ment charging the defendant with having forged and counterfeited the instrument itself. As, for instance, where the indictment charged the defendant with having made, forged, and counterfeited a bill of exchange, the judges held that evidence of his having altered the bill, which was originally for 10%, so as to make it appear to be a bill for 50%, supported the indictment; even although the statute, on which the indictment was framed, contained the word "alter," as well as the word "forge." R. v. Teague, 2 East, P. C. 979. It is more usual, however, and perhaps more prudent, at least in one set of counts, to charge it as an alteration merely, and to allege the alteration specially. But there is no doubt that any, the slightest alteration, of a genuine instrument, in a material part, whereby a new operation is given to it, is a forgery; as, for instance, making a lease of the manor of Dale, appear to be a lease of the manor of Sale, by changing the D. to S.; 1 Hawk. c. 70. s. 2; making a bill of exchange for 81., appears to be for 80%., by adding a cyper to the 8; R. v. Elsworth, 2 East, P. C. 986, 988; even altering the notes of a country banker, as to the place at which they were made payable in London, has been holden to be forgery. R. v. Treble, 2 Taunt. 328.

But where the forgery is of a mere addition to the instrument, and which has not the effect of altering it, but is merely collateral to it, as, for instance, a forged acceptance or indorsement to a genuine bill of exchange: proof of the forgery of the addition, will not support an indictment charging the forgery of the entire instrument; the forgery of such addition must be specially alleged, and must be proved as laid. Forging the signature of the drawer to a bill of exchange, however, is the same precisely as forging the entire bill, and may be laid as such. Where an illiterate woman of the name of Dunn, represented herself to the prosecutor as the widow of a deceased seaman of the name of Wallace, and obtained from him a loan of money upon her promissory note; the note was written by the prosecutor, and upon his asking her what name he should put to it, she answered, Mary Wallace; he thereupon subscribed the name "Mary Wallace" to the note; and she affixed her mark in the usual place, between the christian and surname : the judges held this to be a forgery of the note. R. v. Dunn, 1 Leach, 57. And whether the name forged be that of a merely fictitious person, who never existed, or a person actually existing, is wholly immaterial; it is as much a forgery in the one case as in the other. R. v. Lewis, Fost. 116. R. v. Wilks, 2 East, P. C. 958. R. v. Bolland, Ibid. R. v. Lockett, 1 Leach, 94. R. v. Parkes et al. 2 Leach, 775, 2 East, P. C. 963. R. v. Froud, 1 Brod. and Bing. 300. R. v. Sheppard, 1 Leach, 226. R. v. Whiley, 2 Russel, 1437. R. v. Francis, Id. 1439.

Even where a man, upon obtaining discount of a bill, indorsed it in a fictitious name, when he might have obtained the money as readily by indorsing it in his own name, it was holden a forgery. R. v. Taft, 1 Leach, 172: and sce R. v. Taylor, 1 Leach, 214. But if a man who has been long known by a fictitious name, draw a bill in that name, it will not be a forgery. See R. v. Aickles, 2 East, P. C. 968. Or if a man pass himself off as the indorser of a bill, when in fact he is not so, but the indorsement is genuine : this cannot be deemed forgery, even although it be done for purposes of fraud, and in concert with the real indorser. R. v. Hevey, 1 Leach, 229. But if a bill payable to J. S. or order, get into the hands of another person of the same name, and he indorse it, it will be forgery. Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28.

That the signature or other part of the instrument alleged to be forged, is not of the handwriting of the party, may be proved by any person acquainted with his handwriting, either by having seen him write, or by being in the habit of corresponding with him. Ante, p. 91. We have seen (ante, p. 96.) that the party himself whose name is forged, cannot be a witness to prove the forgery, except in a few cases which are deemed exceptions to the general rule. But even in those cases in which he may be a witness, the forgery may notwithstanding be proved by other witnesses who are acquainted with his handwriting, without calling him as a witness; his testimony as to the fact of forgery, is not deemed the best evidence, and that of other persons merely secondary. R. v. Hughes, 2 East, P. C. 1002. R. v. M'Guire, Ibid. Evidence must also be given of the identity of the party whose handwriting is alleged to be forged; that is, it must be proved, expressly or from circumstances, that the alleged forgery was intended to represent the handwriting of the person, whose handwriting it is proved not to be; or that it was attempted to be uttered as the handwriting of a person who never existed. See ante, p. 191. and see R. v. Sponsonby, 2 East, P. C. 996, 997. R. v. Downs, 2 East, P. C. 997.

