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the best friend of China: she proposed that the Allied forces and agents should withdraw from Peking to Tientsin and there wait for negotiations. Her proposal failing to receive support, she then attempted to conclude a separate treaty of peace with China, with a view to making Manchuria her exclusive sphere of influence, if not virtually her protectorate. In November, 1900, Admiral Alexieff made an agreement with the Tartar General Tseng of Mukden,50 by which the Province of Fengtien was to be disarmed, its military government was to be invested in Russian hands, its civil government, though left in the hands of Chinese officials, was yet to be under the supervision of a Russian political resident to be stationed at Mukden. Against the ratification of this agreement, Japan, Great Britain, Germany and the United States made formal representations of protest.51 Because of the opposition the agreement failed to obtain the necessary ratification. Thereupon Russia made a further attempt by the conclusion of what was known as the Lamdorff-Yangyu Convention, 52 restricting China's sovereign rights with respect to armament in Manchuria, the employment of foreign instructors other than Russians to drill troops in North China, conceding of mining rights and the construction of railways in Manchuria, Mongolia, Tarbagatai, Ili, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khoten, etc., and at the same time granting to Russia a railroad concession from a point in the Russian Manchurian line to the Great Wall in the direction of Peking. As against the pressure of Russia to ratify the convention, the Emperor of China, on February 28, appealed to Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United States for mediation. In response vigorous representations were made cautioning China not to sign the convention. Thus the second attempt of Russia was foiled.

Negotiations continued. Proposals and counterproposals were exchanged. In addition to the convention, Russia now pressed for the monopoly of the indus

trial development of Manchuria to be granted to the Russo-Chinese Bank.53 Against the monopoly, John Hay protested. Likewise, it is unnecessary to state that Japan and Great Britain had more than once entered vigorous protests against the Russian demands.

While the negotiations between Russia and China were thus in an unsettled state, Japan and Great Britain concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30, 1902,55 directed mainly against the aggressive designs of Russia in the Far East. In face of this determined opposition, Russia quickly changed front and concluded the convention of March 26, 1902,56 pledging to restore the Shanhaikwan-Newchang-Sinminting Railway, and to complete the evacuation of Manchuria in three successive periods of six months each.

When the specified date for the first stage of evacuation came, Russia only effected a nominal withdrawal. She of course left the parts that she had pledged to evacuate, but she concentrated her withdrawn troops in the strategic centers of Manchuria where she was still permitted to remain. But when the date for the second stage of evacuation came, she not only did not fulfill her engagement, but she shortly after presented seven articles as conditions of further evacuation,57 demanding, inter alia, the non-alienation of Manchuria and the closing of Manchuria against economic enterprises of any other nation except herself. Thereupon Japan, Great Britain and the United States again made vigorous pro

tests.

From this point on, Japan stepped into the shoes of China and waged a diplomatic duel against Russia, leading finally to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. On August 12, 1903, Japan presented to Russia six articles, as a basis of understanding, among which she demanded that the integrity of China and Korea should be mutually respected, and that reciprocal recognition of Japan's pre

ponderate influence in Korea and Russia's special interests in Manchuria should be given.58 As counterproposals, Russia presented, on October 3, 1903, eight articles. She proposed to respect the integrity of Korea, but she failed to mention the integrity of China in Manchuria, as was demanded in the Japanese proposals, which revealed most clearly the true intention of Russia. She also proposed that she would recognize Japanese preponderating influence in Korea, but in return she asked Japan to consider Manchuria as outside her sphere of influence. In addition she proposed the creation of a neutral zone north of the thirty-ninth parallel.59

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In answer to the Russian counter-proposals, Japan presented to Russia, on October 24, 1903, the irreducible minimum. She conceded that Manchuria would be outside of her sphere of influence, and also the creation of a neutral zone between Korea and Manchuria, but she insisted on the engagement "to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires." The Russian note in reply, on December 11, 1903, virtually reiterated the first counter-proposals of Russia except the clauses regarding Manchuria and Japan's right to assist Korea in the latter's reform,1 still omitting any mention as to the integrity of China in Manchuria. The Japanese reply of December 23, 1903, reemphasized the importance of coming to an amicable understanding as to where the interests of the two nations conflicted-Korea and Manchuria-and also suggested amendments to two counter proposals of Russia, and the cancellation of the clause for the establishment of a neutral zone.62 The Russian reply of January 6, 1904,63 still omitted any mention as to the integrity of China, but insisted on the recognition of Manchuria as being outside of Japan's sphere of influence and the establishment of a neutral zone. Japan's last proposal came on January 13, 1904, refusing to agree to the establishment of a neutral zone, but conceding Manchuria to be outside.

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of Japan's sphere of influence, but this only on condition of "an engagement on the part of Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria." To this last proposal of Japan Russia made no reply. Diplomatic relations were thereupon severed and war was declared by both sides.

During the war the great problem of China was to maintain neutrality. On February 10, 1904, John Hay issued a circular note urging the belligerent powers to respect the neutrality and administrative integrity of China, and to limit their activities within the zone of hostility.65 Later, in 1905, at the instance of the Kaiser, William II, who feared that the Powers might take advantage of the Russo-Japanese War to seize China's territory, John Hay sent out the circular note of January 13, 1905,6 requesting that in the final negotiations between Russia and Japan no claims be made at the expense of China's territorial integrity.

The war was concluded by the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905.67 Russia recognized the paramount political, military and economic interests of Japan in Korea and pledged not to obstruct any measure of protection and control which Japan might take in Korea (Art. 2). Russia transferred to Japan, with the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan and the southern half of the Russian Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur. She ceded the southern half of Saghalien Island to Japan. In the additional articles, the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was arranged, and the railroad guard was fixed at not more than fifteen per kilometer. To secure China's consent to the transfer of the lease of Porth Arthur and Talienwan and the southern portion of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Japan concluded the Treaty of December 22, 1905, with China, by which China gave her consent to the transfers made by Russia to Japan by the treaty of Portsmouth. In

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the additional agreement of the same date, the concession of Antung-Mukden Railway was granted for fifteen years (Art. 6) and a number of specified places in Manchuria were opened to trade (Art. 1).

The victory of Japan over Russia was a great inspiration to the Chinese. It stirred the hearts of the Chinese as nothing had done. It convinced them that an Asiatic nation, by the adoption of western methods, would be capable of defeating a European state. Furthermore, the fact that Japan, so much smaller and less endowed by nature, and once a disciple of China, should be able to rise to such eminence in world politics, drove the Chinese to the irresistible conviction that they could likewise do the same by following the path of Japan. Thus the indirect effect of the Russo-Japanese War was the strengthening of Chinese nationalism.

Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, the international struggle for concessions was again resumed. As if the Boxer Uprising and the Russo-Japanese War had temporarily suspended the international rivalry, the new struggle soon commenced again after the settlement of the spheres of influence between Russia and Japan. Following the law of historical continuity, the first stage of the resumed struggle was to complete the undertakings of the concessions acquired in the great scramble of 1898. Germany and Great Britain signed, on January 13, 1908,9 the Tientsin-Pukow loan agreement, and later, on September 28, 1910,70 a supplementary loan agreement for the same railway. Great Britain signed the CantonKowlon Railway loan agreement on March 7, 1907, the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway loan agreement on March 6, 1908,72 the Peking-Hankow Railway redemption loan agreement on October 8, 1908,73 and another loan agreement for the same purpose on August 1, 1910." The Peking Syndicate, however, surrendered its mining rights in Shansi for a repayment of