5. First Nigerian Division, 23–27 October, 1968

Enugu, Abakaliki, Afikpo, Okigwi

Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug.

6. Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division, 23-27 October, 1968 Port Harcourt, Opobo, Abak, Azumini, Uyo, Urua Inyang, Aba

Major-General Raab, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns, Mr. Kumanek.

7. Prisoners of war in Lagos, 1 November, 1968

Kirikiri and Ikoyi

Major-General Milroy, Major-General Raab, Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewicz.

8. Kano and North Central States, 4-7 November, 1968

Kano, Zaria, Kaduna

Major-General Raab, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Cairns.

9. First Nigerian Division, 4-7 November, 1968

Nsukka, Awka

Major-General Milroy, Major Arbuthnott, Mr. Kumanek.

10. Second Nigerian Division, 4-7 November, 1968

Benin, Asaba, Kwale, Warri

Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Lieutenant Byczy.

11. First Nigerian Division, 13-19 November, 1968

Makurdi, Agoja, Ikom, Obudu

Major-General Raab, Lieutenant-Colonel Pinnington, Major Arbuthnott, Mr. Kumanek

12. Third Marine Commando Division, 13-17 November, 1968 Port Harcourt, Aba, Owerri, Ahoada

Major-General Milroy, Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant-Colonel Areskoug, Lieutenant Byczy.

Note: On some of the visits listed above the team was accompanied by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and/or his assistants and observers representing the Organisation of African Unity. In addition these other observers made separate visits to different sectors.

Annex C

REPORTS

1. The Observer Team have issued six reports. These are:

(a) Three interim reports, as follows:

(1) First Interim Report. "Visit to First Nigerian Division" dated 2 October, 1968.

(2) Second Interim Report. "Visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division" dated 14 October, 1968.

(3) Third Interim Report. "Visit to Second Nigerian Division" dated 23 October, 1968.

(b) Two reports on allegations involving special incidents, as follows:

(1) Report of investigation into the circumstances of deaths at Okigwi, dated 4 October, 1968.

(2) Report on investigation into allegations of the massacre of civilians at Urua Inyang, dated 2 November, 1968.

(c) A report on the visit to prisoners of war at Kirikiri and Ikoyi, dated 3 November, 1968.

(The activities of the Observers for the period since the Third Interim Report are covered in this report.)

2. The other Observers have produced the following reports:

(a) The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations: (1) First Interim Report by the representative of the SecretaryGeneral to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on his visit to the Northern Front, issued 9 October, 1968.

(2) Second Interim Report by the representative of the SecretaryGeneral to Nigeria: on Humanitarian Activities on visits to the Southern and Western Fronts, issued 30 October,1968.

(3) Third Interim Report of the representative of the SecretaryGeneral to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities, issued 2 November, 1968.

(4) Report of the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humantarian Activities on an incident at Okigwi, issued 8 October, 1968.

(b) The Organisation of African Unity:

(1) Report No. 1 on the visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division, issued on 14 October, 1968.

(2) Report No. 2 on the visit to Second Nigerian Division, issued on 22 October, 1968.

(3) Report No. 3 on the visit to First Nigerian Division and to prisoners of war camps in Lagos, issued 15 November, 1968.

(4) A composite report on the activities of the Organisation of African Unity observers during the period of their stay in Nigeria is in course of preparation.

First Interim Report

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO FIRST NIGERIAN DIVISION

1. The Swedish, British and Canadian representatives invited by the Federal Military Government to observe the conduct of the Federal troops in the waraffected areas, visited the First Nigerian Division during the period 25 September to 30 September, 1968. The representative of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral travelled with the group. This report covers this particular visit.

