be devoted. Among proposals received were that BW facilities be transformed into (1) a national center for testing the possible toxicity of all chemicals used in foods or in other major ways in the environment; (2) an agency of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or the National Institutes of Health devoted to the study of bacteria-caused diseases; and (3) a central international laboratory dedicated to defense measures against threatening organisms, either natural or instigated by man.

From a Department of Defense witness, the subcommittee learned that alternative civilian uses for the Pine Bluff and Fort Detrick facilities are being actively explored. Although no final decision yet has been made within the Government, a strong concensus apparently has emerged that, to the extent possible, BW facilities should be turned to peaceful, civilian uses, rather than be shut down.

THE USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN VIETNAM

The most controversial issue to emerge from our consideration of America's chemical-biological warfare policies and their international effects concerns the use of chemical agents by the United States and its allies in the Vietnam conflict. More specifically, those agents are tear gases such as the widely used CS2 which causes tears, coughing, and burning and stinging of the skin, and herbicides which are used to defoliate the jungle and destroy food sources of the enemy. Since each of these classes of chemical agents presents its own particular problems, separate consideration generally is accorded them.

Tear gases.-The Department of Defense obtained Presidential approval in November 1965, for use of tear gases in Vietnam. The authority to use those agents in military operations subsequently was delegated to subordinate commanders. While this action was taken with the concurrence of the Department of State, a statement by Secretary Rusk at the time envisioned limited use of those nonlethal gases:

We do not expect that gas will be used in ordinary military operations. Police-type weapons were used in riot control in South Vietnam-as in many other countries over the past 20 years and in situations analogous to riot control, where the Vietcong, for example, were using civilians as screens of their own operations.

In actual practice, however, the application of so-called riot control agents has been much wider. They have been used not only to save lives of noncombatants but also to avoid casualties among U.S. and allied forces. For example, CS has been used to clear tunnel complexes of Vietcong soldiers allowing their killing or capture with considerably less loss of life to our troops than might otherwise be necessary. It also is used in attacks on occupied enemy positions. In effect, tear gases have been treated as normal components of combat power. As a result, some 13.7 million pounds of CS have been used in Vietnam. The situation clearly is one in which practice has determined policy. Despite the explanation originally given by the Secretary of State and

2 Strictly speaking. CS is not a gas but a solid which is used as a finely divided particulate or dust cloud. The British prefer to call it a smoke but common usage terms CS a gas.

other official spokesmen regarding the manner in which these agents were expected to be employed, the primary criterion of their use in combat has been their military effectiveness. If in any way they can assist a commander in carrying out his mission, they are used.

Herbicides. The principal objective of herbicide use in Vietnam has been to produce a significant improvement in vertical and horizontal visibility in jungle areas. Areas defoliated have included our own base perimeters; roads, trails, and waterways; infiltration routes; and enemy base camps. A secondary use of herbicides is to destroy crops in order to deny food supplies to Vietcong forces. According to the Department of Defense, herbicide operations have been helpful in protecting American soldiers and have contributed to successful accomplishment of ground combat missions.

Questions have been raised both internationally and domestically about the widespread use of herbicides because of fears about their effects on Vietnam's natural setting and on its people. No country has ever been subjected to such intensive use of herbicides as has South Vietnam since 1962. According to Department of Defense figures, as of the end of July, 1969, the United States has sprayed with herbicides 5,070,800 acres, a figure equivalent to more than 10 percent of the total land area of South Vietnam.

When defoliating operations were begun, herbicidal chemicals were not believed to be permanently damaging to plants or toxic to human beings. With the passage of time, however, evidence has grown that concentrated applications may have drastic effects on the environment and on people intensively exposed. Laboratory tests have indicated, for example, that one frequently used herbicide, 2,4,5-T, causes birth malformations in mice and rats. As a result its use in Vietnam recently was halted, at least temporarily. Other chemicals still commonly used in Vietnam also have been questioned by members of the scientific community for their environmental effects and safety for human beings. Among those herbicidal agents are 2,4,D, picloram, and cacodylic acid. Collateral issues related to the use of herbicides concern the possibility of U.S. liability for expensive damage claims in the future, and the belief of some observers that the destruction of food supplies primarily hurts women, children, and other noncombatants rather than hostile forces.

