like to point to the "colonial economics" that the "savage international exploiters" maintain with East European countries. These and other charges would be less painful and much easier to ignore or parry if they were brought by a capitalist adversary, but they are especially uncomfortable when made by another socialist state. Furthermore, obvious lies don't hurt as much as half-truths and there is enough substance in most of China's abrasive charges to hurt Moscow's pride and international position and thus cause considerable embarrassment. There is little doubt that disappointment is another emotion experienced by the Russian leaders. They are "hurt" because China shows no gratitude for the extraordinary economic assistance that was provided by the U.S.S.R. in the 1950's; she no longer even recognizes such aid. Whereas Moscow had hoped that eventually China would become an Asian satellite-a subordinate ally-similar to the nations of East Europe, it is instead faced with a heretic who, the Russians are convinced, is bent on undermining socialist hegemony. It matters little whether or not the original expectations were realistic-the disillusion is real. Prejudice at the international level is at least as difficult to overcome as it is domestically and at both levels it tends to intensity with diminished contacts. Racial prejudice against the Chinese by the Russian people has a long history, and the short period of cooperation between the two nations is perhaps more surprising than the present antagonism. Fed by ignorance, suspicion, fear, and the memory of the Mongol invasion and the Tartar yoke, the mentality of the Russians toward the "gook" Chinese (khod'ka) completely ignores China's rich cultural heritage. There is no reason to assume that the Kremlin's present leaders are exempt from prejudice, even if they are not quite as obvious about it as Khrushchev once was. The Chinese themselves, incidentally, use race as a factor in their competition for the support of the Third World by claiming that the U.S.S.R. is not an Asian country-although two-thirds of it is in Asia-and is therefore disqualified for leadership not only of Asian countries but of African nations as well. These familiar yet somewhat abstract human emotions bolster each other to create a very real fear on the part of the Government and the people of the Soviet Union-a fear which, in informal conversations, the Russians do not hesitate to express. The "yellow peril," which is now generally accepted as a myth by other nations is still of very real concern to the Russians as they think of over 900 million Chinese "pushing" against their 4,000 mile border. The fear has been further intensified by the Soviet conviction-especially since the Cultural Revolution-that the Chinese leadership, with its nuclear capability to seriously damage many large Russian cities, is not altogether rational, either in thought or in action. To summarize, then, it is only within the emotional atmosphere created by fear, suspicion and antagonism-constantly fanned by Chinese abusive and exaggerated propaganda-that the issues of ideology and national security become so overwhelming. Since neither country has anything to gain from open hostility over border disputes, Third World issues, divergent policies, and strategies in the United Nations and other differences, no single issue is so serious that it could not be resolved if the emotional factors would somehow vanish. All too often, however, just as in interpersonal relations, emotions between nations tend to snowball-as history has so well documented. Even statements that might be considered innocuous under different circumstances, take on an evil and ominous tone in the charged atmosphere that exists between China and the Soviet Union. Normally rhetoric reflects relations between two countries. However, it is not too far fetched to suggest that over the past dozen years it has been rhetoric-especially by Peking-which has dictated the nature of relations between the U.S.S.R. and China. In the Soviet Union there seems to be almost complete congruence between official, academic, and public distrust, dislike, and fear of China-not only of Mao and the Peking leadership, but unofficially and covertly-of the Chinese people. That is why it is so important to view present-day Soviet scholarship on China within the context of the emotionally charged relations between the two countries. That is why Soviet research on China can be both biased and sincere. That is why there is some question as to whether a Soviet sinologist can be completely objective anymore than a Jewish social scientist can be completely impartial in his research on Hitler's Germany. B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Contemporary China Studies Finally, a few comments about what are perceived to be the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary China studies in the Soviet Union; or, perhaps more accurately, the advantages and disadvantages of viewing China from Moscow versus Washington. Keep in mind, however, that "the perceiver" has never viewed China from Moscowor viewed Moscow, for that matter. In their study of present day China, including her economy, Soviet sinologists have several advantages, the most important being that "they were there." For more than 10 years many thousands of Soviet specialists and technicians lived in China and were able to observe the country at close range-as comrades, not as enemies. Hundreds