CONTENTS Foreword.. Letter of transmittal__ Chemical-Biological Warfare: U.S. Policies and International Effects The President's CBW announcement and the subcommittee inquiry. The Use of Tear Gas in War: A Survey of International Negotiations and of U.S. Policy and Practice_ Page ΙΙΙ V 1 2 7 7 8 10 11 CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS Among all forms of warfare, none stands more condemned before the bar of mankind than the use of chemicals and biological agents. From ancient times employment of poisons has been considered a violation of the rules of war. Today, chemical-biological weapons are looked on by the public with a horror and disgust which is not felt for other, potentially more destructive arms. The reaction has been traced to historical experiences, such as the gas attacks of World War I, and even to deep-seated psychological fears. Whatever its origin, this revulsion has expressed itself in continuing international attempts to outlaw chemical-biological warfare (CBW). Among those attempts the most noteworthy, and perhaps the most effective, was the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Nations which adhere to it, as some 84 have, pledge not to use against other parties to the protocol "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases," or "all analogous liquids, materials or devices" or "bacteriological methods of warfare." As a result of reservations to the protocol filed by many countries, only the first use of chemical and biological weapons is prohibited for those countries. Parties who have made such reservations are free to use CB weapons in retaliation if attacked with them. Moreover, the protocol does not affect the right of any party to develop, manufacture, and stockpile chemical and biological weapons. Although the United States was instrumental in drafting the protocol of 1925 and American representatives signed it, the Senate subsequently failed to ratify the agreement. Reasons for this failure are rooted in historical circumstances and the personalities of political leaders who have long since passed from the scene. Despite the lack of any formal adherence to the protocol, a succession of American Presidents has unilaterally pledged support for the principles and objectives it expresses. The United States used no gas of any kind in combat during World War II and the Korean conflict. Through the years, however, the pledge has been seen by some Americans as an unsatisfactory substitute for actual ratification. These feelings have intensified as scientific and technological advances applicable to CBW have increased the potential danger to mankind. Developments in the biological sciences particularly have raised fears of uncontrolled global epidemics resulting from laboratory-created microbes, against which there may be no natural immunity. Moreover, the clear possibility that knowledge about CBW will spread soon to most of the world's nations has engendered considerable interest in the control of such weapons. ACTION IN CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH The degree of concern in the House of Representatives was demonstrated by the resolutions on CBW which were sponsored or cosponsored in 1969 by some 108 Members of Congress. Originally drafted by Representative Richard D. McCarthy, of New York, the resolutions called for: (1) the President to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification; (2) a comprehensive review of U.S. CBW policies; and (3) a clear reaffirmation of U.S. policy on no first use of gas and biological warfare. Sent to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the resolutions subsequently were referred to the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. The subcommittee opened hearings on the resolutions on November 18 by taking testimony from concerned Members of Congress, and 2 days later held a second hearing with private expert witnesses. Before other scheduled sessions could be held, however, the President on November 25 announced his intention to resubmit the protocol to the Senate for ratification. He also affirmed a "no first use" policy for lethal and "incapacitating" chemical weapons, and unilaterally renounced for the United States any use of biological weapons, lethal or nonlethal, even in retaliation. This historic announcement had the effect of rendering moot the resolutions before the subcommittee. After some consideration, it was decided to pursue the inquiry into international aspects of chemical and biological warfare, but on a somewhat broader scale than before. Rather than tailor its hearings to specific proposals, the subcommittee would try to achieve several objectives: (1) to explore the meaning and ramifications of the President's announcement; (2) to deepen congressional and public understanding of considerations involved in Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol; (3) to shed additional light on other issues raised domestically and internationally on America's CBW policies, particularly the use of chemical agents in Vietnam; and (4) to look beyond the protocol ratification to requirements for new international agreements to control the proliferation and use of chemical and, most particularly, biological weapons. In its efforts the subcommitee was fortunate to have the cooperation of a distinguished group of witnesses, including Members of Congress, nongovernmental experts, representatives of interested organizations, and spokesmen for the Departments of State and Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Their testimony provided a significant body of information and expert opinion on chemical and biological warfare. The hearings, together with an index and an appendix of significant documents on CBW, was issued in January 1970, under the title, "Chemical-Biological Warfare: U.S. Polices and International Effects." 1 Based on the information obtained during the hearings, the subcommittee in this report is presenting its analysis, findings, and recommendations on relevant issues of chemical and biological warfare. 1 Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (91st Cong., first sess.). THE PRESIDENT'S CBW ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE INQUIRY The President's announcement of November 25 must be accounted one of the most significant official U.S. statements ever made on chemical and biological warfare. Not only did it give renewed definition and direction to U.S. policies on CBW, it also marked an important step in the global effort to control those much-feared weapons. The brevity of the statement, however, left some questions about the U.S. position unanswered. During its hearings, the subcommittee sought to obtain clarification of certain points, specifically the classification of the gas DM (Adamsite), the status of toxins, and the future use which might be made of facilities like Pine Bluff Arsenal and Fort Detrick, Md., once they had lost much or all of their BW mission. Developed during World War I, DM is a gas which has almost no odor, and causes headache, coughing, sneezing, chest pains, nausea, and vomiting. Used for a short time by South Vietnamese troops according to testimony given to the subcommittee, DM is considered by some to be a "riot control agent" and by others to be an "incapacitant" since it can induce systemic symptoms which can last up to 4 hours. Its status under the President's directive was unclear. As a result of the subcommittee's inquiry, it was established that, regardless of classification, the United States no longer intends to "use, acquire, or export" DM. An even more important issue was the status of toxins, poisonous chemical substances which are produced by living organisms such as bacteria. Although toxins are not contagious, they can cause severe illness and even death if ingested or inhaled. Among them are botulinum which produces the generally fatal disease, botulism, and staphylococcus enterotoxin, which causes common food poisoning. Because the President's message made no reference to toxins, their status became a matter of controversy. Those who supported a toxin ban pointed out that the toxins would require biological means of production, thus reducing the credibility and impact of the President's gesture. Those who favored retaining toxins suggested that the United States should not specifically bar their future use and thereby lock itself in a position which would prevent toxin development by synthetic chemical processes. Both positions were aired extensively in the subcommittee hearings. The controversy was resolved on February 14 when the White House announced that the President's biological warfare ban had been extended to toxins as "another step, which we are willing to take unilaterally, to bring about arms control and to increase the prospects of peace. A third area of debate which resulted from the President's CBW statement concerned the future use of Government facilities which have been engaged in biological warfare missions. Principally affected are Pine Bluff (Ark.) Arsenal, where biological agents have been produced and stored, and Fort Detrick, Md., the center of germ war research. Aware of the valuable resources which the personnel and laboratories of former BW centers represent, the subcommittee sought suggestions from witnesses on civilian missions to which they might |