which is, indeed, regularly made upon every expression of sincere opinion that an independent Conservative may have the audacity to offer. I shall be told that I am no true Tory but a Radical in disguise. Why? For no other reason than because I presume to avow my belief that the Lords will not be consulting their own interests or those of the Conservative party if they throw out the Reform Bill. That is my firm conviction, and for this reason. There can be no greater mistake than to speak of the measure for the extension of household franchise outside urban areas as synonymous with a project for emancipating the agricultural labourer. Its scope will be far wider. In Lancashire, as in many other counties, it is the artisans and skilled labourers rather than the tillers of the soil who will profit by the Bill. If the Conservatives, through the instrumentality of the Lords, withhold from this class of men the boon now offered, I say without hesitation that they will alienate from themselves those couches sociales whom it ought to be their first object to enlist on their side and who will be the backbone of the Conservative party of the future. Take the case of Preston. Here is a manufacturing town with a population of a hundred thousand, where the representation is entirely in the hands of the working classes, and where the Conservative succession to both seats is absolutely secure. Preston, to those who know it, and who know the county Palatine, is typical of Lancashire. Let Lord Salisbury and the official leaders of the Tory party rest assured that the Conservative working men of the North of England will not readily forgive them if in deference to the prepossessions and alarms of the House of Peers the principle of the Reform Bill is repudiated, or the measure is shipwrecked upon any one of the controversial clauses which it contains.

A MANCHESTER CONSERVATIVE.

HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I.-POLITICAL.

PARLIAMENT had no sooner reassembled after the Easter recess than the questions upon the Egyptian policy of ministers, their intentions in the Soudan, and their attitude towards General Gordon, were renewed. Ten days ago it became known that the Government was anxious to call together representatives of the Powers with a view of deciding upon a solution of the financial difficulties which now beset the kingdom of the Khedive. The proposal has been on the whole favourably received, but the interval which must elapse between the antecedent negotiations and to the actual opening of the conference may easily be exceeded by that which would elapse between its meeting and the unanimous arrival on the part of its members at any definite resolution. The preliminaries to be arranged are of the most difficult and complex character, and their complexity and difficulty are increased by the present temper of the French Government and of the French people. Without giving any credence to the ridiculous reports that have found their way into print as to the immediate peril involved in our relations with France, it cannot be denied that the state of these relations is one of tension. This remark holds good quite independently of Egypt. In every quarter of the globe England is brought into closer contact with France than with any other country. Of late, points of collision and controversy with her have increased and multiplied. The Madagascar business provided the materials of a casus belli which, in less rational times might have been turned by England to dangerous account. It would not have been difficult for Great Britain to pick a quarrel, had she been inclined to do so, with her nearest Continental neighbour, over the Tonquin question. With even greater ease might she bring affairs to an abrupt issue between herself and the French Republic on the west coast of Africa. Now while we may emphatically repudiate the idea that our relations towards France are not and will not remain friendly, there is nothing to be gained by concealing the circumstance that as France has the opportunity of displaying the angularities of her temperament towards us in many regions of the earth, so she has apparently the will. England is not the only European nation which may make an identical complaint. There can be but little of reciprocal cordialty at the present moment on the part of France and Spain. Morocco bristles with controversial questions that might easily light up the flames of war on both sides of the Pyrenees. Much may be pardoned to France, on the score of her exaggerated susceptibilities. She is painfully conscious of being placed in a false position before Europe,

and she illustrates this feeling in a manner that reminds us of Vivien as pictured by the Poet Laureate :

'But Vivien, deeming Merlin overborne

By instance, recommenced, and let her tongue
Rage like a fire among the noblest names,
Polluting, and imputing her whole self,

Defaming and defacing, till she left

Not even Lancelot brave nor Galahad clean."

But while we do not anticipate any grave international trouble with France, she will have it in her power to interpose serious obstacles in the way of the meeting of a conference. The first question which the powers, taking part in this assembly, must settle amongst themselves is the limits within which the discussion is to be confined. Now the Eastern European powers, who regard our ascendancy in Egypt with perfect equanimity, will allow us what latitude in this respect we desire. It is only from France that we can meet with much objection. It is conceivable that the French Government might insist on a consideration of the feasibility of reviving the dual control as an essential condition of the conference. England could not, of course, entertain such a consideration for a moment, but it might take days and weeks to impress this impossibility upon France after the courteous fashion of diplomacy. Again, supposing the Conference was already holding its sittings, there is still the contingency to be reckoned with, either that the plenipotentiaries would be hopelessly dilatory with their work, or that they would be compelled to separate before they had done anything. This, it may be said, is a somewhat gloomy view of the future. It is, however, one that, seeing the wildly sanguine anticipations to which the idea of a conference has given rise, must not be wholly ignored.

