ATTEMPTED DEFECTION BY
LITHUANIAN SEAMAN SIMAS KUDIRKA

INTRODUCTION

This is a report of one day in the life of one man, a Lithuanian seaman named Simas Kudirka. For him November 23, 1970, was a tragic day-possibly even a fatal day. At noon it offered the hope of freedom. Shortly after sundown he was doomed to a world of eternal darkness.

For the American officials who contributed to the fate of Kudirka it was no less a tragic day-not so much in a personal sense as the manner in which it portrayed the ineptness and confusion of bureaucracy in motion going nowhere.

The story is very simple. Kudirka, a crewman on a Soviet vessel moored to a Coast Guard cutter in U.S. territorial waters, attempted to defect. His return was requested by the Soviet captain and approved by Coast Guard officers. When he refused to return voluntarily, a Soviet party came aboard the U.S. vessel with Coast Guard acquiescence and forcibly returned him. The significant action and inaction leading up to the decision to return him did not take place on the U.S. vessel. The Coast Guard district office in Boston, Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, and the Department of State contributed in varying degrees to this inglorious episode.

The flagrant disregard of the long-established American principle of asylum came as a shock to the Nation. Newspapers took up the story and distraught citizens across the country poured letters and telegrams into congressional offices. The Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations was concerned that Coast Guard foreign policy had superseded U.S. foreign policy. The thought of foreigners boarding an American vessel-in our own waters no lessconjured up scenes of more than a century and a half ago. Accordingly the subcommittee held a series of hearings that extended over eight sessions.

When the President learned about the incident from newspaper accounts several days later, he ordered an immediate report. Both the Department of State and the Department of Transportation of which the Coast Guard is a part submitted such reports. A week after the incident the Commandant of the Coast Guard appointed a Board of Investigation that met in Cambridge, Mass., and in Washington. The verbatim record, the exhibits introduced before the Board and the report of the Board comprise more than 900 pages. This report has drawn upon the materials developed during the subcommittee hearings and in the other investigations.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

By prearrangement a Soviet fishing trawler and the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Vigilant had moored together off Martha's Vineyard on November 23. The purpose of the rendezvous was to permit U.S. and Soviet representatives to discuss problems of interest to the New England fishing industry. In addition to its normal complement of officers and men the Vigilant had on board five civilians, three of them from the fishing industry and two from the National Marine Fisheries Service of the Department of Commerce. One of the latter served as interpreter.

About 11 a.m., while the civilians and the Commanding Officer of the Vigilant, Commander Eustis, were aboard the Soviet vessel, a member of the Soviet crew, later identified as Kudirka, indicated to members of the Vigilant's crew that he might attempt to defect. When it became apparent that he was serious, the Executive Officer of the Vigilant sent a message to the Coast Guard district office in Boston. The time was 12:43 p.m. After describing the situation, he stated:

If escape is undetected plan to recall entire delegation under false pretense and depart. If escape detected foresee major problems if delegation still aboard. Req. advice.

Within an hour the message had been relayed to Coast Guard Headquarters and to the Department of State.

From the Vigilant to Boston to Washington and return, the call was for advice to which the most frequent response was "keep us advised". Even this clear but bland directive was occasionally ignored. Some sought advice from unqualified individuals or ignored that which came from qualified individuals. Since defection was then a possibility rather than a fact, assumptions were predicated on premises that were unimaginative or irrelevant. One assumption was that if defection did occur, it would simply be a variant of the traditional "mariner in distress" type which is the stock in trade of the Coast Guard. Another was that if we got the defector, everyone would know that he should not be returned. No one gave sustained attention to the possible complexities of the problem and alternative courses of action. The Secretary of Transportation, when informed in midafternoon about the possibility of a defection, instructed his military aide to keep him informed. He was informed the next morning. In the confusion attendant upon the solicitation of advice, no one in authority thought to give the simplest of all advice: Do not return the defector until Headquarters directs. Oral and written communications that might have clarified or amplified the situation lacked precision or completeness. Even the communications equipment proved unreliable.

