words of the Korân, which declare that every nation shall be judged by God from its own book. "Whoso believeth in God and in the last day, and doeth that which is right, upon them shall no fear come, neither shall they be put to shame" (Sura v. 73). Such was the Prophet's judgment with regard to Jews, Christians, and Sabians— those, in fact, to whose sacred literature his own beliefs were so deeply indebted.

Yet in spite of the tolerance of the Korân, and the practice of the early Khalifs, it cannot be denied that fanatical feeling is strongest among the educated Moslem classes, although it may perhaps be doubted how far race hatred, and the sense of injury due to foreign oppression, may really account for a sullenness which is generally attributed to religious hate.

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As regards apocalyptic expectations, even among the educated in Islam there is a divergence of opinion perhaps equal to that which is found among ourselves; and among the lower classes the knowledge of the Sunna is far too imperfect and vague to allow of their being considered very deeply impressed with such convictions. The peasantry are as a rule indifferent to religious doctrine, and far more impressed with the mysterious power of the local saint, at whose shrine they worship with sacrifices and dances, votive offerings of lamps, and fruit, and blossoms, than concerned with the tremendous imagery of the Suras and the traditional literature of the faith. Syria I have heard the peasantry say openly that they had no hope of deliverance by any Mahdi, and if they are stirred by the news which comes from the Soûdan, it is rather because they are interested in an Arab revolt from Turkish tyranny than by reason of any very deep religious convictions as to the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Koran. The orthodox belief in a time of trouble which must precede the triumph of the Mahdi also offers a very convenient excuse for apathy even among the most pious. The appointed time will arrive, and the predestined fate of every soul will be accomplished, say these spiritless fatalists, without any action being necessary on the part of the faithful; and thus while they would flock to the standard of a victorious prophet when he approached sufficiently near, they are content to sit with folded hands so long as the power of the Christian West is evidently in the ascendant.

The danger of the Mahdi's triumph is thus political rather than purely religious, and it is the desperation which arises from the oppression of Arab races by the Turks that we have to fear rather than the fanatical zeal of united Islam. Arabia has long meditated revolt, Syria has long groaned under the rule of fierce Kurdish administrators, and in the army of the Mahdi they perceive a possible nucleus of resistance, by aid of which they may hope to shake off the hated yoke of Turkish authority.

If we may trust the latest news from Syria, it is not merely with the Mahdi that we may have to deal. Secret societies, acting in sympathy with the old party of 'Arâbi, directed, there is only too much reason to fear, by restless spirits who are not Arabs but Europeans (nay, we may even say Englishmen), are plotting in Damascus and elsewhere the ruin of Turkey and the establishment of an Arab khalifate.

It is in the ferment which may thus be created throughout the Levant that the real danger lies, and not in any deep hatred of Englishmen as Christians or of Western civilisation as opposed to Islam. It is against an outbreak of the mob on the established system of society, and against the only existing elements of law and order, that the politician has to guard in treating Oriental questions, no less than in guiding the course of Western government. The Mahdi in the Soudan has personally shown. himself tolerant towards Christian missionaries and captives, however brutal his wild Berbers may be in the hour of victory. As far as we are able yet to judge we may have to deal not with a blind fanatic, but with an able and calculating leader, whose warlike capabilities may be equalled by his political foresight. At present we know little, but when he has advanced nearer to civilisation his success will mainly depend on the strength and wisdom of his personal character. That he is the ally, if not the nominee, of the slave-traders there is every reason to believe; that he is favourably regarded by the Meccan religious leaders (who have a special interest in slave-trading) seems to be indicated by the reported refusal of the Sherîf to denounce the Soudâni as an impostor. It is not impossible that he may yet make his way to the holy city, and set Arabia and Syria in flames before trying his strength against the Assouan fortifications. True, he is not an Arab by birth, and he is of a black hue, which might be thought unacceptable by the Semitic Moslems; but such traditional considerations have very little weight in comparison with the prestige of his victory over an English general; and not only the favourite heroes of Arab legends (Antar, and Zir, and Jandabah), but even Moses himself, according to Moslem tradition, was as black as the Berber Mahdi.

It should also not be forgetten that the traditions relating to the Mahdi represent him sometimes as arising in some remote country and not in Arabia, but that in this case he is expected to march on Mecca, when the blood of Moslems will be shed like water in the streets of the holy city. There is thus a spiritual as well as a practical reason why the Soudâni prophet should attempt to reach Arabia, and the defence of Suakim becomes consequently of primary importance.

In General Gordon we possess a representative who understands

the nature of the movement as here indicated, and who knows the Arab and the negro alike. Gordon's success will be England's success; Gordon's failure (but General Gordon does not fail) would be a most serious blow to the prestige of England. All political parties are thus in agreement on this point, that, through thick and thin, General Gordon must be supported by England.

There remains, however, a class of Moslems for which no parallel can be found in the West, namely that of the Derwîsh orders, to one of which the Mahdi belongs. While 'Arâbi Pasha was lying entrenched at Tell-el-Kebir, the desert slopes around his camp were thronged with these holy men, and their prophecies decided on more than one occasion the movements of the Egyptian troops. The English army at Kassassin unwittingly owed its water-supply to the religious scruples of a respected Derwish from Upper Egypt, and Korân-readers were found among the prisoners who fell into our hands after the first engagements. The power of the great Derwish societies, and the widely spreading ramifications of their organisation, render them of the greatest importance on an occasion when, as in the present case, their members are instructed by an energetic and able chief. The agents who have spread the news of the Mahdi's success in Africa, in Arabia, and even as far as Euphrates, appear be members of the Derwîsh orders, and the victories of the Mahdi seem in part at least to have been due to the blind devotion of his Derwish ghâzîs.