2. On arrival at Enugu the group split into two teams, one visiting the area of 1 sector from Enugu through Awgu to Obinago Chilago and the other visiting the area of 2 sector from Abakaliki south to the front lines. Each team visited front line positions, military units and headquarters, villages, market places, medical and food distributing stations, refugee camps and major cities and towns. The Observers talked to officers, soldiers, local inhabitants, refugees, members of the civil administration, police, Red Cross officials and missionaries. Thorughout the period of their visit the Observers received the fullest co-operation from the military and civilian officials. They encountered no restrictions to their movements investigations and none of their requests was refused. Representatives of the Press were free to accompany the Observers and did so on several occasions. Conduct of Federal troops

3. The Observers found the Federal troops in the areas they visited to be alert, cheerful and well disciplined. They neither saw nor heard any evidence that the troops had committed acts with intent to destroy wholly, or in part, the Ibo people or their property. The Observers did see considerable evidence that the troops in the area were assisting the local population, in particular by feeding them until the civil administration and the Red Cross could take over the responsibility.

Conduct of the civilian population

4. Discussions with village leaders and refugees confirm that the Ibo people feared the Federal troops until they actually met them. This fear is the result of the actual fighting and the propaganda put out by the rebels which leads the Ibos to believe the Federal troops will kill them. Once some of their people make contact with the Federal troops this fear is rapidly allayed. The Observers saw a number of village leaders who had just come out of hiding and noted that the numbers of inhabitants returning to the villages are increasing. The Observers considered it significant that in the villages visited, the inhabitants displayed no fear of Federal soldiers, even when these soldiers arrived in their midst suddenly. However, it was also noted that very few of the more educated Ibos have yet appeared in areas occupied by Federal troops.

Restoration of normal life

5. The major problems in facilitating the return to normal life in the waraffected areas visited, include the provision of food and medical facilities and the restoration of buildings and public services such as water, power, etc. The Observers noted that:

(a) When an area is first occupied, the Army provides the civilians found there with the foodstuffs necessary to supplement the food that is available. This responsibility is taken over as rapidly as possible by the civil administration and the Red Cross and assisted where necessary by soldiers. These arrangements appear to have been adequate to date, but from what was seen, it is apparent that there will not be sufficient to handle the task if the people continue to come out of the bush at the present rate. A contributing problem is the lack of money in the hands of the people.

(b) The major medical problem observed was the malnutrition caused by a poorly balanced diet. The problem exists in normal times in this area, but

it has been accentuated in the case of those people who have spent a long time hiding in the bush. The Army, missionaries and Red Cross are doing a good job but their efforts are hampered by a shortage of drugs, reported to be caused by difficulties in transportation from Lagos. In addition the numbers of medical personnel do not appear to be sufficient to handle a large increase in the numbers requiring attention. For example, the Observers noted in Nenive that there was an increase from 100 on 21 September to about 1,500 mostly women and children, when the medical team returned on 28 September.

(c) In the areas where fighting took place, there is a considerable amount of physical destruction. This is the result of deliberate destruction on public utilities attributable to the rebels when retreating, destruction by shell fire, the use of materials for shelter by soldiers, the inevitable looting by civilians and deterioration caused by the weather. No damage was seen in villages visited that were not in the areas affected by the fighting. Some action has been taken by military and civil officials to preserve property.

Summary

6. In the areas of First Nigerian Division that the Observers visited they found: (a) Genocide. There is no evidence of any intent by the Federal troops to destroy the Ibo people or their property, and the use of the term genocide is in no way justified.

(b) Conduct of Federal troops. The troops in the area are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population and assist them in re-establishing a normal life.

(c) Conduct of civilian inhabitants. An increasing number of the inhabitants of the villages, almost all of whom are Ibo, are returning to their homes. The people who have returned to the villages display no fear of the Federal troops. (d) Food and medical assistance. These are being provided to the civilian population through the combined efforts of the Army, the civil administration and the Red Cross. While the supply of food has been adequate, the supplies of drugs and medical assistance in the area seem to be inadequate because of a shortage of transport, particularly air transport. This situation could become serious if an expected large increase in the number of refugees and people requiring such assistance takes place.

(e) Destruction of property. The Observers received no evidence of deliberate and unnecessary destruction of property by Federal troops. There has, however, been considerable destruction as a result of the war, and the work required to repair this situation, which is just beginning, will be very expensive.

