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other hand, the currency and industrial development loan was successfully concluded, although the loan has not yet been floated, because of the disinterested sharing on the part of the United States with the other Powers and their voluntary coöperation.54

The successful application of the Open Door policy, therefore, depends upon the fulfillment of these three essential conditions: the coöperation of China, the direct participation of the United States, and the coöperation of the Powers interested. In view of the present state of world politics, the lack of any of these conditions will render the application of the Open Door doctrine in China unsatisfactory, if not entirely unsuccessful.

In conclusion, reference must be made to the New International Banking Consortium. This is a living and physical personification of the Open Door doctrine. It embodies the leading principles of the policy. It aims, by an international pooling of interests, to maintain the equal opportunity of trade. It aims, moreover, to preserve, as far as feasible, the territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity of China. It proposes to internationalize the Chinese railways that are to be built, which, as we have seen, has become a new principle or logical corollary of the leading principles of the Open Door doctrine. Regarding the three conditions necessary for the successful application of the Open Door policy, it already enjoys two-the direct participation of the United States and the coöperation of the Powers interested. Its remaining need is the coöperation of China herself, which, under favorable conditions, can be obtained by proper approach and fail dealing. The success, therefore, of the new Consortium spells the success of the Open Door doctrine, while the failure of the new Consortium means the failure of the Open Door policy.55

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Morse, Internatl. Rel. of the Chinese Emp., Vol. 3, p. 350, et seq.; U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., pp. 86, 121.

2. W. F. Mannix, Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 280.

3. U. S. For. Rel., 1908, p. 64, et seq.

4. U. S. For. Rel., 1912, p. 88 et seq.; MacMurray, 1911/2; U. S. For. Rel., 1913, p. 1924.

5. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, p. 345.

6. John Hay's Letter to Paul Dana, dated Mar. 16, 1899, W. R. Thayer, The Life of John Hay, Vol. 2, p. 241.

7. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 128 et seq.

8. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 132, Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Sept. 6, 1899.

9. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 141-142, Count Mouravieff to Mr. Tower, dated Dec. 18-30, 1899.

10. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 142, John Hay's Instructions to Ambassadors at the Capitals of the Powers Addressed.

11. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 132.

12. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 136, Lord Salisbury to Mr. Choate, Nov. 30, 1899.

13. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With or Concerning China, 1906/2.

14. MacMurray, 1913/11, and 1915/10.

15. MacMurray, 1895/5.

16. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 131-133, Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Sept. 6, 1899.

17. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 26, Memorandum Respecting Manchuria, Feb. 1, 1902, inclosed in John Hay's Letter to Mr. McCormick.

18. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 57, from the Original Russian Note sent by Mr. de Plançon to Prince Ch'ing, inclosed in Mr. Conger's Letter to Mr. Hay, May 4, 1903.

19. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 54, Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Apr. 25, 1903.

20. MacMurray, 1903/5.

21. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 132, Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Sept. 6, 1899.

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22. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 141, Mr. Hay to Mr. Tower, Sept. 6, 1899.

23 U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 12.

24.

23.

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US. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 32.

. S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 1, Circular Telegram Respecting rritorial Integrity of China, Jan. 13, 1905.

26. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 243-245, Jan. 6, 1910.

27. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 12.

28. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., ibid, p. 32.

29. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 203-205, the Sec'y of State to the Russian Ambassador, Apr. 9, 1908.

30. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 243-245, Statement given to Press, Jan. 6, 1910.

31. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, App. A, p. 361 et seq.

32. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 12.

33. U. S. For. Rel., 1913, p. 170-171, Statement Issued to Press by President Wilson, March 18, 1913.

34A. N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1916, p. 17.

34B. N. Y. Times, July 30, 1918, p. 13.

35. Millard, Our Eastern Question, App. L, pp. 452-456.

36. Hearings before the Comm. on For. Rel., U. S. Sen., 66th Cong., First Ses., on Treaty of Peace with Germany, pp. 225-226. 37. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 129, 132, etc.

38. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 26.

39. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 234-235, the Sec'y of State to Ambassador Reid, Nov. 6, 1909.

40. Thos. W. Lamont, Preliminary Report on the New Consortium for China, pp. 5-6.

41. Hearings before the Committee on For. Rel., op. cit., Sen. Document No. 106, p. 225.

42. Hearings before the Comm. on For. Rel., ibid, p. 224. 43. Hearings, ibid., p. 226.

44. Vide infra, Part 3, The Policy of Japan in China, chaps. on the Policy of Paramount Influence, and the Policy of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.

45. W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China, p. 263.

46. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 26.

47. W. W. Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 263-264.

48. Art. 10 reads: "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be filled." The reservation reads: "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or to interfere with controversies between nations, whether members of the League or not, under the provision of Art. 10, or to employ the military and naval forces of the United States under any article of the Treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole power to declare war or to authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States shall by act or joint resolution so provide.'

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49. W. R. Thayer, The Life of John Hay, Vol. 2, p. 369. 50. Mention must, however, be made of President W. H. Taft, who, on account of his personal knowledge of the affairs of the Far East, advocated the enforcement of the Open Door policy in China with force, if necessary. In his inaugural address of Mar. 4, 1909, he said: "In the international controversies that

are likely to arise in the Orient growing out of the question of the Open Door and other issues, the United States can maintain her interest intact and can secure respect for her just demands. She will not be able to do so, however, if it is understood that she never intends to back up her assertion of right and her defense of interest by anything but mere verbal protest and diplomatic notes. For these reasons the expenses of the army and navy and of coast defenses should always be considered as something which our Government must pay for, and they should not be cut off through mere consideration of economy."-Congressional Record, Vol. 44, Part 1, 61st Cong., p. 3.

51. Millard, Our Eastern Question, p. 357, The Annual Report of the American Association of China, on Dec. 29, 1914.

52. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 243-245, Statement given to Press by the Department of State, Jan. 6, 1910.

53. N. Y. Times, July 30, 1918.

54. When, therefore, the violation of the Open Door doctrine was committed by Japan in 1915, by the presentation of the 21 Demands, the United States Government, because of the Great War, did not seriously take issue with the Japanese Government, but was reported to have proposed to settle the matter at the close of the Great War by a general international conference, thereby to obtain the cooperation of the Powers expressly or passively committed to the Open Door doctrine, which was indispensable for its successful application. "No protest or aggressive action against the Japanese acts or policy in China will be made by the United States at this time. The State Department is unwilling to begin a serious controversy in the Far East while Europe is seething with war and while this country is involved in the numerous difficulties growng out of that struggle. For this reason there will be no diplomatic protest against Japanese aggressions in China until the European War has ended and its international complications have been resolved. "The United States will content itself with securing from the Mikado's Government a full and clear statement of the intention of the Japanese toward China, particularly toward the Open Door policy, and of the effect of the recent demands made on China.

"With this statement on the diplomatic record, the State Department will wait until the end of the war. Then it is planned to take up the question of Japanese aggressions in China with all of the World Powers who are actually or tacitly committed to the Open Door policy. State Department officials believe that in this way an effective means of meeting the Chinese situation can be evolved without complicating the issue."-Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1916; Patrick Gallagher, America's Aims and Asia's Aspirations, pp. 199-200.

55. It is within reason to expect that, in the Disarmament and Far Eastern Conference, the Open Door Doctrine will be reaffirmed,

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