The one piece of clear and immediate advice came from an officer outside the chain of command who was unencumbered by any knowledge or understanding of U.S. policy on defection. He did, however, have an abiding concern for the future of fish rather than the fate of humans. At 1:20 p.m. his advice was that, given a defection, the de

fector "should" be returned. By midafternoon, this advice had congealed into an order. That was reaffirmed throughout the balance of that day. Those who spent their time advising on advice or brooding over how to pull a defector out of the water did not know that they were engaged in an empty exercise.

The Commander of the 1st Coast Guard District (Boston) was Rear Adm. William B. Ellis. His Chief of Staff was Capt. Fletcher W. Brown. On November 23, Admiral Ellis was at home convalescing from an operation. Captain Brown was the Acting District Commander. Thus Admiral Ellis was not in command.

In Boston Captain Brown discussed the message with his legal officer, Captain Flanagan. The latter advised him that "if we get him (the defector), we should keep him, bring him in and turn him over to State or Immigration." After discussing the situation with two other legal officers, Captain Flanagan confirmed his initial advice to Captain Brown.

Captain Brown called Rear Admiral Hammond, Chief, Office of Operations, at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington. He told the admiral that the Vigilant's message was en route and outlined the problem it raised. They discussed how strenuously the Vigilant should compete with the Soviets in retrieving the defector if he jumped into the water. The possibility of the defector jumping from the Soviet vessel to the Vigilant was not raised. Nor did either pose the key question of what to do with the defector if the Coast Guard did retrieve him.

Admiral Hammond discussed the issue with Captain Dahlgren, Chief of Intelligence Staff. It did not occur to him to consult his legal officer; he assumed that the Department of State would have firsthand knowledge. Seeking guidance from State, Captain Dahlgren had two telephone conversations with Mr. Edward Killham, Office of Soviet Union Affairs-one before State received the original message from the Vigilant and one after. The one helpful piece of guidance that State could have supplied-keep the defector until the Department advised-never emerged in the conversations. Captain Dahlgren did not ask that specific question and Mr. Killham did not volunteer the information. To him it was "inconceivable that once a man had sought asylum on an American vessel that he could be returned." Captain Dahlgren felt frustrated by the conversations. "I didn't get any guidance from the State Department other than that we could pick up a man that was drowning in the water which I knew before I talked to him." The State Department could offer no guidance until the man was aboard the Vigilant at which time the Department asked to be notified.

In two subsequent telephone conversations between Captain Brown in Boston and Captain Dahlgren and Admiral Hammond in Washington, Captain Brown was advised to inform Headquarters if the defector came aboard. Nothing was said about returning the defector to the Soviets.

While Headquarters was seeking guidance to pass back to Captain Brown, he called Admiral Ellis who was not in command. What started as a briefing of Admiral Ellis by Captain Brown turned into a series of strong suggestions to Captain Brown by Admiral Ellis:

If the man did jump in the water *** we should give the Russians the opportunity to pick him up. We should not

let the man drown. We should save him if this became the
situation ***. If we get the defector, we should give him
back.

His reasoning was based on the invitation to the Soviet vessel and the presence of U.S. personnel on board the Soviet vessel.

The Soviet "opportunity to recover" was included in a message from Boston to the Vigilant at 1:30 p.m. The message did not reach the ship until 3:36 p.m.

In midafternoon Captain Brown again called Admiral Ellis to report that he had no further message from the Vigilant and no guidance from Headquarters. There is no indication that Admiral Ellis was told that Headquarters wanted to be advised if the man came aboard. Significantly, however, Captain Brown did state that there was a consensus among his staff that the admiral's decision to return the defector was in error; that he should be retained. This cautionary advice was not accepted by Admiral Ellis because Captain Brown "didn't give me any information that made me change my conclusion." While Headquarters knew that Captain Brown had notified Admiral Ellis, it did not know that the admiral had given Captain Brown advice that through repetition and emphasis would turn into instructions.

What no one ashore knew was that about 2 p.m. Kudirka had passed a note in a cigarette package indicating that he planned to defect when the Vigilant was ready to depart. This information was sent to Boston at 2:23 p.m. Incredible as it may seem, the message did not arrive until 6:38 p.m.

