tion has changed considerably." He was not familiar with more recent Soviet actions. In fact, he exhibited appalling ignorance about basic American history as well as current international events.

At 8:19 p.m. Čommander Eustis told Captain Brown that he had a formal written request from the Soviet captain to return the defector. "My intentions are to return defector to custody of Soviet vessel * * *. Am getting underway at this time." It was not until 11:50 p.m. that Kudirka was returned; the Vigilant did not get underway until midnight.

A recorded conversation between two officers in Boston best summarizes the situation at this time. "Everybody's doing something but nobody knows why they're doing it." An individual named Alcorn in Florida tried to reach Captain Brown and Admiral Ellis. The radio operator refused to give him their telephone numbers but offered to transmit Alcorn's number to them so they could call. The transcript reads:

ALCORN. And well you can pass this on. I talked to John
Volpe, Governor Volpe, and they all know about this—

At this point the machine blew a fuse.

The testimony leaves unsettled the failure to notify Headquarters while these events were transpiring. The Board of Investigation report, referring to a few minutes after 6 p.m., reads:

He (Captain Brown) then directed Lt. Ryan to notify Headquarters Flag Plot that the defector was aboard the Vigilant. They decided, however, that they should first contact Vigilant to see if the defector was still on the ship. (p. 45.) Captain Brown testified before the subcommittee that Lieutenant Ryan did not carry out his order to notify Headquarters, a fact that he did not know until 3 weeks later. He did not explain satisfactorily the effect that the joint decision to postpone notification had upon what he regarded as an order. After a conversation with Commander Eustis that ended at 6:38 p.m., Captain Brown told Lieutenant Ryan to wait before calling Flag Plot; he was going to call Admiral Ellis. Further telephone conversations ensued. Not until 8:24 p.m. did Captain Brown concur in Lieutenant Ryan's suggestion to call Flag Plot. At no time was Lieutenant Ryan aware that Headquarters expected to be advised if and when the defector came aboard the Vigilant.

In his position as RCC controller Lieutenant Ryan had monitored the telephone calls between the Vigilant and Captain Brown. Thus he was familiar with the orders Captain Brown had given Commander Eustis and the difficulties the latter was having in executing these orders because of Kudirka's refusal to return voluntarily. Headquarters had heard nothing from Boston since early afternoon. Hence an accurate explanation of the existing situation on the Vigilant was crucial to any decision Headquarters might make.

The pertinent remarks of Lieutenant Ryan to Lieutenant Tritbough, Flag Plot Duty Officer in Washington, as recorded, follow:

The man came over to the Vigilant but he is going back aboard the vessel, the Russian vessel ***. Because the skipper of vessel requested in writing the man be returned, he was returned, he is being returned and shortly the Vigilant will get underway ***. We just finished a phone patch with the Vigilant. He says that at this time when they finish talking

they will be returning the man to the Russian vessel and the custody of the Russian officers * * *. He previously said he did not want to return and he stated that he would probably go overboard if he had the chance. The Vigilant is aware of this and they will be keeping a sharp lookout for him * * *. This conversation was made when Kudirka had already been aboard the Vigilant for more than 4 hours and 3 hours before he was returned.

The conversation was incomplete in that it told Headquarters nothing of the background leading up to the decision to return Kudirka or the problems Commander Eustis was having carrying out Captain Brown's orders. It was imprecise, and hence misleading, in that it conveyed the idea that Kudirka had been, or was in the immediate process of being, returned. Lieutenant Tritbough took notes of the main points made by Lieutenant Ryan. These formed the basis for his report to Admiral Hammond who concluded that the defector had already been returned voluntarily. Hence he regarded the case closed. Admiral Hammond, in turn, relayed this conclusion to the Commandant. About 8:45 p.m. Lieutenant Tritbough called the State Department Operations Center and gave Mr. McGuire who was on duty a digest of the conversation he had had with Lieutenant Ryan. The tape recorder for conversations was not working and no official transcript exists. Mr. McGuire stated that he took notes of Lieutenant Tritbough's remarks which he read back to him. Mr. McGuire contended that Lieutenant Tritbough said "the case was resolved," a point which the latter denied but a conclusion similar to that reached by Admiral Hammond. The Soviet Desk Duty Officer, Mr. Mainland, was informed but made no further inquiries until late that evening when he called the Coast Guard Duty Officer who had no further information on the

case.

The final act in this tragedy was played out on the Vigilant. The Soviet captain presented a written request for Kudirka's return in which he followed the common Soviet ploy of accusing Kudirka of criminal conduct, alleging that he had stolen 3,000 rubles from his safe. The implication was that Kudirka was a common thief. Commander Eustis could not convince Kudirka that he should return nor could the Soviet captain. Several of the U.S. civilians on the Vigilant as well as some junior officers suggested that Kudirka be brought to the United States. One of the civilians even attempted to call the State Department. The Soviet captain attempted to call his embassy. In his last conversation with Captain Brown at 10:15 p.m. Commander Eustis described the tense situation on the Vigilant. Captain Brown interrupted: "You have your orders. You have no discretion. Use whatever force is necessary. Do not let any incident occur."