Future plans

7. The Observers propose to make their next visit to the area of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division.

Second Interim Report

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM'S VISIT TO THIRD NIGERIAN DIVISION

Outline of work

1. With the arrival of the Polish representative and the representatives of the Organisation of African Unity there were more Observers available to cover the ground of the Third Marine Commando Division. The group split into two teams one visiting the areas Aba, Owerri and Port Harcourt, the other Calabar, Uyo and Ikot Ekpene. The visit lasted from 5 to 10 October. In addition to visiting hospitals, camps for displaced persons, etc., as enumerated in our first interim report we saw and interviewed a number of internees, prisoners of war and some educated Ibos.

2. The group received excellent co-operation from the Military authorities, civilian and volunteer workers. We were free to question detainees, prisoners of war and displaced persons in private. We arranged our own programme and visited forward areas.

3. It has become more apparent that the future efficacy of Observers will depend largely on their continued presence throughout the whole area and their ability to visit without undue delay, the places where incidents are reported as taking place. It will also depend on good communications both in the matter of air and ground transport and wireless. These are lacking at the present time.

The group is not constituted to be able to follow the method of operation suggested above. We therefore recommend that the organisation of the group should be changed to enable it to have certain of its members permanently on the ground in each divisional sector. We consider this matter to be urgent and would be happy to discuss it with the Federal Government at an early date.

State of the civil population

4. We did not see as many Ibos as in the north since a large part of the area is populated by Rivers people and minority tribes. Most of the Ibos who were working in places such as Port Harcourt fled with the dissidents. In addition towns like Aba and Owerri are still close to the fighting line. It is the pattern in such areas that the local inhabitants either flee with the dissidents or take to the bush.

Very few stay in the fighting zone. Over half the people we saw in camps, either Rivers people, Ibos or minority tribes, were in a fair state of health and well cared for, but a large number including small children are in a state of malnutrition. It is also apparent that the aid on the ground, e.g., Army, Red Cross, missionaries, etc., does not operate on the same scale as it did in the area of the First Division; except in the Calabar area, for example, there is great shortage of doctors. We took note of the fact that the Nigerian Red Cross is beginning to operate in the Port Harcourt area. In the Calabar area the co-operation between the Army, the Red Cross and the National Rehabilitation Commission seemed excellent. If the numbers coming out of the bush increased, as appears to be the case, the Army, the civil administration and voluntary agencies could be overwhelmed. At the moment not many Ibos have come out of the bush, but already relief resources are overtaxed.

The military situation

5. There has been more fighting on this front than on any other, at any rate recently. The Divisional Commander's primary aim is to defeat his enemy, therefore everything else takes second place to this, his main object. This factor has had an effect on the civil population, the noise of fighting, heavy expediture of ammunition and the aggressive military tactics of the troops appear to have instilled more fear into the Ibo population than is the case on the northern front. The Ibos have therefore been slower to come out of the bush and slower still to return to their villages.

6. The troops are aware of the code of conduct and their military discipline appears good. Their officers are in firm control.

Rehabilitation and resettlement

7. At present there does not appear to be any overall policy for resettlement of inhabitants back in their villages, the matter being handled individually by Sector Commanders. The efficiency of this process varies with the personality and operational task of the individual Commander.

We believe that there should be an overall policy for resettlement laid down by the Divisional Commander in conjunction with the civilian administration. Unless people can get back to the villages and to their land a crop will be missed. This will further accentuate the food problem.

We suggest that the Commander considers declaring areas 10 miles or more behind the fighting line as white or clear of dissidents.

Villagers, after rehabilitation in displaced persons camps should be allowed to return to these areas and restart village life. The forward areas to be declared red and closed to all civilians on security grounds.

When feasible, control of the white areas should be handed over to the civilian administration and in particular to the civil police. This would constitute a visible sign that conditions are returning to normal apart from relieving the military of the responsibility which, due to intensive operational activity, they are finding hard to execute. We understand that such a policy is already under active consideration at divisional level.

