, 1910/1.

29. MacMurray, 1916/9.