failure of this first plunge into Central Asian politics. To this day the expression "Lost as Bekovitch" is synonymous in Russia for hopeless ruin. So disgusted was the great Tsar with this unexpected failure that when, in 1720, the Khan of Khiva sent an envoy to solicit pardon and a renewal of friendship, he was thrown into prison at St. Petersburg, and died there.1

Russia's next step in advance was the outcome of the mischievous activity of the Kirghiz, a race of Mongolian origin which roams over the steppes between the Volga and the Irtish, and north of the Turkoman desert and the Ala Tau Mountains.2 Peaceful colonisation was impossible while these restless neighbours retained their independence. Omsk and the middle course of the Irtish became Russian in 1716-1719; and for 1500 miles the Siberian frontier marched with that of tracts claimed as their own by these untamed nomads. In the reign of the Empress Anne disputes arose between the Kirghiz of the Middle and Little Hordes, who ranged over the western steppes, and their brethren of the Far East; and in 1732 the former offered submission to the empress in return for protection against their foes. Thus the Russians obtained a footing in immense tracts which were claimed by the Khānates of Khiva and Bokhārā, and a collision with their forces was rendered inevitable. The foundation of Orenburg marks a second stage in the Russian advance. It became a rendezvous for caravans between Russia and Central Asian cities,

1 Tradition has it that the Khan retaliated by tearing in pieces a letter, subsequently received from Peter, and giving it to his children to play with (Peter the Great, by Oscar Browning, p. 323).

2 The Kirghiz affirm that they were divided into three Hordes by an ancient chieftain named Alash. The Great Horde wander over Chinese and Russian Turkestan, near Lake Balkash; the Middle occupy the northern and eastern shores of the Sea of Aral; the Little Horde, now more numerous than the others combined, feed their flocks between the Tobol and the Aral Sea. An interesting account is given by Stumm of their manners and character. See Russia in Central Asia, pp. 227–34.

In 1803

and a basis for the expeditions which followed. the Tsar had received the allegiance of the tribes of the Mangishlāk peninsula, on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Ten years later Turkoman envoys asked help against Persia. It was refused, for Russia had her hands full with the Napoleonic wars, and a profound irritation was aroused among the savages.1 In 1822 an ordinance was issued bringing the Little Horde within the government of Orenburg, while the western Kirghiz were made subject to that of West Siberia. These attempts to annex territories with southern boundaries so ill-defined aroused intense suspicion throughout the Khānates, and it found a vent in raids on Russian caravans. One despatched to Bokhārā was robbed in 1829 of property to the value of 500,000 roubles by Kirghiz and Khivans. The Turkoman bands, still more to be dreaded, pillaged the Bokharan traders.

Friction followed between the Kirghiz of the west and Cossack settlers, who, in common with old-established policy, had been pushed forward to occupy strips of fertile soil on the southern frontier, and the unrest was increased by the levy of a tax on the nomads, which was fiercely resented by those who rendered a nominal allegiance to Khiva. Count Perofski, who governed Orenburg, endeavoured to cope with the disturbance by constructing a chain of forts on his southern boundary, beginning with one named Alexandrovsk, on the Mangishlāk peninsula. But the Kirghiz carried their incursions far into Russian Orenburg, and plundered caravans close to Alexandrovsk. In 1839 it became clear that neither forts nor flying expeditions of Cossacks could effect the pacification of so chaotic a frontier. In Khiva the nomads found support in their attacks on Russian caravans, and a market for the sale of their prisoners and booty.

1 Stumm, pp. 20, 21.

There, too, hundreds of Russian subjects were held in a state of abject slavery.1 The prestige as well as the peace of the empire was at stake. The Tsar Nicholas

was not a man to brook any infringement of either, and he decided that prompt and heavy punishment should be meted out for Khivan treachery. Perofski, the governor of Orenburg, was an agent fitted by nature and training for the accomplishment of the Tsar's designs. He equipped an army of 3 battalions of picked infantry, 2 regiments of Ural and 5 squadrons of Orenburg Cossacks, and 22 guns with a rocket train. Transport was effected by nearly 2000 horses and 10,000 camels, tended by 2000 Kirghiz, and the utmost care was lavished on every detail of the equipment.2 Perofski calculated on reaching his objective, a distance of 900 miles, in 50 marches, and never doubted of a triumph over the ill-trained forces of Khiva.

