crown of sorrow"; and the Tsar had no more obedient vassal than the man who had aspired to sit on the throne of Timur. His later policy has been adopted by his son, the present Amir 'Abd ul-Ahad. With the conquest of

Bokhārā and the annexation of Samarkand the fourth great stride in the Russian advance was completed. She was mistress of Central Asia, from the confines of China to the Amu Darya, that historic river which rises in the Pamirs to empty its waters into the Sea of Aral.

These immense accessions to an empire which already rivalled that of ancient Rome served but to open up a vista of future possibilities.

"Since the reign of Peter the Great," wrote a contemporary Russian author,1 "we have advanced with. diligence and at the price of immense sacrifices across the steppes which barred our passage. They are now left behind. Our dominion has reached the basin of two great rivers whose waters lave thickly peopled and fertile regions. We have a right to seek compensa

tion for sacrifices and labours endured for more than a century. We have a right to attain a secure frontier by pushing our colonies up to the summit of the Himalayan range, the natural barrier between the Russian and English possessions. When this point has been reached, then only can we look calmly on the development of Great Britain's empire." The reduction of Khiva was a corollary of that of Bokhārā. The Khānate stretched northwards as a wedge into the newly acquired territory and dominated the lower reaches of the Amu Daryā. Its ruler and its entire population were bitterly hostile to Russian designs. A Khivan contingent had fought side by side with the hosts of Samarkand during the recent campaigns, the result of which did not intimidate them.

In the year which followed the conquest of Samar1 Quoted by Ney, En Asie Centrale, p. 221,

kand, Khivan bands penetrated the steppes of the Orenburg government and urged the Russian Kirghiz to revolt. Caravan trade between Western Siberia was paralysed; and in 1870 the Khān had the presumption to forbid the export of grain.1 General Kauffman, now in supreme command in Turkestan, was compelled by his imperial master's explicit instructions to show a degree of forbearance which ill-suited his temper. He was content to demand the release of the Russians whom the Khan still held in slavery, and an explanation of the offensive tone adopted by his ministers in their despatches. As is invariably the case in dealing with Asiatics, the Russians found that moderation was mistaken for weakness. The Khan claimed the river Emba, on the northeastern shore of the Caspian, as the boundary of his dominions, and endeavoured to collect taxes from the tribes of the Ust Urt Desert, which had long been regarded as within the Russian sphere of influence. The Kirghiz steppes became unsafe for caravans, and postal communication between Tashkent and Orenburg was subject to continual interruptions. It was well known that the mullas had incited the Khan to proclaim a religious war, and that his forces were swollen by refugees from Bokhārā. The limits of forbearance had been reached, and the most timid adviser of the Tsar admitted that Khiva must be reduced to impotence. The story of the fall of the rebellious Khānate has been told often, and so graphically that it is needless to relate it in any detail. The Russians had by this time amassed great experience in the physical conditions to be encountered, and had profited by the lessons taught by former disasters. Depôts for provisions were formed at

1 Hugo Stumm, Russia in Central Asia, p. 104.

The best account is one compiled by the Russian staff,-The Khivan Campaign, St. Petersburg, 1873.

each halting-place, and columns started severally from the eastern corner of the Caspian, Orenburg, Perovski on the Sir Darya, and Tashkent. So carefully had the minutest detail been worked out by the Russian staff that the several divisions, after marching for nearly 900 miles through waterless deserts, reached Khiva almost simultaneously. The Khan was unable to cope with a disciplined army 14,000 strong. His capital was taken by storm, and on the 24th of March 1873 he signed a treaty of peace, acknowledging himself to be the humble vassal of Russia, and agreeing to pay an indemnity of 2,500,000 roubles, and to surrender all Russian and Persian slaves. This pact has been loyally observed on both sides. The Khan still retains a nominal sovereignty with even less independence than had been accorded to Bokhārā, and Khiva is de facto as much a part and parcel of Russia as the government of Moscow.

Kokand, the third Khanate of Central Asia, was doomed to lose all semblance of freedom. Its ruler had accepted the inevitable on the defeat of his powerful neighbours, had abolished slavery, and had striven to maintain friendly relations with Russia. But his territories were so placed that the annexation was essential to the safety of the eastern borders. They intervened between Turkestan and China, and were inhabited by a fanatical population with a strong leaven of untamed Kirghiz and Kipchāk nomads. Had Kokand possessed a firm and politic ruler, its absorption might have been indefinitely postponed. The reverse was the case; for the Khan, Khudā Yar, was detested by his subjects, and rebellions frequently recurred which kept the whole of Central Asia in a ferment.1 A climax was reached in 1875, when, after

1 Schuyler, who visited the capital just before the annexation, mentions that 500 prisoners taken in one of these emeutes had their throats cut in the bazaar, which literally streamed with blood (Turkestan, ii. 16).