of India underwent at the hands of the English. The incident is curious as being, perhaps, the earliest serious attempt to establish relations between the Sultan, as supreme protector of Islam, and the Muhammadans of India; and these overtures are all the more remarkable from the fact that Tippoo was a Shia. The embassy got no farther than Basrah, for the Resident having expatiated on the folly of appealing to the Sultan, who was an ally of the British Government, told the envoys of Tippoo's death and of the capture of Seringapatam, and induced them to return to India in one of the Company's vessels.

Soliman Pasha, who at this time was Vali of Baghdad, occupied a very exceptional position. He ruled an immense tract of country, extending from Diarbekir on the Upper Tigris to the shores of the Persian Gulf, and was probably the most powerful official in the Ottoman dominions. He and his descendants managed to keep the government of the country in their own hands for nearly half a century; they issued firmans in their own names, corresponded with the English authorities in India, and sent envoys on their own account to Calcutta and Bombay. In 1807, when Turkey and England were at war, Ali Pasha refused to dismiss the British Residents at Baghdad and Basrah; and in 1808 he received Lieutenant-Colonel (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, who had been appointed "Envoy Extraordinary," on the part of the Governor-General of India, to the "King of Persia and the Pasha of Baghdad." This system of maintaining direct diplomatic relations with the Government of India subsisted for some years after the break up of Soliman Pasha's family. For as late as 1827, when Mahmud II. ordered the reform of the Turkish army, the Pasha of Baghdad applied to the Government of Bombay for British officers to instruct his new "regulars," and to assist him generally in organizing the defences of the province against an apprehended attack from Russia. At last, however, in consequence, it may be, of remonstrances from Constantinople, the Court of Directors were induced to remind the Government of India that the Pasha of Baghdad could not be regarded as an independent prince, that he was merely a temporary governor of a Turkish province, accountable for all his acts to the Sultan, whose sovereign rights must be respected, and at whose Court a British ambassador represented the British nation. From this date the control of the Porte over the affairs of Turkish Arabia entered a new phase. Hitherto the Pashas of Baghdad had indeed held office under a firman from Constantinople, but the individuals who really disposed of the destinies of the country were the Kurd chieftains of Central and South-East Kurdistan, and the sheikhs of the Montefik and other leading Arab tribes. A new Vali could scarcely hope to succeed in enforcing the Sultan's firman ordering the deposition of the Vali in possession unless he could reckon

upon Arab or Kurdish support. And inasmuch as Arab and Kurdish interests were usually ranged on opposite sides, a new succession was rarely settled without an appeal to arms. In one respect, its inaccessibility from Constantinople, Turkish Arabia resembled Egypt, and its remoteness from the centre of government necessarily impeded the consolidation of the Sultan's authority. But Turkish Arabia differed from Egypt in that the population, instead of being abject fellaheen destitute of leaders and incapable of resistance, consisted of independent and warlike Arab and Kurdish tribes, obedient to their Sheikhs and Beys and animated by a profound detestation of Ottoman rule. Hence it was that the Valis of Baghdad were unable to turn the weakness of the central authority to their own profit and achieve an independent position; they were not strong enough to deal with the Arab and Kurdish chieftains as Mehemet Ali dealt with the Mamelukes.

I question, however, whether except for English support the Sultan would ever have succeeded in establishing his authority in Turkish Arabia on anything like a firm basis, and for a time it was doubtful whether that support would be accorded. The competition between the Imperial Government and the GovernorGeneral of India for the supreme direction of Oriental politics which culminated in the dispatch of rival embassies to Persia existed also in Turkish Arabia. If the Government of India had prevailed, it is possible that the Pasha of Baghdad would either have become a second Khedive under Indian control, or have gradually drifted into a position like that of the Imam of Maskat or the Khan of Khelat. The orders, however, which prohibited the Government of India from maintaining direct diplomatic relations with the Pasha of Baghdad decided the question of local supremacy in the Sultan's favour. They were followed by Chesney's Euphrates expedition, undertaken by the British Government with the direct sanction of Sultan Mahmud II. And although the Arab Sheikhs to whom the Sultan's firmans were addressed were so little under the control of the Porte that Colonel Chesney concluded a treaty with one of the most powerful of them, the general effect of the expedition was to impress the people with the notion that behind the Sultan was a stronger power. And this idea was confirmed by the character which British policy in Turkish Arabia gradually assumed. In the Persian Gulf the Indian navy maintained the peace of the sea and protected Basrah from attack by the maritime Arabs. A British gunboat patrolled the Tigris and the Euphrates, and kept in check the lawless tribes of Lower Mesopotamia. A general support also was given to a series of measures undertaken by successive Valis of Baghdad against the principal local chieftains, with the object of breaking their power and of compelling a complete recognition of Imperial authority. And as war

