As a British colony, Nigeria was ruled as a unitary state until 1946, when at Nigerian insistence a tri-regional Federal structure was created. Nigeria became independent in 1960 and continued as a Federal state. When the constitution was revised in 1963 a fourth region was added. (The Midwest Region.)

As the largest nation in Africa, Nigeria has a population of approximately 55 million people, according to mid-1968 estimates. There are three main ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani (Moslem) in the north, the Yorubas (Christian and pagan) in the west, and the Ibos (Christian) in the east. However, Nigeria is actually fractured into many groups: it has been estimated that there are more than 250 distinct languages in Nigeria, only 10 of which are spoken by groups of more than 350,000.

The north is the most populated region, with a population estimated at 29.8 million in 1963. At that time the other three regions combined

were estimated to have a population of 25 million. As of the time it proclaimed independence, the former Eastern Region (Biafra) had a population of approximately 13 million.

B. AFTER INDEPENDENCE IN 1960

During more than 5 years of civilian government following independence in 1960, Nigeria showed considerable promise of achieving its potential as a large and rich country with a stable, democratic form of government. However, the latent tribalism of the heterogeneous population, exacerbated by politicians for their own ends and aggravated by corruption among officials, turned even the census attempts in 1962 and 1963 into major political crises. Nigeria was a Federal republic with a parliamentary form of government.

Though the least modernized and economically advanced, the Northern Region, because of its large population, dominated the Federal Assembly. With political parties largely operating upon a regional tribal base, shifting coalitions of parties for the most part failed to prevent northern control of the Federal legislature.

By 1965 discontent was spreading throughout several segments of the country as citizens became more and more alienated from the corrupt political elite. In addition, easterners, as citizens of the most prosperous region, resented the control by northerners. Unrest particularly arose among Ibo (eastern) leadership in the army.

C. FIRST MILITARY COUP, JANUARY 1966

In January 1966 civilian rule was ended by a military coup led predominantly by Ibo officers. The military government under Gen. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi declared that Nigeria would become a unitary rather than Federal state.

The last crisis of the civilian government was the Western Region election on October 11, 1965. The results of this election, believed to be fraudulent, were not accepted by the people of the Western Region. After 3 months of widespread lawlessness and the breakdown of regional government, with the Federal Government unwilling to intervene, the coup took place, on January 15, 1966. The Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, along with the Premiers of the Western (S. L. Akintola) and Northern (Sir Ahmadu Bello) Regions, and most senior military officers were killed. The commanding officer of the army, General Ironsi, survived the attempt. The government of the country was turned over to him by the surviving members of the last civilian cabinet on January 16, 1966.

The Ironsi government attempted to reassert legality and to try to redress the damage that had been done to the national fabric, but the effort was too weak and too late. Ironsi, himself an Ibo, was not strong enough to punish the captured leaders of the coup attempt, who were held in high regard by the people, especially in the east and west. Northern elements inside and outside the military regarded Ironsi's government as an attempt at Ibo dominance and in July 1966 a countercoup deposed Ironsi and his followers.

D. SECOND MILITARY COUP, JULY 1966

This second coup attempt, on July 29, 1966, like the first, in January, did not succeed in its basic aims, but it did destroy the existing government. General Ironsi was killed and so was the military governor, Lt. Col. Francis A. Fajuyi, of the west. Hundreds of easterners in the military were killed in the coup attempt which was, however, mostly confined to Lagos and Ibadan. The capital cities of the north, midwest, and east were not involved. Amid great confusion, Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Yakubu Gowon was selected to succeed Ironsi on August 1, 1966, and he in turn appointed a new military governor in the west. The military governor of the north adhered to this new regime, and eventually so did the midwest military government. Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, however, military governor of the east, refused to recognize Gowon as head of state, citing the attacks against easterners which had marked the coup attempt.

An ad hoc constitutional conference was convened on September 12, 1966, in Lagos at which representatives of all regions were to decide on constitutional measures to reunite the country. However, within a week, large-scale disorders and persecution of easterners resident in the north further divided the country and sent hundreds of thousands of easterners fleeing to their region of origin. Eastern officials have since claimed that as many as 30,000 persons of eastern extraction were slaughtered in the north during this time. The study mission was informed by reliable sources in Kano that the figure of 10,000 might be more accurate. Whatever the figure, many with wounds and with stories of terror and death, alienated the eastern population to a significant degree and gave plausibility to the subsequent rationale for secession.

In January 1967 members of the new ruling group of regional military governors, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), met under the sponsorship of General Ankrah, leader of Ghana's national liberation committee government, at Aburi, Ghana. As a result of these discussions, the SMC concluded that: (1) force would be renounced as a method of arbitrating regional grievances, (2) faith in Nigeria as a national unit should be maintained, and (3) there was a need for increased regional autonomy although the precoup constitution (Federal) was still the best system of government. SMC Decree No. 8 on March 17 implemented the Aburi agreements by giving the regional military governors a veto power in some areas and thus decentralized Federal authority. However, it was too late, for by the end of March, eastern military governor Lt. Col. Odumagu Ojukwu had cut off all Federal revenues accruing in the east. Eastern unrest had been snowballing since May 1966. On May 26, 1967, General Yakubu Gowon declared that Nigeria's federation would be divided into 12 ethnically based states, abrogated Decree No. 8, and declared a state of emergency.

