although he welcomed an appropriate endorsement. There are no specific provisions on terminating the resolution.

D. The Berlin Resolution, 1962.-House Con. Res. 570, concurred in on October 10, 1962, states the sense of the Congress that the continued exercise of U.S., British and French rights in Berlin constituted a fundamental political and moral determination; that the U.S. would regard any violation of those rights, including the rights of ingress and egress, as intolerable; and that the U.S. was determined. to prevent any such violation by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms; and to fulfill its commitment to the people of Berlin.

The Berlin Crisis of 1961 faded in October of that year, with Khrushchev's downplaying of the importance of a deadline for the signing of an East German peace treaty. In 1962, Berlin corridor harassment had continued, as did incidents involving the Berlin wall, construction of which had begun the previous August. The Soviet Union continued to assert the intention to sign a separate peace pact unless the Western powers came to terms of a new regime for Berlin, but Khrushchev refrained from imposing a new deadline. Meanwhile, as indicated in the previous section on the Cuban resolution, the nation was debating whether there was a serious threat from Soviet missiles shipped to Cuba.

Representative Zablocki, sponsor of the resolution, pointed out that the Congress, representing the American people, had not yet been heard from in support of President Kennedy's position on Berlin. The resolution cleared the House 312-0 October 5 and the Senate five days later by voice vote, with six Senators on the floor at the time.

The resolution, while clearly supporting U.S. foreign policy against threatened Communist pressure, is not usually considered in quite the same category as the four major foreign-policy-support resolutions, in that the President apparently did not request it and it did not take the form of a joint resolution.

E. The "Gulf of Tonkin" Resolution, 1964. Sometimes called "Southeast Asia" Resolution. Public Law 88-408, H.J. Res. 1145, approved August 10, 1964, "approves and supports the determination of the President as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack" on U.S. forces and to prevent further aggression. It affirms that the United States is "prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." It provides that the resolution shall expire by presidential determination concerning the peace and security of the area or by congressional concurrent resolution.

The two Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred on August 2 and 4, 1964, with U.S. air retaliation following on August 4. In a special message on August 5, President Johnson recommended prompt enactment of a resolution expressing support for all necessary action to protect United States armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty, "to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in Southeast Asia will be carried forward-and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved." The President cited the importance of showing

hostile nations "that there is no division among us," at a time "when we are entering on three months of political campaigning."

Within two days, the resolution had been adopted, 414-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate. Some members of Congress have spoken of a "blank check," a vast grant of power to the President. President Johnson, referring to the air retaliation he ordered, stated on signing the resolution, "As Commander in Chief, the responsibility was mine-and mine alone * * *" and subsequently, "This resolution confirms and reinforces powers of the Presidency ***"'*

On March 12, 1970, the Department of State commented on a joint resolution 5 which would, among other things, repeal four joint foreign-policy-support resolutions effective with the sine die adjournment of the Ninety-first Congress. The relevant portions of the letter from H. G. Torbert, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee follow: 6

For reasons discussed in detail below, the Department believes that repeal of the resolutions specified in section 1 is a matter within the discretion of the Congress. We neither advocate nor oppose congressional action

Each of the resolutions specified in section 1 was passed in response to a crisis situation in the affected area. Thus, the Formosa Straits resolution dealt with a direct military threat against the offshore islands; the Mid-East resolution arose from the threat of Soviet expansionism in the area and the situation following the 1956 Suez/Sinai war; the Cuba resolution was passed in the context of adventuristic Soviet military policies directly threatening our security; and the Tonkin Gulf resolution responded to an assault upon our naval forces in international waters.

In these moments of crisis, the use of these resolutions as a highly visible means of executive-legislative consultation was instrumental in demonstrating unified support for our policies to the world and the American public and in indicating congressional approval for the possible employment of U.S. military forces in support of those policies.

The crisis circumstances giving rise to these resolutions have long since passed. As indicated by the specific analyses below, the administration is not depending on any of these resolutions as legal or constitutional authority for its present conduct of foreign relations, or its contingency plans.

