that, by our constitution, all foreign negotiations were trufted Will.III. intirely to the crown: That the king was under no obliga- 1700-1. " 66 tion emperor (whofe claim was for "himfelf and his lineal defcen"dants) or to France, muft unquestionably have formed a power extremely terrible to "the rest of Europe. It was "therefore neceffary to think of dividing the fucceffion, or 66 turning it out of the direct "line, for the common fecu"rity of Christendom. Princes are bound to provide for the "fafety of their fubjects, by all reafonable ways: If the most eligible cannot be arrived at, "they must purfue fuch me"thods as are practicable. It "was vifible, the French king "was refolved not to acquiefce "in the renunciations: his flat"terers had abfolutely hardened "him in the opinion, that all "ders fhould have the whole, 66 thofe folemn acts were infig"nificant; and, to make good thefe fentiments, he had not "only employed his lawyers, "but his arms, in the difpute, "for many years. This the Will.III. tion by law to communicate fuch fecrets to his council, or 1700-1. to hear, much lefs was he obliged to follow their advice. In << ces. par "time, which neceffarily made" ly be at least inconvenient to "the parties contracting, but danger the trade and safety "of the English and the Dutch? " Upon the foot of this treaty, "the king and the States ac quired an explicit and direct right to compel the French "king to acquiefce in the share "allotted to him, which perhaps For was wanting before. though Spain, in respect of "the feveral renunciations and "folemn acts, had an exprefs right to oppose the future pretences of France to any part "of that fucceffion, yet it was not plain, that by renewing "his claim, he violated any "league with England and "Holland, which would be the "cafe after his entering into "that treaty. There is another very confiderable thing to juf"tify this treaty, if it be true, "as it has been affirmed, that during the tranfactions in Hol"land in the fummer 1699, the "emperor's minifters, though they declared they could not "make themselves parties to an "agreement for dismembering "the Spanish monarchy, which "would wholly ruin their af"fairs at Madrid, yet they did 66 not express any great averfion "to be feemingly forced to fome "reasonable terms. It has not "often been known, that a de"liberate particular it was faid, that the keeper of the great feal had no Will.IIL. fort of authority, to deny the putting it, either to powers for 1700-1. 66 66 liberate act of three fovereign 66 powers, made upon very weighty grounds, has been fo frankly called, Únjuft. The emperor has not found caufe "to give it that hard name; "nay, the French themfelves, "who have violated this treaty "in the most open and fhame"less manner, and want to the highest degree an excuse for "breach of faith, and had a good one, if the treaty was unjuft, yet they have never "called it by that name, but "have contented themfelves to "take up the wretched pre"tence, that by breaking the "league, they have pursued the fpirit and meaning of it." The author then proceeds to juftify the wisdom of the treaty, and to fhew, that it was the only means left to prevent the impending deftruction of Europe; and that, in the making of it, the intereft of the house of Auftria was fincerely efpoufed, and a follicitous care uled, that the balance of Europe fhould not be intirely broken, and at the fame time England and Holland did not neglect themselves, but made fuch a diftribution as might be leaft prejudicial to their interest. "The three things, fays he, "which they were principally 66 obliged to take care of, were "their fecurity, their trade, and "the common intereft of the "Proteftant religion. In order "to this, they were firft to take "care of the barrier in Flan"ders, for making good where"of fo much money had been withstanding the vain dif"courfes we heard not long be"fore) England was not likely "to be free any great while. "The fecond thing, which "concerned both nations high"ly, was the preferving the "trade of Spain, and the use of "her ports. "The third thing, which "concerned England, and the "Dutch not a little, was to 66 keep the Weft-Indies, and "the trade thither, in the con"dition they then flood. For "it will not be denied, if ever "France can appropriate to it"felf the trade of Spain, and the management of the Spa"nith Weft Indies, the will "foon be miftrefs of the world. "Thefe were the things to "be first looked after, and for thefe the treaty did fully pro"vide. It is not to be denied "but that the Turkey trade was "of great confequence to both "nations, and the trade of "Italy not inconfiderable, efpe"cially, to Holland; and it "were to be wished, that every "thing could have been intirely gained: But, when that was "impoffible, the most weight was to be laid on what was "of the greatest confequence." Will.III. a treaty, or to any treaty, which the king should agree to, 1700-1. That the law gives no direction in fuch matters, and he could not hardly confider him as a com66 mon father, who could be "made and unmade at the pleasure of France. Without pretending to prophecy, one may fay literally, that "heaven and earth would have "been moved upon this occa"fion. The church would "have drawn out all her forces fpiritual and temporal; and, befides the influence she would "always have upon the Italian princes and ftates, which is avowedly not little, they themselves are quick-fighted -The treaty of parti"tion, if it had been stood to, "had placed Spain, the Weft"Indies, the Netherlands, and "Milan in fuch hands, as "France could expect no fin"cere affiftance from. What "real addition of power Naples "and Sicily would have brought "to her, is not fo plain. "France is a compleat united ftrength. Whether fhe would" "have been ftronger by the "poffeffion of two remote coun"tries, whofe natives have the "utmost hatred to the French," "experience only would have" enough to fee, what different "fhewn. Italy would have been "figures the princes of France "alarmed to the laft degree, "make in this age from what "to find the French taking "they made heretofore, and to "poffeffion of fo large a part of "learn caution from fo fignifi"it, which it could not be pof"fible to prevent, confidering "the power and preparations " of France. But this would "not have been the first time, "that the French had got to "be mafters of Naples and Si cily, and yet were not able to hold them. Certain it is, "the Court of Rome would "have found itfelf obliged to "fet all its engines on work to "prevent the establishing of that flavery, which was inevita"bly coming upon them. They "would be difcerning enough "to fee, that from that hour the "French king became peace 66 ably fettled in the poffeffion of "Naples and Sicily, the pope 46 muit fink in his character, "and would be no more than "a French bishop. The reft "of the Catholic world would 66 cant examples. Befides the "pope's remonftrances would "have had the more authority not refuse to put the great feal to any thing, for which he Will.III. had an order from the king, unless the matter was contrary 1700-1. to law, which had made no provifion in this cafe. They infifted moft on the other fide upon the concluding a treaty of this importance, without communicating it first to the privycouncil. During this debate, fome lords having spoke very reflectingly on the French king, the earl of Rochester animadverted upon them, alledging, that all men ought to speak respectfully of crowned heads; and that this duty was more parti "where upon all accounts we ought to wish it, and not "only as being the most remote "from us. The apprehenfion "of a Catholic league, which " is no chimera, and which it "is to be too justly feared may "be the immediate confequence "of a fettled peace among the eafily, which way the arch"duke's wishes would go. The "duke of Lorrain's affection to "the house of Austria is fo well known, that it is certain the "French could have depended "on nothing from Milan in his "hands. And though the late "chancellor in his letter faid, That, if the treaty fhould." Popish powers, when the zeal "take place, and Milan could "of the emperor, as well as of "the French king, is confi«dered, would have been far " removed. In fuch a state of "things we could apprehend 66 not be relieved by fea, it "would be of little fignification "in the hand of any prince.' we fee he was mistaken, and "that very powerful reliefs 56 might be fent by land to Mi"lan, and the emperor and 66 nothing to our trade, not even in the Mediterranean. "All parties would have found "it reasonable to be courting the great naval powers of the "world. We might be neuter, "if we thought fit, or might "have made our own terms. "We were not bound to take empire might always have an open way into Italy through" "that country. The king of "France would have been cau"tious to have left his frontier "naked towards Flanders, when "in poffeffion of a prince of the "houfe of Auftria, or to have left the Rhine unguarded, "when the pope would be fure "to have a prevailing power "with the ecclefiaftical electors, "and the other Catholic princes "of the empire. This would "have been the highest fecu rity to the Proteftant interest, "for which certainly we were "above all other things con"cerned. Italy would have "been the fcene of the war, any other share in the war "than we pleased; for, though "we ftood obliged to fee the treaty executed, yet in the "utmoft ftrictnefs that was all. "We were not bound to main"tain the refpective parties in poffeffion: We might have "enjoyed the advantages of 66 peace, or we might have "otherwife found our advantages in return for our affiftance, in cafe we chofe to give it to either fide." 66 66 (b) |