Findings and Conclusions

1. U.S. MAAG officials should continue to press for Korean selfsufficiency in most types of training, as embodied in the "time frame phase-out plan.”

To date the Koreans have failed to give training the priority it deserves in bringing their security forces to the point of self-sufficiency. Because of a Korean tendency to rely on the United States for training, and an American disposition to go along with that attitude, the $3 billion invested by the United States in ROK military forces has not brought the required self-reliance in the vital area of training.

Modernization will require increased U.S. training for the next 5 years because of the sophistication of the equipment involved. But the Koreans must develop their own continuing capability to operate and maintain that equipment. The U.S. Army's time frame phase-out plan" points the way to self-sufficiency. The Koreans should be encouraged to adopt it and perform by its standards.

2. English-language proficiency training in Korea is inadequate and requires improvement.

In fiscal year 1970 Korea lost 30 training spaces which it had been allocated because of inadequate language ability among possible candidates. This failure caused considerable problems for the efficient management of Korean MAP training.

The difficulties appear to derive principally from a lack of centralization in the Korean administration of language instruction. Each service conducts its own English-language programs, with no clear national standards for training procedures, length of courses, or proficiency required for graduation. Moreover, because of the proliferation of schools, there are inadequate numbers of trained, competent instructors.

U.S. MAAG officials have long encouraged the consolidation of English-language training in the Korean Department of Defense. Prospects for improvement of Korea's English-language programs suffered a setback recently when ROK bureaucratic rivalries prevented implementation of a plan for unified language training. While there is hope that the plan can be revived, the outlook for change at this time is not favorable.

3. Increased emphasis on training self-sufficiency is desirable in the KATUSA program.

Some 10,200 Republic of Korea soldiers, known as KATUSA's (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army), serve as integral parts of U.S. combat support units. They eat, sleep, perform their duties, and recreate with American military personnel. They wear American uniforms and are paid in part by both governments.

The system dates back to the Korean war when ROK recruits were channeled into American units and has helped maintain bonds of friendship between ROK and U.S. units. Composed entirely of ROK Army enlisted men, the KATUSA program has a twofold mission: to increase the operating capability of U.S. units (one soldier in six is a KATUSA, on the average) and to provide the Korean Army with trained specialists and skilled technicians.

In the past KATUSA's have trained alongside their U.S. counterparts. Because of language difficulties and cultural differences,

KATUSA's often failed to reach skill levels required and were relegated to less challenging jobs.

Although KATUSA's do not come under the MAP program, their presence in U.S. outfits presents an excellent opportunity to provide specialized, formal instruction in military-related skills which can help lead Korea to self-sufficiency. The annual cost to the United States of a KATUSA (see Table 2) is but a fraction of the expenditure required to train a Korean in the United States. Although considerable advanced planning and some changes in the KATUSA program might be required in order to develop its full training potential, the effort seems desirable.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATE OF KATUSA PROGRAM COSTS (8TH ARMY ANNUAL COST DATA (PER MAN PER YEAR) SERVICE FUNDED: 10,200 TOTAL KATUSA'S)

4. The present MAAG structure in Korea should be abolished as soon as possible and be replaced by a joint U.S. military assistance advisory group (JUSMAAG) in order to reflect more adequately current U.S. objectives.

The present MAAG organization in Korea is a jerry-built structure which is a holdover from wartime days. Each service advisory group is commanded by the respective American service component commander. That is, the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) is commanded by the commanding general of the U.S. 8th Army; the Navy Advisory Group (NAG) is under the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Korea; and the Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) is under the commander of U.S. Air Forces, Korea.

Atop these three components is the Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional) or ProvMAAG-K, While it provides overall surveillance and coordination of Korean MAP, including training, ProvMAAG-K has no command function over the other MAAG's and cannot direct compliance from the services in the interests of an integrated MAP. The major general who heads ProvMAAG-K sits as the MAAG representative on the Embassy "country team" but has no authority to enforce decisions reached in that group. Perhaps as a result of the present structure, training programs in Korea have been designed more to support and complement U.S. forces than to provide the Koreans with a self-contained, self-sufficient security force.

Although plans have been made to replace the present structure with the JUSMAAG system common to other MAP countries, the changes

2 Other on-the-job programs are operated for Koreans through the U.S. MAAG but at no cost to the MAP program. For example, 127 Koreans trained with the 8th Army during fiscal year 1970.

have yet to be implemented. They should be, and as soon as possible, in order to permit a more efficient and effective organization commensurate with the new U.S. objectives in Korea. The changes should also permit a significant reduction in the number of MAAG personnel in Korea from the present level of 320.