of Soviet China specialists spent time in the country either as visitors or as embassy officials. China has changed since the 1950's, but the opportunity the Soviets had, not only through observation, but through their associations with policymakers, administrators, intellectuals, and workers, was not available to anyone else. This experience of the 1950's-and continued diplomatic presence since then-represents an important advantage in the study of China. Although the Soviets accuse the Chinese of distorting the socialist system of development, it is very helpful to know exactly what is being distorted and how it is being distorted. The top Soviet research institutions and the most prominent scholars on contemporary China are concentrated essentially in Moscow. Presumably this should make for a better planned and better coordinated program which facilitates meetings, conferences, and the general exchange of views and information. In the United States such crosspollination may require a major effort and a substantial expense; in Moscow-at least in theory-this can be done more quickly and informally. Whether this is, in fact, the case is debatable however, since the impression one gets from Soviet visitors is that sinologists are highly compartmentalized by disciplines. The Soviets also have the advantage of Western scholarship on China at their disposal. Anyone struggling with economic estimates can appreciate the value of first reviewing the analyses of others—and whether or not one agrees with them is immaterial. Certainly China watchers in the West have not had the benefit of seeing more than a smattering of Soviet estimates. The Soviets, on the other hand, not only obtain all the relevant foreign publications through normal subscriptions and purchases, but in nations where significant work is done on China, Soviet embassies maintain a China specialist whose primary responsibility is to collect unpublished reports and papers, attend conferences, and in general keep up with the activities of scholars and officials working on China. Since the English language has apparently become a prerequisite for the younger generation of China scholars, U.S. research is carefully studied and frequently cited-albeit usually selecting critical evaluations which seem to support and perhaps add authority to their own judgments. With no intent of reprobation, it is safe to say that the new estimates of China's economic performance by Molodtsova have been greatly influenced by Western scholarship. Surely the Soviets would have no problem in writing a report on "U.S. Perceptions of China's Economic Development"-if only there was more uniformity in these perceptions. There are, however, inherent weaknesses and important handicaps faced by Soviet sinologists in their analysis of Chinese developments. We have no way of knowing the number of people in the Soviet Union who are working on contemporary China, but it is small in comparison to the United States. An obvious reason, but one that is not generally appreciated, is the problem of language. In the United States the overwhelming majority of university scholars and government researchers working on the People's Republic of China rely on the hundreds of pages per week of translated texts-newspapers, journals, radio broadcasts, and other materials-which are available to individuals interested in the day-to-day developments, in China. Even many scholars of Chinese extraction find it more practical to use translations and only occasionally supplement or cross-check this information by consulting the original texts. In other words, the knowledge of the Chinese language, while highly desirable, is not a prerequisite to the study of contemporary China in the United States. While the Soviet Union does apparently publish Chinese radio broadcasts in Russian and probably translates other selected materials from Chinese, the overall effort does not compare to the extensive translation services available in the United States. This means that every person working on China must have a good grasp of the Chinese language. As admirable as this may be, the obstacle of language limits tremendously the number of people who, in addition to getting a higher degree in, for example, economics, would be willing to devote years of additional study to attain a reading fluency of Chinese. In addition to postponing their career for several years, the necessity of analyzing materials in the Chinese language inevitably slows down the rate of progress of any research." Related to the question of language, the Soviet Union does not have the tremendous resource represented by 11 Although there does not seem to be a subscription record in Washington, I was told that the Institute of the Far East receives one copy of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: "People's Republic of China" and perhaps some other American or British translations. There is a great demand for this document among Soviet China specialists and it takes weeks to route it within the China branch of the Institute. Since all reproductions in the Soviet Union are vigilantly controlled ("must have the signature of the head of the department"?), scholars spend hours transcribing in long-hand passages from these publications. Since there are no restrictions on subscriptions for translations distributed by the National Technical Information Service, would it not be practical for the Soviets to subscribe and teach their