He had reckoned without a force which had again and again won the battle for Russia,3 and committed the fatal mistake of starting from his base at Orenburg in November, a month which brought his army to the centre of the Ust Urt at the most inclement season of the year. The sufferings of men and beasts in the ice-storms which swept over the desert in the winter of 1839 are paralleled only by those endured by Napoleon's legions during the retreat from Moscow. The expedition struggled on as far as Ak Bulak, about half-way to the Khivan frontier, and was there fain to retreat, leaving the bones of 1000

1 Meyendorf, Voyage d'Orenburg à Boukhara, p. 285.

2 For a detailed account of the Khivan expedition, see Hugo Stumm's Russia in Central Asia, chap. ii. p. 26.

It is well known that the Tsar Nicholas, on learning the disasters suffered by the allied forces during the terrible Crimean winter of 1854-55, complacently remarked that there were two generals who fought for RussiaGenerals January and February.

men and 8000 camels whitening the pitiless sands. Nothing daunted by his failure, Perofski set about the organisation of a second attempt on a far more elaborate scale, but it was rendered unnecessary by the submission. of the Khivans. The ruler, 'Alā Kulī Khān, was cowed by the persistence and the might of Russia, and in 1840 he despatched an embassy to Orenburg, accompanied by more than 400 released Slavs. Perofski accepted the olive-branch, and in 1842 a treaty of peace and alliance was concluded with the new ruler. The failure of the expedition of 1840 had shown the incurable defects of Orenburg as a base for operations in Central Asia. If the trackless steppes, the oases teeming with robbertribes, were to be dominated by Russian influence, some route must be chosen which possessed the advantage of water transport. The vast lake known as the Sea of Aral is connected with the heart of Asia by the Sir and the Amū Daryā, and is easier far to traverse than the steppes on either side. Batakoff explored it thoroughly in 1844, employing vessels brought in sections from Orenburg. Four years later a fort named Kazalinsk was erected at the mouth of the Sir Daryā, and, ere many months had elapsed, Russia was in possession of a chain of strongholds completely commanding the lower reaches of the great river. These precautionary measures raised an intense irritation in the breast of the Khan of Kokand, who claimed the whole course of the Sir Daryā as his own. His subjects were encouraged to invade Russian territory, compelling costly reprisals. In order to put a period to these aggressions, Perofski attacked the fortress of Ak Mechet, 280 miles from the embouchure of the Sir Daryā, and after an abortive attempt took it by storm in 1853. Thus the second. great highway of Central Asia fell under Russian control, and it was soon afterwards navigated by a steamer

constructed in Sweden, and brought in sections with incredible labour by way of Nijni Novogorod. The amazement excited in the nomads by the spectacle soon died away, and Perofski was besieged by the Kokandis in vain. The grip of Russia tightened. In 1854 an expedition penetrated the valley of the Ili, and a fort was built at Verni, between the lakes of Balkash and Issik Kul. But between this stronghold and Perofski there was a gap of more than 500 miles, which included the desert of Ak Kum, and through it the Kirghiz and Turkoman bands carried devastation far into Siberia. The Kokandis, too, were determined to break the net in the meshes of which they were struggling. Frequent attacks were made on Russian outposts, and the whole Siberian border was kept in a ferment.1 Russia resolved to strike a decisive blow at the recalcitrant Khānate, and to obtain possession of the northern portion, which gave a more defensible boundary, and was desirable by reason of its fertility. With this object in view, Staff Colonel Chernaieff marched southwards from the basin of the Ili on the fortress of 'Ali Ata, commanding the Kara Tau range, while Colonel Verefkin, starting from a base on the Sir Daryā, moved eastwards and captured Hazrat, another strong place which, under the name of Turkestan, stands sponsor to the whole province. The two columns then joined hands and stormed the citadel of Chimkent, nearly 300 miles south-east of the old frontier post at Perofski. This steady advance aroused the susceptibilities of the British public, which saw in the Russian invasion of the Mohammedan states on the Siberian frontier a foreshadowing of similar designs on India. In order to allay suspicion and enlighten the communities of the West as to the motives of the recent encroachments, Prince Gortschakoff issued

1 Stumm, p. 50.