The old Northern Region would be divided into six states and the old Eastern Region would be divided into three. This plan, while claiming to be an attempt to improve the balance of power among the regions, failed to satisfy the eastern Ibos as the six northern states could still be expected to act in unison in the Federal Assembly. In addition the Ibo state would be cut off from the rich oil area and their vital Atlantic outlet, Port Harcourt.

E. BIAFRA SECEDED ON MAY 30, 1967, FROM THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION April and May 1967 witnessed a series of ploys and counterploys between the Federal authorities and the eastern government. A blockade of the east was established in early April, in reaction to eastern claims to tax revenues collected there on behalf of the National Government. On May 26 the Eastern House of Assembly voted to approve secession if the Ojukwu government should so decree. The Central Government responded the next day by announcing a national emergency, mobilizing the army and navy.

While several other factors must be considered, tribalism ranks among the most important elements in the Nigerian conflict. However, it is not traditional tribalism which has most influenced the present situation, but a new tribal consciousness which is the result of unequal modernization among the various tribal groups. The Ibos, large numbers of whom had migrated to the north because of population pressures in their own region, were certainly the most educated, most prosperous, and most modernized of the three major ethnic groups. Therefore, in proportion to their number in the total population they filled a disproportionate number of the top civil service, administrative, and management posts. This aroused a great deal of jealousy among the northerners who grew to fear Ibo domination. As early as 1953 there were riots in Kaduna and violence against the Ibo population in that northern capital. Thus as a result of their status the Ibos began to assume a rather arrogant attitude toward other groups. The Ibos' greater modernization created among them an attitude of increased tribal consciousness which came to outweigh their earlier national orientation and desire for assimilation. However, the Ibos remained ardent nationalists in the sense that their economic and educational advantages convinced them that they would play a major if not dominant role in Nigeria. Ibos rose to prominence throughout Nigeria because of their greater ability to carry out the tasks of modernizing the country.

The Eastern Government on May 30 declared itself the independent "Republic of Biafra." On July 6 the hostilities began. Advancing from the north, Nigerian troops soon captured the Nsukka and Ogoja areas in the northern portion of the former Eastern Region. An amphibious invasion of Bonny Island, near Port Harcourt, on July 25 sealed off Biafra from normal access to the sea and made the isolation of Biafra a significant factor in the strategy of both sides. The fighting since then has resulted in a steady tightening of the Federal encirclement of the Biafran enclave. A Biafran invasion of the midwest and part of the west in August 1967 had been thrown back by early October. Of the original 30,000 square miles, Biafran forces now hold some 7,000 square miles, accessible only by air.

Since November 1968 there has been a slowdown in offensive operations by both sides. No major towns have been captured, with the Federals and the Biafrans limiting their military operations to smallscale attacks and counterattacks. Federal casualties have decreased considerably during this period. Federal authorities are currently undergoing a manpower buildup and stockpiling ammunition and equipment for an all-out offensive. At the same time press reports contend that French military supplies have been sent to Biafra through Gabon. We had conversations with witnesses who had observed at

first hand one large delivery by air of military supplies from a French

source.

V. THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT

As the military side of the war has dragged on longer than anyone originally thought possible, there have been innumerable efforts to mediate the dispute and to find grounds for a compromise settlement. Within the context of the given situation it appears likely that the resolution of the conflict could emanate from three possible forms of settlement: (1) cessation of the conflict as a result of one side's military defeat; (2) mediation by a third force-the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), or the United Nations; or (3) the imposition of a solution by an outside power,

The third possibility, the imposition of a solution by an outside power, perhaps may be dismissed as the least probable and least desirable. As death from starvation in both the remaining Biafran territory and the new federally controlled areas continues the consciences of many Western nations cry out for an immediate end to the war. However, the attempt of any outside power to impose a solution upon Nigeria or Biafra would quickly raise cries of neocolonialism. Western nations also lack the powerful influence they had in the African Continent in the era before and immediately after independence. Even though spurred on by humanitarian impulses, the United States has maintained a policy of nonintervention in the crisis. Great Britain, which has attempted to use its influence upon Nigeria to bring about a negotiated settlement, is also not likely to take forceful unilateral action. Such an effort would be at variance with the policy set for Rhodesia, where Britain has already renounced the idea of the use of force.

Three major attempts to reach a negotiated settlement have failed, and there is an increasing possibility that an end to the civil war will come only through a military solution. Yet, military victory cannot necessarily be said to be the short road to peace. Biafra's original life expectancy was predicted to be only a matter of months. With each ensuing Federal military advance the Biafrans withdrew farther and farther into the Ibo heartland and seemed to be only postponing the inevitable. After 19 months of fighting, however, few now venture to guess how much longer the war will drag on.

Even though Biafran territory has now been reduced from its original 30,000 square miles and 13 million people to approximately 7,000 square miles and 6 million people, Federal military victory is not necessarily imminent. The Biafran forces appear to be fighting at a higher level of effectiveness than before. This is partially a result of the fact that their supply lines are now shorter and also because of the small arms supplies and ammunition which they are reported to have received from France. Furthermore, the back of Ibo resistance continues to remain unbroken as the Biafrans are convinced that they are fighting for their very survival. The fear of genocide is very strong among the Ibos, who claim, as indicated earlier, that 30,000 of their tribesmen were killed in the spring and fall disturbances in 1966. Thus, Ojukwu has contended that Biafran forces will continue their resistance through guerrilla warfare if they suffer conventional military defeat. Meanwhile Federal troops, in spite of their superior military equipment and numbers, have been slowed by problems arising