OKINAWA

Okinawa, the most important island in the Ryukyu Archipelago, has been a vital center for "forward defense" military activity in the western Pacific for more than two decades. An awesome garrison on which all military services are represented, Okinawa is strategically located 970 miles southwest of Tokyo, 410 miles north of Taipei, 900 miles northwest of Manila, 830 miles northeast of Hong Kong, and 550 miles east of Shanghai.

Despite its central location, Okinawa has not been a major center of U.S. military training for foreign personnel in Asia, as the Panama Canal Zone has been in Latin America.

Okinawa is, however, the site of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Intelligence School, which is devoted entirely to providing intelligence-related courses to officers and enlisted men of friendly and allied Asian nations. In addition, other U.S. units on the island provide on-the-job training and training workshops. Those include:

-An Air Force on-the-job training program for instruction in aircraft support functions in which some 670 trainees have participated during the past 2 years;

-U.S. Marine on-the-job training courses and orientation visits in which 50 officers and enlisted men from allied nations have taken part since 1969;

-An annual Army psychological operations workshop of a week's duration which is attended by from 300 to 400 foreign military personnel; and

-A periodic workshop in sea survival with 20 available training spaces for foreign military.

U.S. military authorities believe that the opportunity exists on Okinawa for expanded on-the-job training of Asian military personnel, particularly in logistics and supply management. With the limitations on CONUS training spaces and budgetary considerations, Okinawa may be used increasingly in the short run as a site for foreign military training.

The long-term prospects of creating a major training center on the island, however, are not bright. At the present time negotiations are moving forward between the United States and Japan which will lead to the reversion of the island to Japanese administration by 1972. After Okinawa's return to Japan, discussions are expected to begin on closing down or relocation of some U.S. bases.

In the past, Japan has forbidden the training of third-country nationals at U.S. military bases on its soil. When Okinawa becomes a Japanese prefecture in 1972, Tokyo may seek an end to the training of other Asian nationals on the island and the matter could become an issue in post-reversion negotiations.

The USARPAC Intelligence School

The USARPAC Intelligence School is, together with the Army and Air Force schools in the Canal Zone, one of three U.S. service schools

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for which instruction is provided only to foreign nationals. The school was founded on Okinawa in 1958 to fill a perceived need for better intelligence systems in allied and friendly Asian nations.

The central location on Okinawa meant budgetary savings over CONUS training, less cultural shock among trainees, and easier handling of language and cultural difficulties. Moreover, for security reasons, the Army's U.S. intelligence schools, such as Fort Holabird in Maryland, do not accept foreign nationals.

Although the school is administered by the Army, training is given on a tri-service basis to recipient countries. Budgetary support for the school comes primarily from the Army, with some reimbursements for training through MAP and military assistance service funded programs (MASF). (See Table 3.)

Through fiscal year 1970, the total number of students trained at the school was 3,670, including personnel from 16 countries. Student loads have been averaging more than 450 students annually for the past 4 years with heavy attendance by students from Vietnam and Laos.

TABLE 3.-USARPAC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL BUDGET

Fiscal year
1970 1

Fiscal year

Total..

MAP-Reimbursement.

Service funded-Reimbursement.

(OMA) direct obligation authority.

Number students.

1 Actual as of June 30, 1970.

2 Program as of Jan. 30, 1970.

Fiscal year
1971 2

1971 a

& Revised program as of Sept. 20, 1970. Increase in reimbursements due to increase in programed student input from Korea (MAP) and Air Force and Navy students from Thailand and Vietnam (service funded).

At the same time attendance by other Asians, including the Koreans and Chinese, has declined sharply as they have achieved training selfsufficiency in unit level intelligence activities.

Although intelligence staff officer courses are taught in English, much of the instruction is carried on through interpreters. In such cases each class is composed of a single nationality. The group brings with it as interpreters men who have previously completed the course and who understand English. The interpreters orally translate in the classroom as the instructor gives his lesson. They also answer questions and otherwise assist with classroom work.

Despite a serious and dedicated director and staff, the USARPAC Intelligence School appears to have serious shortcomings, particularly in the following areas:

1. Instructor personnel.-Because the rank of Asian trainees in officer courses may be as high as full colonel, U.S. instructors for officer-level classes are to hold the rank of captain or above. The Army, however, has failed to provide men of sufficient rank and many officer courses are being taught by young lieutenants and noncoms. Given the rank, age, and status consciousness of most Asians, particularly in the military, the situation is far from satisfactory.

2. English-language instruction. The intelligence officer courses include 50 hours of English-language enhancement. The language