plation, for the sending of the notices. We think the question must receive an affirmative answer. Competition, it has been said, is the life of trade. Every act done by a trader for the purpose of diverting trade from a rival, and attracting it to himself, is an act intentionally done, and, in so far as it is successful, to the injury of the rival in his business, since to that extent it lessens his gains and profits. To hold such an act wrongful and illegal would be to stifle competition. Trade should be free and unrestricted, and hence every trader is left to conduct his business in his own way, and cannot be held accountable to a rival who suffers a loss of profits by anything he may do, so long as the methods he employs are not of the class of which fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, coercion, obstruction, or molestation of the rival or his servants or workmen, and the procurement of violation of contractual relations, are instances."

Among the leading cases cited is Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. Div. 598.

DEED NATURE OF ESTATE. -RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE. In a deed under which the plaintiffs claim, the grantors, after stating a consideration of natural love and affection for a son, "released, transferred and conveyed unto him a freehold and good possession during his natural life, and his heirs and their assigns, we covenant to here transfer a fee simple right to them forever." The habendum clause provides that the grantee is to hold the lands "during the term of his natural life and a fee simple right to his heirs and their assigns forever." The court held that the grantee took a fee simple estate, Avery, J., stating that the rule as laid down in Anderson v. Logan, 105 N. C. 266, is, that if the word "heirs" appears in the deed in connection with the name of the grantee, or as qualifying the designation of the grantee as party of the second part, it may be transposed from any part of the instrument, in construing it, and made to serve the purpose of passing an estate in fee simple.

The Court furthur adds, "if this deed is inartistically drawn, that rule of Construction would serve the purpose, if

it were necessary, of bringing the word 'heirs' in juxtaposition to the name of the grantee." Tucker v. Williams. 23 S. E. 90, N. C.

EVIDENCE-HEARSAY.-DECLARATIONS TO PHYSICIAN.-In an action for personal injuries, it appeared that a year after the accident, when the plaintiff's condition had much improved, and while under the care of a competent physician, he called in another physician of great reputation as a medical expert, made certain statements as to his condition and symptons, and requested an opinion and physical examination. This expert was produced in the trial and his evidence was mainly relied on by the plaintiff to show the extent of his injuries, the sole question being the amount of damages.

The Court held "that these circumstances showed that the plaintiff called on the expert physician merely to qualify him to testify in his favor; that hence his statements to the latter were inadmissable.

There is no doubt, that if the plaintiff had been seeking medical aid at the time when he made the declarations to the doctor, the doctor's statements would have been proper evidence under a well settled exception to the hearsay rule.

There is, however, another well established exception which allows a medical expert to state his opinions based on a known or hypothetical state of facts; and it is for the jury to determine whether the case at bar is smiliar, and weigh the opinion accordingly. U. S. v. McGlue 1 Curtis 1.

This is what was practically done in the present case. The doctor's opinion was based on facts stated ex parte. which would amount to nothing more than mere hypothetical facts. These assumed facts were then attempted to be proved. If all these facts had been proved to the entire satisfaction of the jury, no one would doubt that the expert's opinion was properly admitted. If only the greater part of the facts had been proved, no one, probably, would doubt that it was the exclusive prerogative of the jury to determine how much weight should attach to the opinion under the circumstances.

This is very likely the view which the trial judge took of the situation, for in his charge to the jury, he said, "If, gentlemen, you are satisfied that Dr. Hamilton's opinion has been based upon perfectly true statements of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has proved these facts before you, you will give it full weight. If, on the contrary, you think those statements have not been fully proved before you, of course it will detract from the weight of Dr. Hamilton's opinion." Yet the Appellate Court, though it observes" that it is a matter of discretion whether the admission of such opinion should follow or precede proof of the supposed facts" counted the admission of the doctor's opinion an error and granted a new trial.

We are unable to discover the precise reasoning upon which the upper court founds its decision. We think, however, that there was an error, and that it consisted in allowing the doctor to say anything about the statements made to him by the plaintiff, for they were purely hearsay and came under no one of the exceptions. Yet if the attorneys for the plaintiff had gone about the matter in a different way. and assumed the facts for the moment, they would have had no difficulty in getting the doctor's opinion to the jury.

Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Roalefs, 70 Fed. Rep., 21.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.--CREDITORS' RIGHTS. In the case of Kennedy v. First National Bank, 15 Southern 396, (Ala.), the question of whether a conveyance by a debtor, of property including a homestead, in fraud of creditors, which conveyance was set aside, prevented the debtor from setting up the claim of homestead after the decree annulling the conveyance was entered. Two of the judges held that it did not, and that the debtor could afterward claim homestead exemption, because the decree setting aside the conveyance placed the debtor and creditors in the same position as if the conveyance had never been made.

One of the judges, in a strong dissenting opinion, held that by the conveyance the debtor gave up all his rights to homestead, and that the decree of the court setting aside the con

veyance was directed simply against the fraudulent grantee, and gave the creditors his rights in the land, and that the debtor did not reacquire the right of homestead with which he had parted to the grantee, because he could not have set up such right against his grantee.

The other two judges did not sit, as they were of counsel, so that a minority of the whole court decided the question.

The opinion of the dissenting judge seems the sounder. The creditors did not desire a decree against the debtor, but against the grantee who was wrongfully in possession of land which belonged to them. A decree by which the debtor gained any right in the land with which he had fraudulently parted was just what the creditors did not want. The conveyance was set aside only in favor of the creditors, and they should succeed to the title of the fraudulent grantee which was valid except as to them. As between the debtor and his grantee, no claim of homestead could be set up, as it had been expressly renounced in the deed. It does not seem that the debtor should be placed in any better position with reference to the land than he occupied before the decree of court setting aside the conveyance.

INJUNCTION. REMEDY OF PROPERTY OWNER.-The Appellate Court of the First District of Illinois has recently handed down an opinion in the Chicago Elevated Railroad injunction cases, dissolving the temporary injunctions granted the property owners by the Circuit Court and affirming decrees dismissing the bills filed by property owners for want of equity. The decision in substance holds: That street abutting property owners, or persons conducting business upon a street are not entitled to an injunction restraining the construction of an elevated railway upon such street even though there is no valid ordinance permitting its construction; that the fee of the streets being in the city, and it having the power to regulate and control their use, any misuse of a street is to be redressed or prevented by public authority, and the property owner must seek his remedy in damages at law.

It is unquestioned that where there is a valid ordinance, permitting a public work of this kind which furnishes additional facilities for travel or transportation, no injunction to restrain it will be granted at the suit of a property owner. (Moses v. The Railroad, 21 Ill. 515). In this case, however, the ordinance was admitted by the record to be void. The court cites Corcoran v. The Railroad, 149 Ill. 291, as authority for the proposition that, “If an ordinance permitting the laying of a railroad track in a street, subjects the street simply to an additional public use, it is well settled in this state that an injunction will not be granted at the suit of an abutting property owner to restrain such additional use "; but the proposition in that case was predicated upon the theory that the ordinance was valid, and its application to the case in question is doubtful; furthermore the only cases cited in support of the opinion were those of surface roads, and it is clear that an elevated structure being permanent in its character, obstructing the free passage of the owners of property adjoining and depriving them of light and air, stands on a somewhat different footing. The decision is not directly supported by any authority and is not free from doubt. We are inclined to the belief that the principle contended for in the majority opinion was carried to an extreme in this case, and that the abutting owner should have his remedy in equity by injunction. Judge Shepard dissented on the main question involved. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court and a decision is expected during the January term.

INSOLVENCY.-PROOF OF CLAIM.-The case of Levy v. The Chicago Nat. Bank, 158 Ill. 88, presents the question whether a creditor of one becoming insolvent, who holds security on which payments are made from time to time, is entitled to prove his claim and receive dividends on the amount due at the time of the assignment, or on the amount due when proof is made, or only on the amount unpaid at the time the dividend is declared.

The last view, while held in some jurisdictions, does not