Economic Behavior and Legal Institutions: An Introductory SurveyWorld Scientific, 2003 - 415 頁 Markets would not function unless supported by a legal framework. That framework is no self-contained, exogenous structure; it has evolved in response to the demands of economic activity. There are laws made to modify or supplement market behavior, in an attempt to produce the desired outcomes. Such laws are often called forth by political ambitions to change the distribution of wealth, channeled through the political process.Thus economic life and law are strongly interrelated. There is neither a pure economic system unaffected by law, nor a legal system possible to understand without regard for its interplay with economic behavior. Still, such a compartmentalization has dominated the perspectives of both economics and legal studies.This invaluable book presents a unified picture of the full economic-legal system, based on results within the novel fields of ?new institutional economics? and ?law and economics?. It is carefully argued, and written in a non-technical style, albeit with no attempts to avoid ?deep? theory. It is primarily aimed at students of economics just beyond their introductory course and students of law in the middle or towards the end of their studies. It can also be of great use to both economists on a more advanced level and lawyers, looking for a thought-provoking survey of an exciting new sphere of ideas. |
內容
PREFACE | 1 |
1 | 9 |
1 | 15 |
6 | 21 |
8 | 29 |
POLITICALLYBASED VERSUS JUDGEMADE | 35 |
EFFICIENCY | 47 |
TWO BASIC PROPOSITIONS | 61 |
DAMAGES OR PUNISHMENT? | 191 |
THE SIMPLEST CASE | 217 |
JOINT RESPONSIBILITY | 237 |
INTENT STRICT LIABILITY INSURANCE | 247 |
THE STRINGENCY OF SANCTIONS | 261 |
THE BEHAVIOR OF DISPUTANT PARTIES | 275 |
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS | 291 |
OF FIRMS | 313 |
TWO MAJOR THEOREMS ON PROPERTY RIGHTS | 71 |
COORDINATION AND CONSTITUTIONS | 85 |
4 | 95 |
MARKETS AND FIRMS | 105 |
POLITICAL PROCESSES | 133 |
FORMALIZED PROPERTY RIGHTS | 151 |
INJUNCTIONS | 185 |
LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT | 341 |
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS | 371 |
A NOTE ON EXTERNALITY | 379 |
389 | |
55 | 404 |
411 | |
常見字詞
acting person activities agreement amount analysis apply arrangements assets basic behavior breach of contract bundle bundle of rights buyers called Chapter claims Coase Theorem compensation corporation costs of organizing court decisions delineation discussed efficiency efficiency-promoting employees example expected wealth extent external firm formalized Hand's Rule harm or loss harm-doer hence holder hypothesis important incentives incurred individuals interaction costs Journal of Legal judge-made law kin selection kind land legal person legal rules Legal Studies legal system legislation liability rules mainly major market contracts moral hazard negligence obviously organizing interaction Pareto improving particular parties pay damages political processes politically-based law possibility potential victim principle probably problem production property rights property rule punishment reason reciprocal altruism regulatory takings rent seeking residual loss restrictions on rights rights of transfer risk sanctions Section sellers shareholders social contract solution someone statutory law strict liability structure substantial tend theory tort transaction costs usually wealth-increasing