a circular addressed to the Great Powers.1 It is a remarkable state paper, which enunciates the principles governing the Russian advance in a manner as convincing as it is accurate and logical. The prince pointed out the dilemma in which civilised states in contact with wandering tribes are placed. They find it impossible to live in unity with such neighbours, and must establish a system of control or see their frontier a prey to chronic disorder. But the tribes brought under the strong arm of law and order become, in their turn, victims of similar aggression on the part of more distant ones. Thus the process of subjugation must be repeated until the paramount Power comes into direct contact with one which affords reasonable guarantees that it can maintain order within its own territory. Prince Gortschakoff fondly hoped that this boundary, safeguarded by a long chain of strong places stretching over a fertile and well-watered country between the Sir Daryā and Lake Balkash, would secure two desiderata-supplies for Russian garrisons, and the vicinity of a state strong enough to be mistress at home and willing to unite in fostering that true civiliser, commerce. He had omitted, however, the consideration of factors which are at the root of all conquests, the fierce passions evoked by warfare, and the lust for fame and booty. Such are the motives that inspire successful generals to fresh exploits, and they burned in the breast of Staff Colonel Chernaieff, a man who, under happier auspices, might have been the Clive of Central Asia. Learning that a host of Kokandis was massed at Tashkent, the second city of the Khanate, eighty miles south of Chimkent, he determined to anticipate attack by adopting the only safe policy in dealing with Orientals. He advanced with every available man, and, on the 2nd October 1864, attacked Tashkent. The want of a 1 See Appendix.

breaching-train and scaling-ladders was an insuperable obstacle to success, and the Russians were fain to retire, baffled by the lofty ramparts of Tashkent. The effect of this disaster on the excitable Asiatic character was marked and instantaneous. A Kokandi force of 10,000 men, under the Khan in person, burned Chimkent, and attacked Turkestan far in its rear. They surprised a squadron of Cossacks during a halt near the fortress, but met with a reception which should have convinced them of the superiority of the Russian arms.1 The Khan was compelled to raise the siege of Turkestan and retreat on Tashkent. But this incident rendered it clear that no peace could be expected on the frontier while a town of 72,000 inhabitants, inspired by the fiercest fanaticism, remained unsubdued in the proximity of the outposts. General Chernaieff resolved to plant his country's flag on the fortifications of Tashkent; but his master, Tsar Alexander II., was a monarch who loved peace from a personal knowledge of war's horrors, and on learning of the failure of Chernaieff's first attempt he positively forbade a repetition. The general, however, postponed taking cognisance of His Majesty's orders till he had made a second onslaught on Tashkent. It was delivered by a column of 951 men with 10 pieces of artillery, and in spite of the vast disproportion in numbers the city was stormed with a loss of 125 men only. Then only did the daring commander peruse his master's despatches, and his reply was a characteristic one. "Sire," he wrote, "your Majesty's order forbidding me to take Tashkent

1 The Cossacks numbered only 104, under Sub-Lieutenant Saroff. They made a zariba of their horses' bodies, and, after repelling incessant attacks for two days, they cut a path through the dense masses of their foes, and joined a relief column from Turkestan. Only nine escaped unwounded, and the killed numbered fifty-seven. Such actions abound in modern Central Asian annals, and they are as glorious as any performed by our own brave troops in India (Ney, p. 213).

has reached me only in the city itself, which I have taken and place at your Majesty's feet." The Tsar was furious at the breach of discipline, but he did not refuse the fruits of his lieutenant's too daring enterprise. In 1865 Turkestan was constituted a frontier district, with Tashkent as its capital.

1 Ney, p. 214.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE WITH THE KHANATES

THUS was a third stage reached in Russia's advance. Her Siberian frontier extended from the north-eastern shore of the Caspian to the borders of China. It had been pushed forward to the edge of the plateau of Samarkand, then a province of Bokhārā, and lay within striking distance of the three Central Asian states which still maintained their independence. A sense of common danger united the forces which had hitherto been hostile: Kokandis, Bokhārans, and Khivans felt instinctively that the hour had come for a combined attempt to shake off the Russian incubus. A leader alone was required, and one was found in Sayyid Muzaffar ed-Din, Amir of Bokhārā. He claimed a descent from Tīmūr, and doubtless dreamed of repeating the conquests of his great predecessor on the throne of Samarkand. His ambition was fanned by the fierce breath of fanaticism, for the Amir was notoriously subject to priestly influence, and the mullas of Central Asia were among the bitterest foes of Russian designs. At his prompting the bazaars of the three Khanates swarmed with emissaries, who preached a Holy War, and exhorted true believers to drive back the invaders into the Siberian steppes. The Amir soon found himself at the head of a huge force drawn from his own subjects, while he obtained control over those of Kokand by assuming the guardian

ship of the minor Khān.1 Thus reinforced he occupied Khojend, a city on the north-east corner of Samarkand only a hundred miles from the new Russian capital, and summoned Chernaieff to release his conquests. At the same time he imprisoned four Russian envoys 2 sent him by the general. This act of war met with a prompt

response.

Chernaieff advanced from Tashkent with 14 companies of infantry, 6 squadrons of Cossacks, and 16 guns as far as Jizāk, a fortress barely 60 miles from Samarkand. But the population was hostile, supplies failed, and he was obliged to retreat on his capital. Retrograde movements in the face of Asiatic forces are always pregnant with disaster. General Chernaieff's was interpreted by the Bokhārans as a confession of weakness. Crowds flocked to the Amir's standard, and he moved on Tashkent with 40,000 men. In the meantime Chernaieff, who had not been forgiven for his breach of instructions in the occupation of Tashkent, was superseded by General Romanovski, who had received peremptory orders from the Tsar that hostilities with the Khanate must cease. Like his predecessor, he found himself compelled by force of circumstances to disobey orders.

The Bokhāran host was within three marches of Tash

1 Ney, En Asie Centrale, p. 214. Stumm asserts that the Bokhāran Amir made the exiled Khan named Khuda Yar his Bey, or governor of Kokand (The Russians in Central Asia, p. 57).

2 The chief was Colonel Von Struve, who afterwards attended Kauffman in a diplomatic capacity during his campaign against Khiva in 1873, and, at a later period of his career, was envoy of Japan. Among the other members was Colonel Glukhovsky, who was an ardent pioneer for Russia in these little-known tracts (see Schuyler's Turkestan, ii. 354, 386), and published an interesting account of his mission in the Paris Geographical Society's Bulletin for September 1868.

3 This illustrious soldier never regained imperial favour, and died almost unnoticed in August 1898.