The financial settlement of Egypt and the prospective conference are alike eclipsed in interest by the events now passing in and around Khartoum, by the position of General Gordon, and by the news which reaches us of the other imprisoned garrisons. It is of some importance exactly to understand the declarations of the Prime Minister on these matters in the House of Commons on Thursday last. We will not, in effect said Mr. Gladstone, undertake to protect the garrisons. On the other hand, as regards Gordon, we will take every reasonable means to secure him from injury or death. The precautions thus inferentially indicated by the Prime Minister do not, it may be assumed, include the summary despatch of an expedition like that which was sent fifteen years ago to Abyssinia. The Government profess to be satisfied that Gordon, as he himself is understood to say, is in no immediate danger. Short of despatching a British force for his relief-a purely Quixotic enterprise in the opinion of all experienced judges-they will give him every sort

of help, and what they are prepared to give the documents yet to be published must show. If this assistance proves unavailing, and Gordon continues to be shut up in Khartoum, a British force may be sent to his rescue later in the year. But between the possible despatch of this and the present moment much may happen. The whole aspect of affairs at Khartoum may be changed by disturbances within the city, and the garrison may make their own terms with the besiegers. Again, Gordon may resolve, seeing that there is nothing more which he can hope to do at Khartoum to penetrate to equatorial Africa, or when the Nile rises he may retrace his way to Cairo. Whatever he may elect to do, Mr. Gladstone has now explicitly said that the Government will not divest themselves of responsibility for his fate. As regards the garrisons at Berber and elsewhere, that is a different matter. All, indeed, which England can do for these Egyptian troops, up to a reasonable point, she is bound to undertake. That duty is imposed upon her by considerations of ordinary humanity. When, however, it is said that England is immediately answerable for the garrisons, it is well that we should look at the hard facts of the case. From what is sometimes alleged, it might be supposed that the English Ministers had planted Egyptian troops in the Soudan, and were now protesting that the circumstance of their having done so carried with it no sort of responsibility. But these garrisons were sent long before England had acquired any semblance of exclusive authority in Egypt proper. For years the Egyptian Government has been prosecuting its military enterprises in the Soudan. We may therefore reasonably inquire whether, in the ordinary course of things, the garrisons would not have been in a position at least as bad as they are now if we had never entered Egypt. By not sending an expedition to Berber or elsewhere we are doing no wrong to the Egyptian troops themselves or to the Egyptian Government. They are simply faring in the same way as they would have fared if Alexandria had never been bombarded and Tel-el-Kebir never won. It is asserted that we might have interposed to prevent the starting of Hicks Pasha's expedition. Hence, it is argued, that as we incurred a species of moral responsibility for that gallant soldier's fate, so we are incurring a similar responsibility in the case of the other Egyptian contingents, stationed at different points in the Soudan. The fact is entirely overlooked that the despatch of the latter was far anterior to the despatch of General Hicks. Even as regards General Hicks himself, it is more than doubtful whether we could have interfered to prevent his march into the interior. Apart from the circumstance that we had no European commission to control the foreign policy of the Egyptian Government, nothing is more certain than that by not allowing Hicks Pasha to proceed we should have exposed ourselves to the vehement con

demnation of the Egyptian Government. A profound conviction existed that he would succeed. There was no reason to suppose this faith rested upon insufficient evidence. Certainly the English Government would have been held at the time to have acted most unwarrantably if they had refused to allow Hicks to go.

Let us now pass on from the question of the garrisons in general to the mission and the position of Gordon in particular. His journey to Khartoum, so far as concerns the purpose for which it was originally stated to have been undertaken, can only be regarded as a failure. a failure. It was supposed that the extraordinary qualities with which he is endowed would enable him to exercise an almost supernatural power over the Mahdi and his men, that he would no sooner appear upon the scene than the magic of his incantation would compel the Arabs to drop their swords, and peace would follow. The Government are unquestionably to blame for having ever appeared to acquiesce in this view. But granting that the original despatch of Gordon was a mistake, how are the relations between the Government and himself to be described, or upon what theory is the part which he has played, since he was in Khartoum, to be accounted for? That General Gordon has at each turn pursued what he is honestly persuaded is the best and wisest course, none for an instant would doubt. Equally indubitable is it that his own line of action is not identical with that which the Ministers who originally enlisted his services contemplated. The mission on which he was despatched was understood to be purely pacific. He would, it was expected, announce to the inhabitants of the Soudan that he came amongst them to leave them alone and to obliterate, by the withdrawal of the garrisons, the last traces of Egyptian interference. He had himself personally protested in the strongest way on behalf of Soudanese autonomy. He had denounced the claims of the Egyptians to administer the country as iniquitous. He had praised the valorous resolution of the Arabs to defend the region they inhabited against aggressors. Yet what has actually occurred? Since General Gordon has been in Khartoum he has, intentionally or unintentionally, posed as the enemy of the Soudanese. He has spoken of them as rebels. How is language like this to be reconciled with the estimate of them which he first formulated? A few weeks ago Gordon described them as men striving to protect their country against foreign aggression. Why now, then, should he accuse them of rebellion?

Upon one assumption, and upon one only, can the seeming inconsistency between General Gordon's earlier professions and his subsequent actions be explained. He was emphatically a man with a mission. The end of that mission was to tranquilize the Soudan, but conquest he may have conceived when he arrived upon the scene of his labours was the antecedent of tranquility. To pacify the