Sinologists English-as, it seems, they already do? the many hundreds of American scholars and translators of Chinese extraction, who not only have a native language fluency, but also can provide valuable perspective on many of Peking's policies and programs. Another serious handicap faced by Soviet sinologists relates to the availability of Chinese sources. Every Soviet scholar visiting the United States is overwhelmed by the materials on China available in our academic and governmental institutions and by the elaborate retrieval technology. While Soviet centers have impressive Chinese collections in their own right, and have numerous titles not available in the United States, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the amazement of visitors with American collections and facilities. When queried about reasons for this discrepancy, the answers are more or less the same. In the fifties, when the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. were friendly, the Soviets obtained much material from China, but apparently there was no directed intensive and systematic collection effort; certainly nothing comparable to the U.S. effort. There seemed to be no reason at that time for anything more than a casual procurement of Chinese publications. They apparently did use some of the Hong Kong booksellers to obtain publications from the Chinese mainland after the 1960 schism, but the U.S.S.R. did not seem to establish a wide-ranging procurement system comparable to that of the United States. Why not? One can only speculate; maybe they could not absorb and process more than they already received; more likely, the Soviets did not believe until the late sixties, that the break between them and Peking was anything but temporary. Finally, in addition to the already discussed intrusion of politics into research on China, there is a weakness in Soviet sinology which stems from the rigidity of the system under which such research is performed. Highly planned, regulated, and coordinated research may not be appropriate in dealing with contemporary China, or, for that matter, with any other area with inadequate data. In this stifling atmosphere there is little imagination in the work on China, and Soviet researchers find it difficult to go beyond the data-an imperative when working with limited information. Duplicative research may seem wasteful and inefficient, but it is exactly this individuality and "freewheelingness" of American research on China, which eventually produces growth in understanding and sometimes even a modicum of consensus. Neither the Soviet political milieu, nor the Soviet highly structured and orthodox educational system encourages the use of creativity, and even occasional flights of fancy, in a field which has such far-reaching political and international ramifications. Although the Soviets themselves recongize and even publicly admit some of the problems and weaknesses in their research on the People's Republic of China, they will understandably find much to fault in the above evaluation by an outsider and a foreigner. But it would be misleading to end this discourse on a negative note. It is very important not to loose sight of the great improvement that has taken place in Soviet research on the PRC since the beginning of this decade. Whether this trend is accellerated or retarded will depend entirely on the level of political constraints imposed by the leadership on the academics. Unincumbered by political demands for conformity, free to pursue their research and arrive at independent conclusions,. Soviet sinologists should be able to move to the forefront of studies on modern China. If this day every comes, it will behoove Western China-watchers to pay much closer attention to what their Soviet counterparts may start saying and writing about China. ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN POST-MAO CHINA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS BY NAI-RUENN CHEN CONTENTS I. Introduction____ II. A three-stage development program_ 1. The background.. 3. Stage II: 1981-85. 4. Stage III: 1986-2000_ 5. Implications for policy formulation III. Economic planning and management. 1. Material incentives_ 2. Manpower utilization. IV. Human resource development.. 1. Shifts in science and educational policy.. V. Technology imports--- 1. The role of foreign technology and equipment. 3. The policy of "yang wei chung yung". 4. Financing technology and equipment imports. VI. Prospects for the future__. 1. Constraints influencing economic modernization.. I. INTRODUCTION Page 165 166 166 169 171 172 173 174 174 177 179 181 183 185 186 188 190 192 192 194 195 196 200 200 202 The major task facing Chinese leaders in the post-Mao era is to realize China's long-held goal of transforming the country into a "powerful modern socialist state" in the shortest possible time. This goal, however, encompasses two, often competitive, components: economic modernity and socialist transformation. The past 28 years have witnessed recurrent ideological conflicts and policy disputes within the Chinese leadership over the relative weight attached to these two components. The "moderate" group assigns greater priority to economic growth while viewing the attainment of socialist values as a long-range objective. The "radical" faction, on the other hand, advocates the simultaneous achievement of economic development and socialist revolution, and opposes programs and methods that may (165) |