Internationally, the use of nonlethal gases and herbicides in Vietnam has resulted in considerable criticism of the United States. Our Nation has been charged with violating international law including the Geneva Protocol, and with breaking down the barriers to chemical and biological warfare which have existed since World War I. In December 1969, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution, by 80 votes to 3, with 36 abstentions, declaring that the Geneva Protocol prohibits all chemical agents which have direct toxic effect on men, animals, and plants. The resolution was aimed primarily at U.S. practice in Vietnam.

One of the three nations which voted against the resolution was the United States. Its position has been that neither careful textual analysis, nor the history of negotiations, nor pertinent interpretations of prior treaties reveal a clear intent to include tear gas among the protocol's prohibitions, and that, broadly considered, its provisions do not

cover the use of CS in Vietnam. With respect to herbicides, the U.S. position is that neither the language of the protocol nor the negotiating history indicates an intention to cover antivegetation chemical agents. Moreover, the United States, although not a party to the protocol, has rejected the right of the General Assembly to interpret or declare principles of international law embodied in the protocol or other treaties "where the rules are ambiguous and where universal consensus is lacking."

SUBMISSION OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE SENATE

In accordance with the President's November 25 message, the executive branch was reported by administration witnesses during subcommittee hearings last December to be preparing to send the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Some delay has been experienced, however, and submittal has not yet occurred. When formal papers are at last sent to the Senate, it is expected that they will, according to testimony before the subcommitee, include a reservation on "no first use" limited to chemical weapons. The reservation which the executive branch proposes to make would be more restrictive of America's freedom of action than the reservations made by many parties to the Geneva protocol. The United States would retain the right to retaliate in kind only with chemical weapons, whereas some states have reserved the right to use both chemical and biological weapons in retaliation. This, of course, would be in accord with the President's November 25 statement. Moreover, in an accompanying message the administration is expected to state its view of the scope of the protocol, including its interpretation that the treaty does not cover the use in war of tear gas or chemical herbicides.

If, as expected, the protocol comes to the Senate in such a form, that body would be faced with several important, interrelated decisions affecting the protocol, the reservation, and the interpretation.

The protocol. On the issue of ratifying the Geneva Protocol of 1925, three general lines of action are open to the Senate: (1) It can approve ratification of the protocol as requested by the President; (2) it can reject the protocol perhaps, to quote one opponent, as "an example of hypocrisy and cynicism unworthy of ratification by the United States:" (3) it can keep the protocol in committee, as did the Senate of 1926. Some who favor U.S. ratification of the protocol without any special interpretation on tear gas and herbicides have advocated this third way, apparently believing that the United States might be willing to abandon its position on those chemical agents once the Vietnam war was settled and the protocol then could be reviewed and approved without an interpretation.

The reservation.-If the Senate determines to approve the protocol, it could take one of three positions on the proposed reservation: (1) It could approve the reservation as submitted by the President and thus give congressional sanction to the unilateral renunciation of biological warfare by the United States; (2) it could reject the President's proposed reservation and adopt instead the broader "no first use" reservation now held by many protocol signers. That action would conflict with the President's unilateral renunciation of BW and would cloud

U.S. policy on the issue; (3) it could reject any reservation at all, which might be construed as a unilateral renunciation of the use of CW as well as BW, even in retaliation.

The interpretation. Regardless of its action on a reservation, if the Senate approves the protocol, it would be faced with several options regarding the administration's likely interpretation that tear gas and herbicides, as used in Vietnam, are not covered by the treaty. (1) It could explicitly endorse that interpretation, thus consolidating the position of the U.S. Government on the issue. (2) it could say nothing on the subject, thus tacitly accepting the administration's position. (3) it could modify or revise the interpretation, accepting, for example, the administration position on herbicides but rejecting it on tear gas, (4) it could refuse any interpretation, leaving the issue to future negotiations among protocol signatories. (5) it could express its own interpretation that tear gas and herbicides are prohibited by the protocol.

