peaceful vocations. According to most reliable reports, several Japanese brought with them to this province notorious robbers.

These ringleaders and their Japanese friends have been distributed at various points along the Chinese Eastern Railway where they intend to create trouble..

16. In a further attempt to control the railway she offered the Russian committee military support on several conditions, among which was the one that any further financial needs of the Chinese Eastern Railway were to be the first submitted to JapanMillard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 307.

17, 18. H. K. Tong, article on The Inter-Allied Watch Dog of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Millard's Review, June 26, 1920, p. 211 et seq.

19. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 192.

20. MacMurray, 1898/2.

21. Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 264.

22. Ibid., p. 265 et seq.

23. U. S. Commerce Reports, Feb. 20, 1915, Report of Consul General P. S. Heintzleman, Dec. 21, 1914, quoted in Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 267.

24. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, pp. 274-275. 25. Ibid., p. 275.

26. For the manipulation of Chinese currency in Manchuria, see H. K. Tong, article on Driving American and European Business out of Manchuria, Millard's Review, June 29, 1918, p. 168; Violating the "Open Door" in Manchuria, Millard's Review, July 20, 1918, p. 294.

27. John Spargo, Russia as an American Problem, pp. 254-255. 28. J. O. P. Bland, article on A Goal for Japanese Ambition, Asia, February, 1921, p. 147.

29. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 22.

30. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session, Senate Document No. 106, on the Treaty of Peace with Germany, p. 225.

31. Vide infra, chapter on the Policy of Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.

32. Hearings, op. cit., p. 229 et seq.

33. Ibid., p. 233.

34, 35. Ibid., p. 230; Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 148; Letter of Russian Ambassador at Tokio, Oct. 22, 1917.

36. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 149; The Shantung Question, op. cit., p. 15; Krupensky's Third Dispatch, Nov. 1, 1917.

37. Kawakami, Japan and World Peace, p. 161.

38. Hearings, op. cit., p. 444, the testimony of T. F. Millard. 39. John Spargo, op. cit., p. 236.

40. Ibid., pp. 253-254.

XIV

THE POLICY OF POLITICAL CONTROL

As we have already seen, Japan's whole policy turns to-day on two fundamental problems-the problem of the increasing population of Japan and the question of China. Out of the first the policy of economic exploitation and the policy of territorial expansion developed, manifesting partly also in the policy of paramount influence. Out of the second, the Chinese question, there arose her policy of paramount influence and that of political control which constitutes the theme of our present chapter and the "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Japan's policy of political control is largely an outgrowth of existing conditions in China. Ever since the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the control of the Central Government has relaxed and weakened, and the provinces have practically become independent states. Armies are maintained by the various provinces, over which the President has little control. As a result, the provinces can declare their independence, almost at will. Thus, over the issue of the constitutionality of the dissolution of the Parliament in 1917, the provinces split into North and South. Again, taxes are, in the main, collected by the provinces, which can refuse to remit quotas as requisitioned. As a consequence, the provinces fail to send remittances, and the Central Government is compelled to live on loans. As it does not enjoy the confidence of the people, it is forced to resort to foreign financial aid. In doing so, it mortgages one asset after another, thereby placing the country under the danger of foreclosure. Added to this is the corruption of some of the leading

officials who in exchange for the rich commission they can gain from the loans passing through their hands, do not hesitate to contract foreign loans, regardless of future consequences. Such a combination of situationscivil war, foreign borrowing, and official corruptioncannot but give rise to the apprehension of possible bankruptcy and Western control.

If the conditions existing in China were free from foreign influences, Japan would probably have been less anxious. As it is, the Western Powers have made China a happy hunting ground for gaining concessions and exploiting natural resources. They would not hesitate, save for the rise of Chinese nationalism, to make the country a second Africa or Egypt. And yet, in face of the foreign menace, China remains divided, incapable of resisting alien aggression, and headed toward the abyss of bankruptcy and foreign control. To the mind of Japan, granting the continuance of existing conditions, and provided no new factors of salvation arise, foreign control is China's well-nigh inevitable fate. As is said, “If this unhappy condition is permitted to continue much longer, the outside Powers interested in China will sooner or later combine their influence to establish international supervision over that country." 1-2

Besides, had China been located far away and had she not been of the same racial and linguistic family, Japan would not have been so much impelled to action. As it is, China is situated at the door of Japan and is of the same family in race and language. Should China ever pass under Western control, thus losing her independent existence, Japan would be left all alone in the world to face the increasing domination of the West. What is worse, Japan's destiny and welfare are intimately related to those of China. Japan depends upon her for the supply of basic materials, particularly coal, iron and steel, for a market for her manufactured products, and for mutual coöperation against the Western

domination. Should China fall, Japan would undoubtedly be crippled. "With the history of European diplomacy in the Near and Far East before them, the Japanese cannot but shudder at the thought of the day when China shall be held fast in the grip of Western Powers." 3

To Japan, therefore, the Chinese question is one of life and death, and upon its proper and successful solution depends her future prosperity and well-being:

"For many years to come Japan's efforts will be concentrated upon the solution of the Chinese question. Whether or not she is equal to the task, she must here make supreme efforts, for her place in world politics primarily lies in the molding of Asia's destiny. She will be spurred to play the leading rôle in the disposition of the Chinese situation, not from any motives of empire building, but from the necessity of self-preservation. Open the map of China, and mark out the territories staked out by various European Powers as their spheres of influence. Then you will begin to realize why the Japanese, deep in their heart, still cherish the fear of the Occident." 4

For this reason, Japan would not hesitate to take such measures as are necessary for her own self-preservation as regards China. Consequently, she endeavors to forestall Western control by Japanese control.

Aside from existing conditions and out of fear of the Western control of China, there is yet another vital reason why Japan desires to attain political control, and that is the future of China and its relation to herself. Should China be partitioned, Japan would again be isolated, and have to face the West alone. If she should be controlled by the Western Powers, Japan would again lose the economic support and political coöperation which China can give her. If China should remain weak and divided, as she now is, Japan's own welfare and safety will be jeopardized by frequent rebellions and insurrec

tions and possible foreign intervention. If, however, China should become strong, Japan has to face the alternative of a strong and friendly China or a strong but hostile China. Frankly speaking, a strong and hostile China, possessing ten times the strength of Japan, is the last choice Japan wishes to have to make. On the other hand, a strong and friendly China would be difficult to secure. Having attained her own status of international equality at the expense of China's defeat, and entertaining territorial designs on South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, she is quite aware of the possible revenge that a strong China is likely to take. Apart from the possibility of revenge, the rise of a strong China, granting it to be friendly, is bound to stand in the way of Japan's territorial expansion and to overshadow her strength and importance. It would probably wrest from her the leadership of the Orient, which she would never willingly yield. While it must be stated in all fairness that there are Japanese who believe sincerely that a strong and friendly China is the best protection Japan can have, there is an overwhelming majority who hold to a contrary opinion. Prince Yanmagata once remarked: "A strong Emperor is what is needed to rejuvenate China, and to enable her to surpass Japan. Japan, therefore, does not want a strong Emperor in China. Still less does Japan want a successful republic there. Japan wants a weak and incapable China; and a weak China under a weak Emperor, subject to Japan's influence, would be the ideal state." 5-6-7-8 It is, therefore, fair to infer that Japan does not wish to see a partition of China, nor a Western control of China, nor a strong China, nor a hostile China. What she desires is her own control of China. That is her ideal. By this means she can not only forestall Western control, but also safeguard her own future against China. With control assured, she can, as a matter of course, carry out at will the rest of her policies in China-economic exploitation, territorial