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The Derwish orders are secret societies, with rules of initiation, oaths of obedience, mystic ceremonials and symbols, and all the paraphernalia of organisations which demand unhesitating obedience to the commands of an autocratic chief believed to act by divine inspiration. There are good reasons for supposing (though there is no time now to enter deeply into the question) that the higher grades of initiation gradually lead up to a scepticism such as is known to have distinguished the old Ismáileh sect in the early days of Islam, but the danger which arises from the action of the Derwish orders is all the more serious because the leaders of the societies are influenced by worldly considerations rather than by fanaticism, while they can count with certainty on the devotion of the numerous members of the lower grades whose zeal requires no stimulus beyond a simple order from the sheikh. The Mahdi is said to belong to the Kadriyeh order, which is highly venerated in Egypt, and which preserves many curious pagan superstitions, including the worship of the gigantic shoe of their founder. They are distinguished by white banners, and are said to carry fishing-nets in procession; and with the Málawîyeh and Ahmedîyeh they are among the most powerful of the Derwish orders in Egypt and in Syria as well.

Such are the forces arrayed in Africa and Arabia against the

de facto Khalif and against the Western world. It is not easy to calculate the strength of the movement or the limits of its activity, but in many respects the condition of the East is not unlike that which existed when Muhammad's victories became possible, and not unlike that of Southern Italy when Garibaldi dared to strike the blow which shattered the Neapolitan kingdom. Were England and France to hold their hand, and content themselves with action. limited strictly to the extent of their own interests, it is clearly within the range of probability that Turkey might soon find itself engaged in a desperate struggle with its Arab subjects, and the Sultan involved in a rebellion directed against his strongest claim to the Khalifate, which consists in the de facto argument that he has possession of the two sanctuaries of Mecca and Jerusalem.

The Sultan's claims are no doubt in other respects very weak. He is not of the Koreish tribe, and not even of Arab race; but the office of the Khalif or "successor" is founded on the old patriarchal system of Arab government, which seeks not a hereditary successor so much as a strong man, and which recognises the power of the sword, the guardianship of the two Harams, and the possession of the holy relics (the Prophet's cloak and the sword of Omar) as real claims in the pretension of the Sultan to the sacred office of Prince of the Faithful-claims equally strong with the somewhat doubtful nomination of Sultan Selîm by the last of the Abbaside family. It is remarkable that the Mahdi's denunciations seem to be directed against the Sultan and the Turks rather than against the English or the French, and it must not be forgotten that war with the Turks and the invasion of Mecca by a negro army are among the greater signs of the end which have already been enumerated. It is for this reason that it becomes as vitally important to the Sultan as to the Khedive himself that Suakim and other harbours on the western shores of the Red Sea should be most carefully guarded, to prevent the possibility of a sudden transfer of the centre of disturbance from the Soudan to the Hejâz.

The question of the effect which the Mahdi's victories may have on the minds of Indian Moslems is one which is considered of importance scarcely inferior to that of the line of conduct which it may compel us to pursue in Egypt; yet it is little more than a year since we were able to trust our Indian Moslem regiments to fight in our behalf against their co-religionists in Egypt in a war which had been publicly proclaimed as a jehâd against the infidel. It may perhaps be seen from what has been said above that the supposed religious sympathy of Moslems in different parts of the world, belonging to different races and various sects, and having conflicting interests and very different beliefs, is a sentiment of which the weakness has been proved by the failure of the Sultan's pan-Islamic schemes. The

Indian Moslems are of the Shafi or broad school, while the Turks are Hanifeh and the Egyptian peasantry Maleki; and not only does this sufficiently broad distinction exist, but the best authorities (as quoted by Barth and by Herklotz) agree that the Moslem faith in India is deeply tinged with Brahminical and Buddhist ideas, which render it distinct as a system from the Islam of the Levant. It has, in fact, more in common with the Shiah tradition than with any Sunni form of orthodoxy, and the irremediable schism between Persia and the Sunni sects is too well known to need more than a passing allusion. The Mahdi will not influence the Persian Moslems, and it is extremely doubtful whether his pretensions will excite any dangerous emotion among our Indian Moslems so long as he is known to be powerless against the strength of England in Egypt. The Indian Moslems, in short, like those of the Levant, are more keenly impressed with veneration for local deities (for such strangely composite figures, for instance, as Buddi ed Dîn) than with the apocalyptic expectations of the Korân literature. Their eyes are turned homewards rather than to the cradle of their faith, and although so large a proportion of the Mecca pilgrims are Indian, the Eastern Moslem is debarred by difference of language, of custom, and of race from any very intimate association with the pilgrims who come from Arab-speaking lands. The fellah in Egypt and the Moslem sowar in our Indian army meet as strangers, with sentiments respectively of fear and of contempt, and so do the various races who all profess Islam meet together at Mecca.

It must, however, be confessed that we are confronted by a dilemma due to the victories of the Mahdi in the Soudan which may prove more serious than even that of 1882. It is recognised by many writers that 'Arâbi carried with him the sympathy of the whole native population of Egypt, yet the triumph of 'Aràbi could not be calmly contemplated by any sober statesman. The elements of stability cannot be expected to be found in the government of Arab lands by a race which has so long been subject to foreign rule as to have lost the very tradition of power, and which fails to produce men of sufficient education and ability for the successful conduct of government. Thus, though the sentiment common among Englishmen in favour of native self-government and against foreign domination may incline us to view with favour the revolt of the Arab race against Turkish corruption and oppression, it must unfortunately be allowed by all who have studied the question on the spot that the elements of stability and order are to be found at present only on the other side, and that the attempt at self-emancipation must entail heavy responsibility on both England and France, if not on other nations.

If we are prepared to substitute for the foreign power of Turkey