Which said false, &c.is as follows, &c.] The instrument given in evidence, must correspond exactly with that set out in the indictment; the slightest variance will be fatal. Ante, p. 64. A mere literal variance, however, (that is, where the omission or addition of a letter does not alter or change a word so as to make it another word, 2 Salk. 661. Cowp. 229), will not be material; as, for instance, "received" for "reiceved," R. v. Hart, 1 Leach, 145, 2 East, P. C. 977, "undertood" for "understood," R. v. Beach, Cop. 229, or the like. Ante, p. 64.

The instrument must also appear, upon the face of it, to have been made to resemble a true instrument of the denomi

nation mentioned in the indictment, and in the statute upon which it is framed, so as to be capable of deceiving persons using ordinary observation, see R. v. Collicott, 2 Leach, 1048. 4 Taunt. 300. R. v. Jones, 1 Leach, 204, although not perhaps those scientifically acquainted with such instruments. See R. v. Hoost, 2 East, P. C. 950. Even where, upon an indictment for forging a bank note, there appeared to be no water mark in the forged note, and the word "pounds" was omitted in the body of it: the defendant being convicted, the judges held the conviction to be right. R. v. Elliot, 1 Leach, 175. So, where the defendant was indicted for forging the will of Peter Perry, and the will produced in evidence commenced "I Peter Perry," but was subscribed "John Perry his mark;" but it was also stated in evidence, that upon this repugnancy being remarked to the prisoner, he said that he had by mistake written "John" instead of "Peter," and that the mark was that of Peter Perry: the defendant was convicted and executed. R. v. Fitzgerald et al 1 Leach, 20. But if, on the other hand, the instrument do not appear to be such as probably might be imposed upon persons to whom it was likely to be uttered, as a true instrument of the denomination mentioned in the indictment, the defendant must be acquitted. Where the defendant was indicted for forging a will of lands, and the will produced was attested by two witnesses only: the judges held that the defendant could not be convicted, although it did not appear either in evidence or upon the face of the will, whether the lands were freehold or not; for they must be presumed to be freehold, unless the contrary appear. R. v. Wall, 2 East, P. C. 953. So, a bill of exchange for three guineas, not attested as required by stat. 17 G. 3. c. 30. s. 1, was holden by the judges not to be the subject of an indictment for forgery, as a bill of exchange; because, if it were a genuine instrument, it would be absolutely void for want of the attestation. R. v. Moffatt, Leach, 431. But a man may be convicted of forging a will, although it appear in evidence, that the pretended testator is alive; R. v. Sterling, 1 Leach, 99. R. v. Coogan, Id. 499; for the instrument, if genuine, would be a will notwithstanding the testator were still alive; his death would merely give effect to the instrument. So, a man may be indicted for forging and uttering a bill of exchange, although the name of the payee was not indorsed on it, R. v. Wicks, 2 Russel, 1451, or even although the bill were not stamped R. v. Hawkswood, 2 T. R. 606. 1 Leach, 257: ante, p. 92. R. v. Reculist, 2 Leach, 703. So, a man may be indicted for forging an instrument, which, if genuine, could not be made available, by reason of some circumstance, not appearing upon the face of the instrument, but to be made out by ex

trinsic evidence. See R. v. M'Intosh, 2 Leach, 883. 2 East, P. C. 842.