Given Kudirka's resistance, force was required and an incident was inevitable. The only option open to Commander Eustis was whether his crew or the Soviet crew should use the force. He chose the latter course for three reasons: (1) he felt that adverse publicity could result from the use of Coast Guard personnel to forcefully return a defector to the Soviets; (2) if the man went overboard and was lost while Coast Guard men were attempting to return him, they might be accused of allowing him to get away; and (3) he was concerned

with the effect personal participation in the forceful return of the defector would have on the attitude of the crew.

Five Soviet crew members boarded the Vigilant bringing with them. a blanket, rope, and a ball of material that they intended to stuff in Kudirka's mouth. Kudirka prepared to fight and gave to Commander Eustis the few personal effects he had brought with him. Included in these were his identification card and a photo of his wife. Action moved over the Vigilant as Kudirka tried to elude his pursuers. Finally cornered, he was beaten by his captors, tied up in the blanket, and by 11:15 p.m. was under the control of the Soviet sailors.

During the excitement the two ships had been unmoored. Kudirka could only be transferred to the Soviet ship by small boat. Whose small boat? When Captain Brown was advised of the situation, he authorized the use of the Vigilant's. Bound in the blanket, Kudirka was thrown into the small boat. One of the Soviet crew sat on his head while another beat him. From the boat he was thrown into a net lowered from the Soviet ship. His bid for freedom was over.

The coverage given the Kudirka case by news media in the United States left no doubt how Americans regarded the handling of this case. But what did this story mean to those abroad, particularly those living under Soviet domination? Did it extinguish any hope that they may have in a dash for freedom? Did it mean a reversal of U.S. policy?

The subcommittee took testimony from individuals in the Voice of America responsible for broadcasts to the Baltic countries and the Soviet Union. Since this case did not really break for about a week, first broadcasts were necessarily fragmentary but used by VOA. As more details became available, VOA devoted more of its limited transmission time to the story. In its commentary three points were emphasized: (1) the United States bungled; (2) U.S. policy for political defectors has not changed; and (3) the real substance of the incident. is what it reveals about freedom in the Soviet Union and the countries it occupies.

CONCLUSIONS

Admiral Ellis and Captain Brown were spared court-martial proceedings and allowed to retire. Whether judicial process would have found either or both derelict in their performance and spared the Government the cost of their retirement is speculative.

Their relationship during this incident is a lesson in command. Either an officer is or is not in the chain of command. On November 23 Admiral Ellis was not and he knew it. Captain Brown knew it. It was his responsibility to exercise command no less than it was Admiral Ellis' not to inject himself even when his advice was sought. Admiral Ellis soon lost any sense of distinction between advice and orders. More significant, he gave advice and orders on substantive policy about which he knew nothing and cared less. He showed no disposition to urge Captain Brown to seek advice from Headquarters. At one point Captain Brown was wavering on what to do. In his 6 p.m. conversation with Lieutenant Ryan he said: "Look I think it might be preferred to keep that fellow on board the Vigilant and tell the Vigilant to go proceed to New Bedford". Admiral Ellis straightened him out. Captain Brown had no confidence in the advice of his staff and ignored the order to advise Headquarters if the defector came aboard. He knew he was treading a dangerous course, but he did not care. In a conversation at 7:25 p.m. with Lieutenant Ryan as to whether Commander Eustis understood what he was to do these remarks were made:

BROWN. What a lousy job.

RYAN. And he's caught (Commander Eustis) in the middle.

BROWN. No he isn't.

BROWN. I got my 30 in anyway (a reference to 30 years serv

ice for retirement purposes).

In other words, he was saying: "I've got it made. What do I care for any other human being." If this attitude is typical of high officials in the Coast Guard, God help America.

Commander Eustis was caught in an untenable position. He was ordered to use force but to avoid an incident. The situation on the Vigilant was such that one without the other was impossible.

In his review of the report of the Board of Investigation Admiral Bender, Commandant of the Coast Guard, noted "that more aggressive action on the part of Coast Guard Headquarters might have altered. the prosecution of this incident. Specifically, Coast Guard Headquarters might well have insisted on more definite guidance from State Department." He could well have added that his Headquarters should have made an initial decision (he has a legal staff) and that his Headquarters should have been more persistent in its communication with Boston. Instead of the routine "keep us informed" message a clear directive not to return the defector until ordered by Headquarters would have forestalled the incident-assuming that Admiral Ellis would not overrule Headquarters.

The State Department also had a casual attitude about the situation. As in the case of Coast Guard Headquarters, a detailed knowledge of all the circumstances was not immediately necessary to state a basic principle of U.S. foreign policy. Whether a defector comes by land or sea does not alter the policy.

A reading of the many communications on the Kudirka case points up the need not only for aggressive action but for a refresher course in basic English for both Coast Guard and State Department officers.

One final point. As a nation we have pride and confidence in the reliability of our sophisticated communications equipment. If November 23 is a demonstration of its efficiency, we had better think of smoke signals or carrier pigeons.