tions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be in the German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow or elsewhere in Chinese territory.

"It is understood, however, that premises used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not inIcluded in the above cession, and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter at Peking without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which, on the coming into force of the present treaty, remain Parties to the Final Protocol of September 7, 1901 (Art. 130).

"Germany undertakes to restore to China within twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty all the astronomical instruments which her troops in 1900-1901 carried away from China, and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses of dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation (Art. 131). "Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held.

"China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention of opening them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which these concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of national's of Allied and Associate Powers who are holders of lots in these concessions. (Art. 132).

"Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any Allied or Associated government arising out of the internment of German nationals in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the capture and condemnation of German ships in China, or the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country since August 14, 1917. This pro

vision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the provisions of Part X (economic clauses) of the present Treaty (Art. 133).

"Germany renounces in favor of the Government of His Britannic Majesty the German state property in the British concession at Shamen at Canton. She renounces in favor of the French and Chinese governments conjointly the property of the German school situated in the French concession at Shanghai" (Art. 134)."

Similar articles, mutatis mutandis, and except the one relating to the restitution of astronomical instruments and other works of art, appeared in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary.12

In addition to these, upon the declaration of war on the Central Powers, China abrogated all her treaties with them. As a result, she extinguished the extraterritorial rights of German and Austrian subjects in China. She also took over the German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow, and the Austrian concession at Tientsin, and administered the municipalities therein through the Bureaux for the Municipal Administration of the Special Areas. In addition, taking advantage of the collapse of the old Czaristic régime in Russia, she terminated all relations with the old régime by a Presidential Mandate of September 23, 1920, withdrawing recognition from the officials of the old régime and temporarily taking over the interests of Russia, pending the eventual establishment of a stable government there. She also assumed the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway belonging to Russia, and, to some extent, regained a partial control of the line.

From the above account, it is obvious that China is undertaking the policy of recovery. As, however, an irresponsible pursuance of this policy may lead to friction and even conflict, since the Powers hitherto enjoy

ing special rights are generally reluctant to surrender the same, it is essential that we should state certain definite principles based on justice and righteousness, which should govern the execution of this policy. First, to recover vested interests, due compensation must be paid. As an illustration, if China desires to recover certain railway concessions in which foreign capitalists have invested, she should refund the capital. This principle

seems to have been followed by the Chinese Government, when it asked for the recovery of agencies for wireless and telegraphic communications in exchange for due compensation.13

Second, what is vital should be recovered as soon as possible. For instance, the leased territories, being all strategic bases and indispensable to national defense, should be recovered at the earliest possible moment. Pending their recovery, these leased territories should be neutralized by an international agreement, so that China may not be unnecessarily involved in a war in which a lessee state is a party, in order that she may better safeguard her own neutrality, and that the experience of Kiaochow or Shantung may not be repeated. Conversely, what is not vital to us, and especially what is vital to the concessionnaire state, should be treated with due caution and consideration. In such cases, while no encouragement should be given for retention, due consideration of the vital interests of the party concerned should govern our procedure, to the end that harmony and friendship may not be marred.

Third, and lastly, for whatever rights she seeks to recover, China should stand prepared to assume the corresponding duties. Rights and duties being correlatives, she should always be ready to fulfill the duties for the rights to be recovered. For example, to recover extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction, she should be prepared to fulfill the duty of efficient and modern judicial administration. To recover concessions and settle

ments, she should be ready to assume the responsibilities of modern municipal administration. To regain leased. territories, she should stand ready to preserve and protect these strategic bases; that is to say, she must undertake the obligation of maintaining a strong army and

navy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XXIX

1. Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. 1, No. 26, pp. 128-129. 2. The Shantung Question, submitted by China to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, published by the Chinese National Welfare Society in America, March, 1920, p. 90; cf. Questions for Readjustment, submitted to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, by the Chinese Government, p. 31.

3. Ibid, p. 90.

4. Ibid., p. 91. 5. Ibid., p. 91.

6. Ibid., p. 90.

7. Ibid., p. 91.

8. Millard's Review, Supp., July 17, 1920, Millard, China's Case at the Peace Conference, p. 5; vide supra, chapter on The Most Favored Nation Treatment.

9. Millard's Review, Supp., July 17, 1920, ibid., p. 4, Millard, China's Case at the Peace Conference.

10. For a full statement of these provisions for insertion, see Millard's Review, Supp., July 17, 1920, ibid., pp. 4-5.

11. Articles 156, 157, 158, Relating to Shantung, which awarded the former German rights in Shantung to Japan.

12. Supp. of American Journal of Internatl. Law, Jan. and Apr., 1920, Treaty of Peace with Austria, Sept. 10, 1919; The American Journal of International Law, Jan., 1921, Treaty of Peace with Hungary, June 4, 1920.

13. The Shantung Question, op. cit.,

p. 90.

XXX

THE POLICY OF THE GOLDEN RULE

THE third policy for China should be the policy of the Golden Rule. By this we mean a policy of applying to the international relations of China the tested rule of mankind—“Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," or, to use a simpler expression, "Love thy neighbor as thyself."

It is often questioned whether the Golden Rule, applicable to private relations, can be applied to international relations. It is claimed that inasmuch as nations are not exactly like the individual, the Golden Rule is not admissible or applicable in international relations. History, however, does not support this contention. On the contrary, it serves to prove the applicability of the Golden Rule in these relations. In 1871 Germany humiliated France. She took Alsace-Lorraine, saddled a crushing burden of indemnity upon her, and caused her to sign a treaty of humiliation in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. She did not treat France as herself, nor do unto France as she would have France do to her. In 1919, as measure for measure, France recovered AlsaceLorraine, and in conjunction with her Allies, caused Germany to sign a treaty of humiliation in the same Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, where Germany had humiliated France forty-eight years before.1 To-day, France is endeavoring to impose on Germany a crushing load of indemnity as Germany had done in 1871. As Germany had dealt with France, so France deals with Germany.

On the other hand, Lafayette came over and fought for the independence of the United States. He treated this country as his own, or did what he would have