The Concept of ControlScience Press, 1907 - 40 頁 |
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常見字詞
¹ Ibid absolute according action activity affirmation Anaxagoras argument assertion assumption attention basis candle ception certainty choice cognition conceived conception consciousness constitutes criticism defense of religious definite Democritus determined dualism elements Empedocles epistemological essence essential existence experience expression external fact factor feeling Fichte formulation foundation free belief freedom freely function ground Heraclitus Hume idea inasmuch individual intellect James James's doctrine James's theory judging justified Kant knowledge Leibniz logical matter means ment metaphysical method mind Monadology monads movement nature option Paulsen philosophy point of view possible postulates practical pragmatic present presupposition principle problem problematic judgment proposition psychology question rationality reality realization reason relation religious belief religious faith religious hypothesis Rickert scholasticism scientific sense Sigwart standpoint stoicism subjective subjectivism theoretical theory of judgment things thought tical tion true truth universe validity volitional voluntarism voluntaristic voluntary Weltanschauung Windelband
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第 18 頁 - There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where faith in a fact can help create the fact, that would be an insane logic which should say that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the "lowest kind of immorality" into which a thinking being can fall.
第 15 頁 - I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity.] For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this.
第 25 頁 - The essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,' is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind.
第 11 頁 - Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open...
第 10 頁 - Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, — what is it but a passionate affirmation of. desire, in which our social system backs us up?
第 1 頁 - This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out.
第 62 頁 - The essential thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and ' adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold true of that reality. Thus, names are just as "true" or "false" as definite mental pictures are.
第 21 頁 - The whole distinction of real and unreal, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus grounded on two mental facts— first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, a>e can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard...
第 62 頁 - We must find a theory that will work; and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis.
第 21 頁 - ... all propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions.