country.

paid punctually every quarter? That, this question being utterly unfeasonable, it is neceffary to form another; and let that be, Whether we are willing, by a pecuniary fubfidy, to merit the affiftance of the king of Sweden? To that I anfwer roundly, Let us but be affured on the part of his majefty, upon whose bare promise we will rely, more than on all the fecurities and engagements of others: I fay, let us only be affured, that by our money we fhall merit his help, and actually have it. After this, let us but know what you would have us to do, and we will make fuch efforts, that his majesty shall not repent of giving his royal word to affift us. But, Sir, (added he) What must we think, when, after a negotiation of three months or more, we are yet in uncertainty upon what ought to be the chief fpring of all our undertakings, and are to merit by our money, not the help we afk, but barely an answer, whether we fhall obtain it or not? How can we run

into expence, expofe our friends, and, in fhort, endanger our fortunes and lives, when perhaps his majesty's refufal may stop us fhort; fubject, among other things, to the fear of being betrayed by thofe, who, feeing the ill fuccefs of our projects, and that there is nothing to be hoped for more on our fide, may endeavour to make their fortune, by ftriking in with our enemies, and facrificing us?

We

Let us examine all this, and yourself will acknowledge, we fhould hazard too much in following thofe, who leave us in fuch uncertainty. But, on the other hand, what does the king of Sweden rifque? Is not our government his enemies in every refpect; and will it not affift them more this enfuing year? What can be faid against him, if, after the example of Scipio, he carries the war into their country, who have been defirous, and are ftill fo, to carry it into his? This diverfion will be fo much the greater, as it will be unexpected; and there is the more reafon to hope for fuccefs, because the whole country is difaffected. It is alfo probable, that half the army will be disbanded by the parliament of England; and it is certain great part of that army will defert on the approach of a fufficiant body of troops.

But fuppofe this enterprize fhould not fucceed, would this government be more bent upon the intire ruin of the king of Sweden than it was before? And, when king George's defire to have the country of Bremen is fatisfied, will our government be lefs follicitous by what means to prevent the czar's aggrandizing himfelf? Let me beg you (faid he) to reprefent all this to baron Gortz; and I am fure he will change his opinion: and that he will not let flip, by chaffering, an opportunity fo beneficial for the king

of

of Sweden, and fo glorious for himself. Tell him likewife, if you please, that there is no thing more proper than what he demands as to a fcheme; and the means of fupporting the af. fair. But he must give us the encouragement to fee, that we are not labouring in vain, and running all hazards without any fair profpect. One pofitive affurance given at Avignon will put all in motion; but, without that, all will flag. As to the colour, which the king of Sweden may put upon his enterprize, I fhall always have that opinion (faid he which baron Gortz himself would have me entertain of his scheme, namely, that the king of Sweden intends fincerely to reftore the chevalier, But I am much afraid, that the reft of my party will take this affair in quite another light; that is to fay, that they will imagine, his Swedish majefty, having not given any promife to our chevalier, nor declared for him, will make no other use of this enterprize, than only to compass his own defigns, exclufive of the chevalier, and to oblige king George to come to better terms. But in this he will find himself deceived; for, the greatest part of the nation being at prefent inflamed with Jacobitifm, and fet a longing for the return of him, whom they believe their lawful fovereign, they will not join any perfon, who does not declare openly for him; on the con.

When

trary, perceiving it is only a foreign quarrel, which draws the king of Sweden hither, vexed to fee their expectations fruftrated, and not knowing how far his majesty's refentments may go, and who will be expofed to his vengeance, or who be exempt from it, they will fall into the common humour of the nation, which is to unite all, notwithstanding their past feuds, against a foreign power.

This is fo true (continued he) that if the chevalier de St. George had not an English father, and been born in England, all his pretenfions would avail him nothing with the common people; who, when the conteft fhall be only between foreigner and foreigner, will certainly declare for him in poffeffion, without much regard to the juftice of the caufe.

For what remains (added he) I intirely agree, that the maintaining of the Church of England ought to be one topic in the king of Sweden's manifefto. This is the more neceffary, because it would ferve to fettle the minds of fuch as are disturbed about the chevalier's religion. His majefty likewife would act in his known character, which is to be, on all occafions, follicitous for the welfare of the Proteftant religion.

This Sir, is what was moft material in my converfation with my friend, who, I affure your excellency, is a man of folid judgment, and fo well in

2

formed

formed of what paffes at Avignon, that he told me a long time ago what was negotiated there on our part, though I took no notice of it, while I faw nothing particular about it, either in your excellency's letters, or in those of monfieur Sparre. He even told me, that a certain re lation of my lord Mar's was confident of doing us very good offices with the czar; and that it had been intimated to baron Sparre. But, being tender of intruding into the provinces of others, I reckoned your excellency would be better informed of this the direct way.'

In answer to this letter, baron Gortz wrote the following letter, dated at the Hague, December 11, 1716, to count Gyllenburg I have received your agreeable letter of the 4th inftant. I fhall have the honour to answer the contents of it, that, the stronger the reafons are, which are alledged to make us enter into the affair you know of, the more should people be perfuaded of the true defire, that we have to undertake the thing. It is fuperfluous to fuggeft motives to us, and we have no need of a fpur. As I run no rifque with you. Sir, I will freely tell you, that, even before my departure from Sweden, we were already, on our fide, difpofed to this expedition. It is eafy to believe, that thofe difpofitions are fince increafed, in proportion as the animofity of the court, where you are, hath continued incrcaling. There is

nestly,

therefore now no other question, but of the means to fatisfy our juft defire of revenge. We have in Sweden troops more than enough for that purpose; but what fufpends our entering upon action, is that,

First, We have not the ships neceffary as well for transporting the troops, as for the convoy itself.

Secondly, We do not know how it is propofed to maintain. the troops, when they shall be arrived at the place intended.

Thirdly, Horfes muft forthwith be found to mount the cavalry. It is well known, that, when one enters into an open country, the first impreffion muft be made by the cavalry.

Fourthly, We must know the number of troops, that is thought requifite for this expedition, in order to regulate thereby the armament of the fhips.

It is true, Sir, that, for several months laft paft, we have had fome preliminary negotiation upon thefe matters with the court of Avignon. They have declared themfelves very well fatisfied with the manner, in which we have spoken to them, and have promifed not only to give the neceffary explanations upon the advances of money propofed, but also to furnish inftantly wherewithal to prepare on our fide, during this winter, every thing that concerns the firft ftep; being themfelves of opinion, that, if any thing be intended to be done, it must be

entered

nourable.

entered upon immediately after the obftacles, which a hard winter might bring to navigation, are removed; but hitherto all this has ended only in vain hopes. However, I have not, on my part, loft any time for this enterprize. I have beftirred myself to find out men of war: I have actually found out fome, and have even made bargains for purchafing fix of between fixty and feventy guns, all armed and rigged; and they are to be delivered at Gottenburg in the beginning of the month of March. The advance of money, which I asked from the court of Avignon, was only defigned for the purchase of those fhips; and the fum did not exceed fixty thousand pounds. If I have propofed the expedient of furnishing us with this money upon the foot of a common loan, it was only done, Sir, with a view, the better to fecure thofe, that were concerned on both fides, from the danger of a discovery, and thofe, that fhould give the money, against the accidents, in cafe any fuch fhould be, that might render the defign impracticable. It is alfo the fear either of fome treachery or disappointment, which cannot be forefeen, that will hinder us from declaring before we come to the place, where we are to fhew ourselves.

Our friends will have nothing to object against this precaution, if they will but confider, that, if we throw off the mask too foon, and should afterwards mifs

our blow, we fhould give the English ministers a very good argument to carry the nation into a war against us, into which they would not have a great deal of trouble to draw Holland alfo.

This is a rifque of the last confequence; and would they have us run into it, Sir, for a trifle? I do not know how elfe to file the money-business in question.

The naval armament at Got

tenburg cannot be useful to us, unless for the defign, which they propofe to us; and the money we ask will not be sufficient even for that armament.

As to the reft, however just and folid I allow your friend's reafoning in other matters, yet I cannot reconcile the opinion, which your friend feems to have of the good faith of the king, and his intereft, with the fear, which is nevertheless fhewn, that we have no other end than to procure for ourselves the reftitution of the duchy of Bremen,

Pray, Sir, which way can the king of Sweden better secure to himself the recovery and poffeflion of his faid duchy, than by reducing king George to be nothing more than an elector of the empire? By which means the king of Sweden will make himself be courted by the house of Lunenburg, as in former times. Can good faith and a man's word be put in the scale against fo folid and fo evident a reafon, after we have expeE 3

rienced

Geo. I. faid,

rienced how little account ought to be made of a fecurity founded in words or in treaties? To be fhort, Sir, the question is with us an affair already decided; nothing remains but to confider the means.

As I understand the matter, those, that shall furnish the money, will be in no danger; they may give it under the name of Dutch merchants, and under pretext of the great gain, that is to be made in dealing with me. The better to colour the thing, they may even give commiffion to fome English merchants, to make an agreement with me upon the foot of the contract, which I have had the honour to communicate to you After this there would remain no other rifque than that of losing the money, in cafe the defign fhould not be executed; but, if they had the leaft confidence in the word of the king, this fcruple would vanish immediately. His majefty piques himself too much upon performing his engagements, to leave any room to mistrust him. We have fresh proofs of this; notwithftanding the vast expence, that we are obliged to bear, his majefty would have the pretenfions of Mr. Cook, and the other merchants in France, touching the money advanced to him in Turkey, fatisfied, and I have actually paid thofe creditors.

To conclude, I must tell you again, Sir, that they must come to a refolution speedily, or think no more of the affair for all the

next year.

con

It would alfo be neceffary, that thofe, who mean us well, fhould labour to get half the troops, that are now on foot in England, broken, and to hinder any naval armament till the month of May.

It concerns us also to know, for our direction, what number of regular troops will remain, after they fhall have got one half of them difbanded. I reckon, that we might employ from ten to twelve thousand Swedes in this expedition; amongst whom there fhould be four thousand horse.

When things fhall be put upon the foot abovementioned, I intend to go into Sweden myfelf, to push on the execution; for I do not like to rely on the care of others in fuch a particular. I had alfo rather concert this affair directly, and with you, than by the other way, which I think too long.

My lord's relation hath indeed fent word, that the czar has fome difpofitions to peace, which we will not fail to make advantage of, that we may be in a condition the better to push on the affair in queftion. The czar is to be here very fpeedily. If it could be ordered, that the faid relation of my lord Mar fhould speak to me, I fhould quickly perceive what might be done there. You will cafily judge, Sir, that an agreement with the czar would give great weight to the other affair.'

In anfwer to this letter, count Gyllenburg, on the 18th_of

De