Obviously, some courses of action suggested above are more likely than others. The range of options does, however, point up the complex issues involved in Senate approval of the protocol. The situation suggests that optimism may be unwarranted about the ease with which Senate ratification will be accomplished. Deadly serious issues are involved about which reasonable men may differ.

LOOKING BEYOND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

Impetus is given to ratification of the Geneva Protocol by the clear prospects of CBW proliferation both among countries obtaining a capability and in the types of CB agents which might be available for use in warfare.

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons would tend to change the world's balance of power reducing U.S. power. The military advantage which large, rich nations like the United States and the Soviet Union have over small, poor countries in a conventional war is significantly reduced by the economics of chemical weapons. Moreover, a simple biological warfare capability, enough to cover small neighboring countries or several metropolitan areas within the United States, is within the easy reach of most countries. The biological agent can be grown in a public health laboratory and covertly delivered in the normal course of commerce.

Thus, it is argued, the United States and other world powers would lose some of the relative advantage of nuclear and conventional capability which results from their wealth and technology. Strong incentives, therefore, exist to discourage other nations from acquiring chemical and biological capabilities.

Secondly, on the immediate horizon are modern developments in molecular genetics which could result in manmade viruses for which there would be no natural immunities and against which no reasonable defense could be mounted. Because of the dangers to all mankind in the use of such agents, they would hardly be used as a result of any rational military decision, but obviously might abet aggressive insurgence or blackmail. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences if such agents should fall into the hands of a future Hitler.

As the accumulation and development of CB weapons is allowed to proceed unchecked, the world is confronted more with the awesome possibility that they will be used. It is not unreasonable to contend that the effects of these agents in war is completely unpredictable. If they were ever used on a large scale, they could bring about serious and radical changes in our environment and society. The dangers are equally great for the nation reckless enough to initiate an attack, as for the one attacked. Faced with that prospect, the world's nations have recently given considerable attention to the prospects of their control. At the United Nations General Assembly last year CBW was the subject of extensive debate-attracting more attention than any other single disarmament topic. Both in 1969 and 1970, the subject has been a principal agenda item at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Because the United States is not a party to the Geneva Protocol, some believe it has been prevented from taking positions of leadership in international forums which are discussing crucial CBW issues.

Already several draft resolutions and conventions for restricting and in some cases, prohibiting the production and any use of chemical and biological weapons, have been introduced at the United Nations and the CCD. The United States has expressed its support for the principles of the British draft convention on the prohibition of biological methods of warfare. An alternative approach has been offered by the Soviet Union in a draft convention which offers prohibitions against developing, producing, or stockpiling of chemical as well as biological warfare agents. Because the Russian proposal poses serious problems for verification of limitations on chemical weapons, the United States has backed the British approach of dealing with this complex arms control problem on a step-by-step basis, taking the most urgent and manageable problems first, that is, those related to biological weapons. Current debate at the Geneva Disarmament Conference has centered on the wisdom of dealing with biological warfare apart from chemical warfare.

While current. U.S. efforts are devoted to promoting the principles of the British draft convention, research work is being done by ACDA looking toward the prohibition of chemical weapons as well. An ACDA spokesman pointed out to the subcommittee that the key to control of CW is verification. While policing a CW ban presents difficult technical and political problems, there is some optimism that technical problems involved in verification by direct observation can be resolved, perhaps leading eventually to the complete elimination of chemical agents of war.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

After having given careful consideration and review to the information, expert opinions and informed judgments provided to the subcommittee during weeks of hearings on aspects of U.S. chemical-biological warfare policies and their international effects, we have arrived at a number of findings and conclusions.

First, because of the obvious dangers to America's strategic posi