With intention to defraud J. N.] It is not necessary to prove that J. N. was actually defrauded by the forgery: R. v. Crooke, 2 Str. 901. R. v. Goate, 1 L. Raym. 737 if from circumstances the jury can presume that it was the defendant's intention to defraud J. N., if in fact J. N. might have been defrauded if the forgery had succeeded, it is sufficient to satisfy this allegation in the indictment.

2d. Count.

Utter and publish as true.] To utter and publish, mean nothing more than that the party tendered, or attempted to pass, or make use of the forged instrument, with the intent charged in the indictment; these words do not import that the person, to whom the forged instrument was tendered, actually accepted it with intent to retain it, or was defrauded by it. Accordingly we find that the legislature, wherever they intended that the offence should not be complete, without an acceptance on the one part and a relinquishment on the other, have described the offence in words of a different and appropriate meaning, such as " pay and put off," (See 1 East, P. C. 179) or the like. In stat. 45 G. 3. c. 89. s. 1, (which is the act of most general importance upon the subject of forgery, extending to deeds, wills, bonds, bills of exchange, and promissory notes, warrants or orders for the payment of money or delivery of goods, acquittances and receipts for money or goods, and accountable receipts for notes, bills, or other securities for money) the offence of uttering, &c. is described by the words offer, dispose of, or put away," which include attempts to make use of a forged instrument, as well as cases where the defendant has actually succeeded in making use of it.

To maintain this count, also, the instrument must have been uttered as true, and not sold or disposed of as a forged instrument. Therefore where the legislature intended, by stat. 45 G. 3. c. 89, to prohibit not only the passing of forged bank notes as true ones, but also the selling of forged bank notes, they described the offence by the words " offer or dispose of, or put away," as to the vendor, (s. 2.), and by the words "purchase or receive," as to the buyer. s. 6. The first section also of the same statute, which we have seen (vide supra) extends to deeds, wills, bills of exchange, &c., describes the offence of uttering, &c. in the same words, "offer, dispose of, or put away."

A certain other false, &c.] This must be proved, as in the first count. See ante, p. 192.

With intention to defraud J. N.] This is also proved, as in the first count. See ante, p. 194.

Well knowing the same to be false.] This is not capable of direct proof. It is, nearly in all cases, therefore, proved by evidence of facts from which the jury may presume it. Upon an indictment for disposing of, and putting away a forged bank note, knowing it to be forged, proof that the defendant has passed other forged notes, raises a probable presumption that he knew the note, for the passing of which he is now indicted, to be forged; R. v. Wylie, 1 New Rep. 92. R. v. Tattersal, Id. 93 n. ante, p. 69. and see R. v. Ball, 1 Camp. 324; and if, in addition to this, it be proved that the defendant, when he passed these notes, gave a false name or address, it amounts to a violent presumption of his guilty knowledge. See ante, p. 78.

Indictment for forging a bond.

Commencement as ante, p. 188.] A certain bond and writing obligatory, which said false, forged, and counterfeited bond and writing obligatory is as follows, that is to say: know all men [&c. &c. So proceeding to set out the bond and condition verbatim, see ante, p. 189.] with intention to defraud the said J. N. against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our lord the King, his crown and dignity. (Second count). And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the said J. S., afterwards, to wit, on the day and year last aforcsaid, at the parish aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, feloniously did utter and publish as true, a certain other false, forged, and counterfeited bond and writing obligatory, which said last mentioned false, forged, and counterfeited bond and writing obligatory is as follows, that is to say: know all men [&c. &c. setting out the bond and condition verbatim] with intention to defraud the said J. N., he the said J. S., at the time he so uttered and published the said last mentioned false, forged, and counterfeited bond and writing obligatory, as aforesaid, then and there well knowing the same to be false, forged, and counterfeited: against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Add another count similar to the last, but stating that the defendant "did offer, dispose of, and put away a certain other false, forged, and counterfeited bond, and writing obligatory, &c. &c." he the said J. S. at the time he so "offered, disposed of, and put away" the said last mentioned, &c. &c. well knowing &c. &c.: against the form, &c. The reason this count seems to me to be necessary, is this: The stat. 2 G. 2. c. 25. s. 1, made it felony,