between Persia and Turkey would have seriously impeded the progress of this work of consolidation, strenuous and successful efforts were made to keep the peace, often in imminent danger of being broken, between the two Muhammadan powers.

Prima facie it would be natural to regard a province like Turkish Arabia, in which the Muhammadan element dominates all others, as a pillar of strength upon which a Muhammadan sovereign might lean with the fullest confidence. There are, however, some considerations which appear to justify a different conclusion. In Turkish Arabia the Ottoman Turks are aliens, and Ottoman rule is odious to Arabs and Kurds not so much on account of its intrinsic defectsthough the people are far from indifferent to these as because it is the rule of a foreigner. The possession of a common faith is the sole bond of union between Arabs and Kurds and their Ottoman masters, but the cohesion which is the natural outcome of this tie has not penetrated far below the surface. The Kurds are mostly Sunnis, but the Arab tribes of Turkish Arabia are divided pretty equally into Sunnis and Shias, and the last of course utterly reject the Sultan's claim to the spiritual leadership of Islam. In Baghdad itself and its immediate vicinity Shias are in the majority. Their religious sympathies incline towards Persia, and are so little favourable to the Sultan that during the last Russian war the contingent of redifs enrolled among the Shias of Kerbela had to be collected at the point of the bayonet. Nor do the Sunni Kurds and the Sunni Arabs regard Ottoman supremacy from an identical point of view. Putting aside things which are mere accessories, the real foundation of the Sultan's title to the Khalifate is his ability to protect Islam. As long as his material resources are equal to this task, so long will the Kurds acknowledge him to be the spiritual head of all Muhammadans, and therefore entitled to their obedience. With the Arabs the case is different. All Sunni Arabs sympathize in their inmost hearts with the idea of an Arab Khalifate, and in their eyes the Sultan is at best a Turk who has usurped and who holds by superior force the spiritual authority which rightfully belongs to the Beni Koreish, and which must eventually revert to them. In other words, the Kurds obey the Sultan because as long as he is able to make good his position as an efficient protector of Islam they regard him, without question, as rightful Khalifa. The Arabs, on the other hand, acquiesce in the Sultan's Khalifate only because they are compelled by circumstances to acknowledge his authority as Padishah or Sovereign. The connection which subsists between the two things is so close and intimate that any diminution of the Sultan's material resources must necessarily impair his spiritual authority. The Kurds would regard such diminution as evidence of the Sultan's inability to protect Islam; the Arabs, as a sign that the Ottoman usurpation of