Equally important, the administration does not consider the continued existence of these resolutions as evidence of congressional authorization for or acquiescence in any new military efforts or as a substitute for the policy of appropriate and timely congressional consultation to which the administration is firmly committed. Should a situation arise calling into play our treaty commitments or otherwise seriously and immediately affecting vital United States interests in the areas affected by these resolutions, we would wish to see Congress at that time fulfill its proper role under the Constitution in the decisionmaking process. We would keep the appropriate committees and the congressional leadership fully informed and would cooperate to the maximum in Congress' fulfillment of its responsibilities. Should circumstances warrant, and after consultation with appropriate committees and the Congressional leadership, we might indeed seek further resolutions in fresh crises.

In short, as a functional matter, these resolutions have no continuing significance in the foreign policy formulation process, and it is for Congress to determine whether they should be terminated or simply allowed to fade away.

• Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. II, 1963-64, pp. 946-7. S.J. Res. 166, introduced by Senators Mathias and Mansfield, Dec. 8, 1969, to repeal legislation relating to the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in certain areas outside the United States and to express the sense of the Congress on certain matters relating to the war in Vietnam, and for other purposes.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Termination of Southeast Asia Resolution. Report, May 15, 1970, 91st Cong., 2d sess. No. 91-872. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. pp. 20-24.

APPENDIX I

1

MAJOR U.S. ARMED ACTIONS OVERSEAS, WITH RELEVANT
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, 1789-1970

A. DECLARED WARS

1. War of 1812.-Congress declared war on Great Britain, June 17, 1812. Madison's review of grievances did not actually call for war, but Congress resolved the matter with a joint resolution declaring war.

2. Mexican War, 1846.-U.S. troops under General Zachary Taylor were ordered by President Polk to occupy the land between the Nueces and Rio Grande Rivers, territory also claimed by Mexico. This was done without any authorization from Congress. Mexican troops surprised and mauled an American unit, and Polk sent a message to Congress asking that it recognize the existence of hostilities. Congress responded by a resolution declaring that a state of war existed between the U.S. and Mexico.

There was opposition to the war from the beginning, which grew stronger with time. The House added a rider to a resolution honoring General Taylor on January 3, 1848, stating that the war was begun "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally" by the President.

3. Spanish-American War, 1898.-President McKinley at first merely requested Congress' permission to use military and naval forces to effect a cessation of hostilities between Spain and its rebellious possession, Cuba, and to establish a stable government in the latter. The Senate added a provision to this request recognizing the independence of Cuba. This provision was opposed by the President and deleted in the conference with the House. A resolution was passed giving the President discretionary_authority to use military force to satisfy U.S. aims with respect to Spain and Cuba. Spain responded by declaring war on the U.S. In response, McKinley ordered Dewey to attack the Philippines. He then asked for a declaration of war, which Congress gave, stating that war had existed from the day Spain declared it against the U.S.

4. World War I, 1917-1918.-President Wilson asked Congress to recognize that the course of the German government amounted to war against the United States. Congress responded by a joint resolution declaring that a state of war existed between the Imperial German Government and the U.S. War was not declared against Austria-Hungary until December, 1917, eight months after the declaration against Germany.

5. World War II.-After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt went before Congress the next day, and asked for a declaration of war, dating from the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. Germany and Italy, who were allies of Japan, then declared war on the United States. On December 11, 1941, President Roosevelt asked that Congress recognize a state of war between the U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and Italy, a request to which Congress acceded the same day.'

1 Armed action means the confrontation of U.S. forces with those of a foreign government or revolutionary faction, usually, but not always resulting in an actual clash.

For an account of the moves short of war by which the U.S. sought to aid Britain in its fight against Germany, see part B of this Appendix.

'Two days before Congress authorized the seizure of French ships, a lone U.S. naval vessel had been sent out on patrol to protect U.S. coastal waters between Long Island and the Virginia Capes.

B. OTHER ACTIONS-continued

War with Tripoli, 1801–1805.-The so- In 1802 Congress passed a law entitled

Although favorable in comparative terms, the treaty still recognized the right of the pirates to obtain