Relations military/Ibos/Rivers people/minority tribes

S. Discussions indicate that the relationship between Rivers people, the minority tribes and the Ibos is at present strained. The Rivers people and minority tribes appear to have no love for the Ibo: it is reported that they settled many old scores when Federal troops moved in. In Port Harcourt some Ibo leaders are advising their people to stay in displaced persons camps until after the war is over. Their reason for doing so appears to be that if the war is not finished soon and the Federal Forces suffered any reverses. Ibos outside protection camps might be in danger. The Federal Government allows Ibos to remain in these camps if they wish to do so. In Port Harcourt they live as family units.

9. It is impossible for us to generalize as a result of isolated incidents. However, we did report to the Divisional Commander a case of a Regimental Sergeant Major maltreating an Ibo who had been picked up in the front line dressed in civilian clothes, a practice often followed by dissident soldiers before surrender. This practice is said to be the reason why Federal troops are suspicious of all Ibos of military age, however dressed. Despite this, as many of the Federal officers themselves pointed out, Nigeria has to live as one when the war is over and maltreatment of suspected persons is not going to make this task easier.

10. Ibos in displaced persons camps have a healthy respect for the troops but mutual contact appears to be gradually dispelling the fear that has undoubtedly existed. Due to the intensity of military operations contact between villages and the military is less than in the First Division area. And therefore the process of dispelling fear slower.

11. Prisoners of war and internees appear to be in good health; however there are points which should receive early attention by the military Commanders; for example, the prisoners do not appear to be given any constructive work to do, nor exercise. Accommodation is inadequate. They have little to read and some appear to have been kept in custody unnecessarily: internees and many Ibo displaced persons have no money and are therefore unable to buy anything to supplement the issue rations. We consider that prisoners, internees and displaced persons who are unable at present to earn their living should be given a small weekly allowance in addition to the initial payment most of them receive. It is also important that a record be kept of money and personal possessions taken from prisoners/internees, so that these can be returned to them when they are released from custody; as is customary the Red Cross should be invited to visit prisoners and internees. These points have been drawn to the attention of the Divisional Commanders.

Deliberate destruction of property

12. We saw evidence of destruction of property, particularly in villages along the route of advance Federal Forces. Most of this we assume is the result of the fighting and cannot be ascribed specifically to either side. We did see and hear evidence of looting: from the evidence we have heard we consider that the looting. has been carried out by the civilians and the military of both sides. Deliberate destruction of life

13. We neither saw nor heard any evidence of deliberate wholesale destruction of the Ibo people by the Federal troops. The basis for this statement includes private discussions with a number of educated Ibos who spoke good English. There is evidence that some of the civilians received fairly rough treatment from the troops of both sides and that there is some apprehension among a number of Ibo people now behind the Federal lines. Practically all Ibos testify to the fair treatment they received from officers but some assert that on a number of occasions they have been insulted by other ranks. We therefore consider that selection of Army personnel to look after prisoners, internees and displaced persons should be very carefully done. We did see seven bodies in Owerri Hospital. As these people had been dead for some time and were in an advanced state of decompositio, it is impossible for the Observers to draw any conclusions. Summary

14. In summary, in the areas of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division which the Observers visited we found—

(a) That we had unrestricted freedom of movement.

(b) Conduct of Federal troops. The conduct of Federal troops appears to vary between sectors as does their attitude to the civil population. The degree of positive action taken to obtain the confidence of the local Ibos depends at present on the attitude of the Sector Commander. The troops appear to be under the firm control of their officers.

(c) Conduct of the civilian inhabitants. The Rivers people and the minority tribes who are the main inhabitants of the areas visited are returning from the bush in increasing numbers and once out have no fear of Federal troops. Those Ibos who are now behind Federal lines are apprehensive and some prefer to stay in displaced persons camps where they feel safe rather than return to their homes before the war is over.

(d) Rehabilitation. We believe that a clear policy for allowing people to return to their villages in the rural areas should be put into effect. The policy of declaring red and white areas could be a solution.