the Khalifate is approaching its end. What has been the actual course of events during the last six years, and what effect have they produced upon the minds of the inhabitants of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire? In Europe the Porte has been compelled to cede territory in the actual occupation of Muhammadans to fifthrate Christian Governments. In Asia, near their own homes, the Kurds have seen Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan pass under Russian dominion. Further, in the territory which remains to him, the Hedjaz and Yemen alone excepted, the Sultan has been constrained by the force majeure of the Christian Powers to set aside the precepts of the Koran and accord privileges to his Christian subjects which exalt them to a position of equality with the True Believers. As to the effect which these incidents have already produced, that is shown in the unsettled state of all parts of Arabia during the past few years, and in the proceedings of Sheikh Obeidullah in Kurdistan. As to the results which may ultimately follow, experience has shown the difficulty of attempting a forecast of the future of the Ottoman Empire. And, therefore, it is with great diffidence that I venture to indicate what may possibly happen in Turkish Arabia in the course, perhaps, of the next few years. On the north-east, and along the entire length of its eastern frontier, Turkish Arabia is flanked by two contiguous inimical Powers-Russia and Persia. Constantinople, on the other hand, is distant a month's journey from Baghdad, so that in the event of attack Turkish Arabia must depend upon its own resources for defence. These consist of a bankrupt exchequer; a corps d'armée of perhaps ten thousand men, whose pay is at least two years in arrear, and who are scattered in weak detachments over an immense tract of country; and a population more or less disaffected. Many people think that before long Russia will obtain an accession of territory in Armenia. If in the existing state of affairs Turkish Arabia is almost inaccessible from Constantinople, what will its position be when Russia holds Armenia, and Russian troops occupy Diarbekir? Under such circumstances the provinces which constitute the Pashalik of Baghdad could hardly remain for long in Turkish hands. Either some Arab sheikh will establish himself in Lower Mesopotamia, while the Kurds seize the country between Baghdad and Mosul; or Persia, supported by Russia, may advance from Kermanshah and Muhamerah and occupy Baghdad and Basrah. The fate of Turkish Arabia concerns England to some extent on account of the commercial interests involved, but chiefly for political reasons. British trade in these parts has increased enormously during the last ten or fifteen years, and if any serious attempt were made to develop the resources of the country, which is second only to Lower Egypt in potential fertility, still greater results would soon be

obtained. As to the political interests at stake there can be no doubt of their magnitude. It is not prudent for England to disregard the influence which a foreign Power, acting as protector of the holy cities of Kerbela and Nejef, would be able to exercise over Shia-Muhammadans. Every one knows the facilities which a gathering of pilgrims collected from all parts of the world offers for the dissemination of such political doctrines as may suit the exigencies of the time. But the matter of supreme importance is the fact that the Power which obtains possession of Lower Mesopotamia will command easy access to India by the Persian Gulf. The Tigris is navigable at all seasons of the year from Mosul, and in the spring floods from Diarbekir; the Euphrates, though in the marshes its channel is somewhat intricate, is navigable from Balis to Kornah, where the two rivers join. From Kornah to the sea there is water for vessels of a very considerable draught. The present condition of the Persian Gulf, regarded as one of the approaches to India, may be compared to that of the Red Sea before the Overland route had been established, or the Isthmus of Suez pierced by a canal, and before Aden and Perim had passed under British rule. For years past the attention of British statesmen has been engaged in watching, in the interests of our Indian empire, the development of Russian policy in Central Asia and Northern Persia, and in opposing the introduction of Russian influence into Afghanistan. And, in furtherance of the same interests, we have recently undertaken military operations in Egypt, and we are still engaged in organizing a stable and trustworthy government in that country. But our calculations in respect to the protection of the north-west frontier of India, and the safety of our communications by the Suez canal and the Red Sea, may be upset at short notice by the break up of the Ottoman empire in Asia, or a change of policy on the part of the Sultan. Suppose, for instance, Syria should pass into the hands of France in compensation for the loss of Egypt, Armenia into those of Russia, and Mesopotamia become a province either of Russia or of Persia, which is almost synonymous with Russia; or suppose the policy of the pro-Russian party in Turkey should prevail, and Russia acquire the same influence in Turkey as she has acquired in Persia, the interest of the political situation so far as India is concerned would soon be concentrated in the Persian Gulf and its approaches. At present, with the exception of an occasional French or Turkish gun-boat, no vessels of war other than English are seen in the Gulf, and British influence is paramount over all other. But this state of things will not last. for ever, and it may be well to take thought for the defence of the Persian Gulf, and to remember that, with the exception of Bassidor, in the island of Kishm, we do not possess a single coaling station, much less a strategical position anywhere in these waters.

TREVOR CHICHELE PLOWDEN.