By about 4 p.m. the working day was drawing to a close at Coast Guard Headquarters. In Boston Captain Brown left his office without discussing the matter with his staff. None was assigned nor assumed responsibility for the matter. He did not tell them of Admiral Hammond's directive to keep Headquarters advised. In Washington the duty officer at Coast Guard Heaquarters overheard one side of a telephone conversation with Captain Brown on the basis of which he concluded that "if there is a defection, I will be advised by Boston and I will pass this to State." Captain Dahlgren who had been the most active Headquarters officer in the case had the impression that Admiral Hammond had taken charge. A call to Mr. Killham at State from Coast Guard Headquarters advised that no further information had been received. Since it was getting dark, the possibility of a defection. was reduced. Mr. Killham briefed the Soviet Desk Duty Officer for that evening but gave no instructions as to possible courses of action. Neither of them briefed the State Department Operations Center Watch Officer.

Just at the time the possibility of a defection seemed least likely, it occurred. At 4:20 p.m. Kudirka jumped from the Soviet vessel to the Vigilant. Following the chain of command concept, Commander Eustis of the Vigilant called District Headquarters in Boston. Unable to reach Captain Brown, he called Admiral Ellis at 5: 15 p.m. Following are the pertinent parts of the conversation:

Rear Admiral ELLIS. Does the [Soviet] ship know that he has come aboard your ship? If not, I think they should know that, over.

Commander EUSTIS. Roger, understand they suspect that man has defected from the ship and is aboard Vigilant. How

ever, they expressed no concrete desire to recover man from
ship, over.

Rear Admiral ELLIS. In view of the nature of present
arrangements with them and in the interest of not fouling up
any of our arrangements as far as the fishing situation is con-
cerned, I think they should know this and if they choose to do
nothing, keep him on board, otherwise put him back, over.

Commander EUSTIS. Boston this is Vigilant. Roger on that. Will search out further with them whether or not they know the man is aboard and desire to return him to Soviet mother ship. If they have no indication that he is aboard or no desire to recover him, will intend to get underway at this time with man on board. If they desire to recover him will have them return man to mother ship. If he desires to jump from mother ship to Vigilant as we depart will make attempt to pick him up as he leaves mother ship and recover man and stand by for further instructions, over.

Rear Admiral ELLIS. Go ahead that way. If the man jumps into the water give the Russian ship the first opportunity to pick him up. Don't let him drown. Go get him if they are not going to retrieve him, over.

Commander EUSTIS. Roger on that. Inasmuch as Russian ship will be at anchor and we will be underway, anticipate that it will probably be reasonable for us to recover man from water, over.

Rear Admiral ELLIS. Well, make sure that you don't preempt them in taking that action, over.

Commander EUSTIS. Radio Boston, this is Vigilant, roger on that. Will be underway shortly and will keep you advised of the situation as it progresses, over.

A series of radio and telephone conversations over the next 2 hours, involving principally Admiral Ellis, Captain Brown, and Commander Eustis, sealed Kudirka's fate. Commander Eustis conveyed to both his superiors Kudirka's determination not to return to the Soviet vessel and Kudirka's fear for his life. Until Captain Brown talked to Admiral Ellis he expressed the thought that the matter would have to be resolved by State. While he hoped for time to contact Headquarters, he did not tell Admiral Ellis that Headquarters wanted to be kept advised of developments. In one talk with Captain Brown Admiral Ellis added a new point-the man should not be returned without a request from the Soviets. In relaying this to Commander Eustis, Captain Brown directed him to find out if the Soviets wanted the defector back. He emphasized that there must be a formal request. As a result of confusion on the Vigilant that may have interfered with the receipt of this directive, Lieutenant Ryan, the controller at RCC (Rescue Coordination Center) in Boston through which messages passed, suggested to Captain Brown who agreed that the request be put in writing. In his last talk with Admiral Ellis, Captain Brown repeated Commander Eustis' concern that Kudirka's life was in jeopardy. To which Admiral Ellis replied: "I don't think we have any reason to believe this will happen. They are not barbarians." In his testimony before the subcommittee when he was reminded of the mass executions under Stalin, he defended his characterization because he thought "the situa