LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We submit the report on our factfinding visit to Nigeria/Biafra, from February 7 to 20, 1969. We appreciate your cooperation in assigning Mr. Melvin O. Benson, staff consultant to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to accompany us on this special mission.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr.,

Chairmans

J. HERBERT Burke.

REPORT OF SPECIAL FACTFINDING MISSION TO

NIGERIA/BIAFRA

INTRODUCTION

The factfinding mission left Washington on February 7, 1969, having already been extensively briefed on the Nigeria/Biafra situation by C. Robert Moore, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, and other officials from the Department of State.

In London, aside from the American officials, we met and exchanged views with British Foreign Office personnel, the Nigerian High Commissioner, a Biafran representative, and the Ivory Coast Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

In Lagos, Nigeria, the study mission received excellent cooperation from Ambassador Elbert G. Mathews and the country team. We were afforded the opportunity of meeting Red Cross personnel, priests, U.N. officials, and many of the principal Federal Military Government officials, including Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, both before proceeding into Biafra and after our return. Our stay was not confined to Lagos; we were flown around the country in General Gowon's personal jet to inspect Enugu and refugee camps, as well as Red Cross centers in that area, where relief supplies were being distributed. At Calabar we met with the Military Governor and his executive council. While there the study mission viewed bombed out sections of the city and visited more refugee installations. We touched down at Port Harcourt long enough to exchange views with the commanding officer of the 3d Marine Division, Col. Benjamin Adekunle. For the study mission to visit Biafra it was necessary first to drive for 4 hours to Cotonou, Dahomey, where we conferred with Ambassador Knox and met President Zinsou. From there we accompanied an ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) cargo plane loaded with 10 tons of dried stockfish to land at night at the Uli airstrip. The study mission spent 2 days in Biafra in and around Umuahia where Col. Odumegu Ojukwu welcomed the members, and the various commissioners cooperated in every way in giving information and answering questions. We had time to tour the countryside with Father Doheny and inspected refugee camps and the Mbaise Joint Hospital. We also inspected the bombed marketplace where only about a week earlier 200 persons had reportedly been killed and there had been some 300 casualties. We saw several of the victims in the hospital and talked to Sister Luke who admitted them.

The study mission also visited Kaduna and Kano in the northern area where meetings were held with the State officials, and an audience was granted with Alhaji Ado Bayoro, Emir of Kano. The study mission returned to Washington, February 20, 1969.

I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. The study mission believes that the posture of the United States concerning the Federal Military Government of Nigeria is correct in recognizing it as the only legal government of that country.

2. However, we believe that if there is to be any negotiated settlement of the war short of complete subjugation of one side militarily,

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there must be concessions and guarantees of security to the Ibos and other tribes by way of some form of federalism. The future is questionable, economic or otherwise, for a completely independent Biafra as it is presently constituted.

3. The Nigerian civil conflict is uniquely an African problem. The Organization of African Unity is attempting to mediate the problem. Under the chairmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, and others, efforts have been made to bring the two competing sides together at the conference table. We believe that any ceasefire arrangement which might be worked out should be under African auspices. Furthermore, the OAU has indicated that it would be opposed to the United Nations taking jurisdiction of the dispute.

4. Since the inception of the fighting in Nigeria, the United States has refused to supply armaments to either side. We commend this action. However, arms have been supplied by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and others. It is our hope that the U.S. Government might conduct informal conversations with these powers looking toward a possible agreement for all countries to suspend arms shipments to the warring factions.

5. The study mission strongly believes that our policy in operating through established international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Joint Church Aid (JCA), is justified and should be continued. We would not want to see the U.S. Government become directly involved either through operating an airlift or having the U.S. Government personnel coordinate the local distribution of food. Our humanitarian concern applies equally to both sides of the battle lines. Channeling aid through ad hoc committees should not be undertaken.

6. We are convinced as a result of our study that it is possible through greatly increased delivery of food supplies to prevent mass starvation in both areas of Nigeria. The food is in the area or available. The problem is to provide the means of delivery and distribution to those in direct need. Not enough information has reached the outside world concerning the relief to civil conflict victims in Nigerian federally controlled territory where literally thousands of people are being competently cared for, rehabilitated, and returned to their homes. The Biafran refusal to permit daylight flights and land corridors is the primary reason that relief and rehabilitation procedures are not today as well developed in the east as they are elsewhere in the country.

7. We see no justification for Biafra's continued refusal to permit daylight operations by the ICRC and JCA mercy missions. We have heard all the arguments and justifications for this posture, but we believe that in the light of the grave necessity such rationalizations are unconvincing. If Biafra does wish to save the lives of those verging on starvation in the area which it controls, then it must recognize the necessity of increased airlifts and the advisability of land corridors. The fear of poisoned food has to be shown as unfounded. If military and political considerations are the basis for the rejection of daylight flights and land corridors then the Biafrans must take responsibility for the consequences.

8. While our immediate objective should be to relieve the suffering, the study mission believes that if the two factions can be brought into agreement for increased food delivery there is a good possibility that these discussions might be a bridge leading toward agreement on a cease-fire followed by negotiations.

9. We can only deplore in the strongest terms the willful bombing of innocent civilian populations by the Federal Military Government forces. As we were witnesses to the tragic results of these bombings, we know that no military objective is achieved. Therefore, if these bombings of civilian centers continue, we must conclude that the motivation is malicious.

10. The study mission saw no intent by the Federal troops to follow a policy of genocide toward the Ibo people, although the Biafrans gave the impression of being genuinely fearful of such a development. The International Observer Team to Nigeria, which is made up of officers from Canada, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the OAU, and a U.N. representative, without exception have made the point that no evidence of genocide, based on detailed investigation, was found. We are not so naive as to believe, however, that the bitterness generated by the war has not resulted in some incidents of retribution nor that it will not be in further evidence during the postwar period.

11. The study mission is pleased to note the appointment of Professor Clarence Ferguson, Jr., former dean of Howard University School of Law and presently a distinguished professor of law at Rutgers University, as the special coordinator on relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian Civil War as we believe that pursuing the various initiatives to find agreement will require full time attention, patience, tact, and perseverance in order to reach agreement on certain humanitarian steps which will allow vastly increased delivery of food to the starving populations on both sides.