The subcommittee hearings, the Latin American study mission report, and this study will provide the basis for the subcommittee's final report on MAP training, which is to be issued soon. It is hoped that the final report will be of assistance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and to the Congress in the work of restructuring the military assistance portions of the foreign aid legislation.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security

Policy and Scientific Developments.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING IN EAST AND

SOUTHEAST ASIA

A CONTEXT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TRAINING IN ASIA

A study of military assistance training in Asia must necessarily be conducted within the framework of prevailing political and social, as well as military, conditions in the area. It must also take into account recent adjustments in U.S. policy.

Since the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, this Nation has been involved in three major conflicts in Asia: the war with Japan, the Korean conflict, and currently, the Vietnam war. Although hostilities have threatened elsewhere in the world, only in Asia since 1945 have significant numbers of American troops been engaged in armed combat.

In 1969 a new policy was enunciated with the objective of taking American forces off the firing line in Asia. Often referred to as the "Nixon doctrine," this approach "calls for any country whose security is threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower needed for its own defense." 1

Clearly, such a doctrine has significant implications for military assistance training. The policy calls for the United States to provide assistance to friendly and allied countries to help them assume their responsibilities more quickly and effectively. The ability of the United States to reduce its presence abroad, therefore, will depend in large measure on the amount and quality of training which can be provided to foreign military personnel.

In each location visited for this study, U.S. military and civilian officials were attempting, with varying degrees of success, to translate the rhetoric of the Nixon doctrine into concrete practicalities of operations and programs which would lead to the desired results. As a consequence, there was more introspection and questioning about the MAP program by both U.S. and host country officials than might have been the case at other times. The resulting climate proved to be beneficial to the development of this study.

1 President Richard Nixon, "Foreign Assistance for the Seventies," message to the Congress, Sept. 15, 1970.

JAPAN

Since the end of the Korean war and the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, the United States has reduced its forces in that country from about 185,000 to below 40,000. U.S. military facilities in Japan at the end of March 1970, as compared with those in 1952, are about one-sixth in terms of land area and one-third in terms of building floor space. Moreover, the United States has announced that about 12,000 additional troops will be withdrawn by next June and additional bases will be closed.

As U.S. troops have been withdrawn, Japanese military "selfdefense" forces have increased from virtually none to a quarter of a million men in three services: army, air force, and navy. Beginning with police training in 1952 and moving to actual military training in 1954, the United States played an important role in advising and instructing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces during the 1950's and early 1960's. From 1954 to the present almost 10,000 Japanese officers and enlisted men have received U.S. training and some 71 senior officers have been graduated from U.S. command and general staff schools. As a result, there has been close association between the Japanese and American military. Japanese military doctrine and procedures bear a distinct kinship to U.S. doctrine and procedures. American diplomatic and military personnel in Japan view as very important this rapport between the Japanese and American military establishments.

As the Japanese achieved self-sufficiency in the training and equipping of their military forces, the U.S. MAP program was reduced and finally terminated in 1967. Some training has continued, purchased by the Japanese from the United States under the foreign military sales program (FMS).

As the MAP closed down, the military assistance advisory group (MAAG) in Japan which once numbered 800 was replaced by a Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO). That office is assigned five U.S. officers, five U.S. civilians, and six Japanese civilians. Its principal activity is assisting in the operation of the foreign military sales program. In that connection the MDAO keeps the Japanese informed on the price and availability of U.S. training, particularly training associated with the acquisition of new weapons systems. Its personnel also aid the Japanese in meeting English language requirement for training in the United States.

Self-Sufficiency and its Effects

As a nation which has become largely self-sufficient in training its military forces under U.S. tutelage, Japan provides a prototype of what might be expected in other nations if the Nixon doctrine is carried through. As a prototype, of course, Japan is somewhat atypical because it is a developed nation with a long military history. At the same time, the Japanese example is instructive. Self-sufficiency in training in Japan seems to have had these effects: