Another radical-led province, Kirin, encountered similar problems. GVIO actually declined during the 1974 campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius and slowed significantly during the 1976 campaign to criticize Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The present First Party Secretary, Wang En-mao, who replaced PLA commissar Wang Huai-hsiang in March 1977, acknowledged Kirin's slow development in 1976 and went on to say that it had also been slow in 1977 because of the continued "interference and sabotage"-codewords for fractional disorders-of followers of the "gang of four." 16 Although details are not available, other reports suggest that the worker unrest mentioned by Wang En-mao was most serious in the troubled Ch'ang-ch'ün Railway Subbureau 17 and may have occurred in isolated factories in other areas. In contrast to Kirin, the two remaining radical-led provinces in quadrant III Anhwei 17 and Kansu, were less damaged industrially by political conflict. Although Anhwei experienced some serious problems in the strategically important Huainan coal mine in 1974, it registered solid overall industrial growth in 1976-a fact highly publicized by the Anhwei radical leadership at the time.18 No reports or indications of serious industrial unrest could be detected in the Anhwei media until the late winter and early spring 1977 when a provincial radio broadcast alluded to serious problems along the province's railways and to difficulties in meeting first quarter production targets.19

The sudden appearance of these problems in early 1977 coincides with the Hua administration's insistence that the intensity of the campaign to criticize the "gang of four" be stepped up in those provinces such as Anhwei-that had been guilty of foot-dragging. In fact, Sung P'ei-chang (who was Anhwei's First Secretary at the time) was criticized after his purge in June 1977 for trying to "put a lid" on the progress of the campaign. This strongly suggests that Sung attempted to stave off pressure from Peking by sacrificing some local radicals, This move caused morale problems and considerable confusion, which in turn may explain the decline in GVIO during the first quarter. In any event. the unrest of the winter-spring period was followed by a period of growth, which lasted until Sung's purge in June and his replacement by Wan Li, the former Minister of Railways and a close associate of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.20 After Wan's transfer to Anhwei, provincial GVIO fell off sharply for several months, indicating that Wan-a noted disciplinarian-probably ordered local leadership changes, which in turn led to disruptive activities at the lower levels. As of late December 1977, production still had not returned to the level of June.

Most of the industrial disruptions in Kansu reportedly occurred along the province's rail system, which is under the jurisdiction of the Lanchow Railway Bureau. Reports released after the purge of First Party Secretary Hsien Heng-han, who was accused among other things of "covering up" the turmoil within the Lanchow Bureau,21

16 FBIS, Jan. 10, 1978, L-1-L-15.

17 FBIS, Jan. 10, 1978. L-9-L-11; and FBIS, Aug. 24, 1977, L-1-L-2.

17 For a detailed analysis of politics in Anhwei Province during the mid-1970's, see William B. Abnett, "Anhwei Province, 1949-78," in Edwin A. Winckler, ed., Provincial Handbook of China, Standard, forthcoming.

FBIS, Jan. 4, 1977, G-3.

1 FBIS, Apr. 12, 1977, G-1-G-2.

20 FBIS, July 29, 1977, G-3-G-4; and FBIS, Jan. 24, 1978, G-1-G-5.

21 FBIS, July 12, 1977, M-1-M-3.

revealed that the Bureau was practically paralyzed in 1975 and 1976 and that central work teams had been sent there several times in an attempt to rectify the troubled situation.22 The absence of reports in the provincial media concerning factory unrest suggest that these Lanchow Railway Bureau disorders were the primary source of the virtual stagnation of Kansu's GVIO in 1976.

The four other provinces in quadrant III which were led by moderate First Party Secretaries, represent four of the most seriously factionalized and politically unstable provinces in China. These provinces share the dubious distinction of having been cited officially by Peking as members of a group of seven provinces whose industrial output was most seriously damaged by the "gang of four." 23 Chekiang Province, for instance, was the subject of central directives several times during the mid-1970's. The "Chekiang problem" became so serious that PLA troops were ordered to solve it in 1975. Details in recent radio broadcasts-including approximate dates-reveal that factory unrest and factional disputes in Chekiang during 1974-76 correspond closely with the erratic changes in GVIO over the same period.24

Another greatly factionalized province was Kweichow, whose industrial production was so disrupted that GVIO fell by 13 percent in 1974 and, following an increase of 44 percent in 1975, dropped 12 percent in 1976. The monthly GVIO peak reached during the relatively stable year of 1975 was not regained until April 1977, after several months of floundering that followed the purge of the "gang of four." Ma Li's transfer from Hopeh to become Kweichow's First Party Secretary in March undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the sudden upsurge of Kweichow's GVIO shortly thereafter, as incompetent radicals were probably ousted from positions of responsibility. But this new growth was shortlived and the new provincial leadership failed to stabilize industrial production.

At the time of his transfer to Kweichow, Ma Li convened a fourlevel (provincial, prefectural, county, and district) [hsiang] cadre conference which emphasized production and suggested that Kweichow's new leadership would at last be able to overcome past problems and make decisive recoveries. In July 1977, however, a second fourlevel cadre conference was convened, during which problems such as "sabotage," theft, and the like were discussed.25 These problems, which were encountered during the months of April to July, are reflected in Kweichow's erratic GVIO pattern during the same period. Apparently, the problems discussed at the second conference persisted until October, when the province's industrial production began to grow steadily.

Kweichow's neighbor, Yunnan, was more seriously disrupted in 1976 than in 1974 and did not begin to recover from the turmoil until the summer of 1977-several months after the replacement of First Party Secretary Chia Ch'i-yün by the politically moderate former leader of Kwangsi, An P'ing-sheng. Chia Ch'i-yün was probably replaced because of his inability to control the rival factional

22 FBIS, July 11, 1977, M-1—M-4.

23 FBIS, Jan. 3, 1977, E-18. The other three provinces were Fukien, Honan, and Kiangsi, none of which. are analyzed in this section.

24 FBIS, Nov. 29, 1976, G-6-G-8; Issues and Studies, vol. XIII, No. 6, 1976, pp. 602-605.

25 FBIS, Mar. 8, 1977, J-1-J-5; and FBIS, July 31, 1977, J-1-J-8.

groups that had been actively fomenting unrest since the days of the cultural revolution, not because he was a radical.26

Finally GVIO in Szechwan-a province that was not quite so seriously disrupted as Chekiang, Kweichow and Yunnan-grew satisfactorily in 1974 but declined in 1976. Unfortunately there have been few detailed reports on Szechwan's industrial unrest during the mid-1970's. First Party Secretary Chao Tzu-yang was promoted to alternate Politburo member at the party's 11th Congress in August 1977, suggesting Peking's confidence in Chao and satisfaction with Szechwan's industrial recovery despite serious and persistent political problems. Industrial recovery, which was well underway by February 1977, has continued to the present with minor fluctuations.

B. Politically Stable Provinces With Declines or Slow Growth

The provinces in quadrant IV cannot be linked as easily as those in quadrant III. Shensi's GVIO declined in 1974, as did Hopeh's in 1976. Shensi was a hotbed of factional political activity during the 1974 campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. Provincial First Secretary Li Jui-shan was attacked in numerous wall posters and a mass meeting was reportedly held in July in the provincial capital to criticize that city's second-ranking party leader. Meanwhile, in Shensi's factories, veteran workers and managers were accused of being "capitalist roaders" and then subjected to mass criticism and physical abuse. A recent radio broadcast revealed that some factories "halted production for a long time, and production fell in other units." 28 According to one report, for example, the Sian condenser plant, which had fulfilled its production quotas every year since the plant was set up, failed to do so in 1974 because of the turmoil generated by the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius." Unlike Shensi's decline (which was largely due to political conflict), Hopeh's was brought about by a combination of factionalism and natural disasters. The well-publicized "Pao-ting Incident," which occurred in the summer of 1976, resulted in considerable disruption and violence and probably had to be brought to a halt by the PLA. Although the few details of the Pao-ting incident that are available are contradictory, the incident nevertheless contributed to Hopeh's 1976 GVIO decline. Most of the decline, however, should be attributed to the devastating earthquake that leveled T'ang-shan in July."

30

The normally stable province of Hunan-the birthplace of Mao Tse-tung experienced periods of political turmoil during both 1974 and 1976. Factional problems existed in some localities and especially within the trade union organizations, which were heavily influenced by radicals such as T'ang Chung-fu; T'ang, a "model worker" and former Central Committee member and provincial trade union council chairman had been promoted rapidly under radical sponsorship

20 For a somewhat exaggerated but nevertheless useful description of unrest in Yunnan during 1976, see Issues and Studies, vol. XIII, No. 12, 1977, pp. 41-52.

27 FBIS, June 28, 1974, E-2; and FBIS, July 10, 1974, E-1.

28 FBIS, May 31, 1977, M-2.

"FBIS, Jan. 31, 1978, M-3.

20 For reports of political unrest in Shensi in 1974 see FBIS, June 28, 1974, E-2; and FBIS, July 10, 1974, E-1. For accounts of the "Pao-ting Incident," see FBIS, May 23, 1977, H-1-H-3; and New York Times, Dec. 30, 1976. On the devastation of the T'ang-shan earthquake, see New York Times, June 2, 1977, and FBIS, Jan. 7, 1977, E-1.

during the Cultural Revolution, and was quickly purged following the ouster of the "gang of four."3 T'ang appears to be representative of the young workers, who were either recruited by the "gang of four" or joined the radical cause on their own, and succeeded in attaining political power at the provincial level. T'ang and others like him, were typically Central Committee alternate members, standing committee members of the provincial CCP committee, and provincial trade union council officials. Although they were not powerful within the provincial CCP leadership (especially in moderate-led provinces such as Hunan), they wielded considerable influence and control over the trade union organizations, in which radical workers were heavily represented. T'ang Chung-fu was an active leader of the radical faction and organized worker slowdowns, criticism rallies, and other disruptive activities directed against the moderate faction. In general, trade union organizations during the mid-1970's were not only considerable more radical than their provincial CCP committee superiors, but also a real source of political unrest

Hunan's provincial trade union council was rectified shortly after the purge of the "gang of four"; however, a new chairman has not yet been appointed to the council. Moreover, reports of slack management suggest that problems with local trade unions still persist. 31a Provincial GVIO which made little progress toward recovery after the purge of the "gang" until the summer of 1977, declined again in November.

C. Politically Stable Provinces With Moderate or Strong Growth

The provinces in quadrant I generally achieved solid GVIO growth rates and were seemingly quite resistant to the chaos and unrest that affected the provinces around them. While the provinces in quadrant III possessed perhaps the least favorable political conditions for industrial growth in China, the provinces in quadrant I appear to have had the political environment and leadership most conducive to sustained, high rates of growth in industrial output. For example, Shantung Province, led by Pai Ju-ping, a man with considerable experience in economic affairs,32 was the most successful province in China during the mid-1970's in obtaining and sustaining the optimum combination of political stability and outstanding industrial growth. There are few reports of unrest in Shantung during the 1970's and even the reports that have surfaced suggest the disorders were compparatively low-key.33 One additional reason may have been Peking's concern with the strategically important Sheng-li oilfield. Peking undoubtedly kept a watchful eye on the province and would have reacted quickly to political turbulence. In any event, Shantung benefited greatly from the relative absence of turmoil.

The other provinces in this quadrant also experienced satisfactory GVIO growth rates amidst stable political conditions. There are, to

T'ang last appeared in public on Oct. 1, 1976. failed to be reelected to the CCP Central Committee in August 1977. He was finally criticized in a Hunan broadcast on Oct. 22, 1977. See FBIS, Oct. 28, 1977, H1-H-3.

31 FBIS, Aug. 17, 1977, H-2; FBIS, Oct. 14, 1977, H-6; and FBIS, Dec. 8, 1977, H-2.

32 Donald W. Klien, and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-65, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, pp. 707-708.

33 FBIS, Dec. 8, 1976, G-16; FBIS, May 11, 1977, E-12-E-15; and Issues and Studies, vol. XI, No. 1, 1975, p. 102.

be sure, reports of isolated factory unrest, political factionalism, and railway disturbances, but none approaches the seriousness of the turmoil experienced by the provinces in quadrants III and IV.34 Kwangtung and Kwangsi were as much the bastions of moderate politics in China as Shanghai and Anhwei were of radicalism. The fact that Peking is the center of China's party and national government probably prevented the outbreak of serious industrial disruptions there

Kiangsu is yet another example of a moderate power base. When Shanghai was taken over by Hua Kuo-feng's subordinates, Su Chen-hua and Ni Chih-fu, in mid-October 1976, Kiangsu's first party secretary, P'eng Ch'ung, was transferred east to run the day-to-day affairs of China's largest city. The fact that Kiangsu could spare such a man as P'eng a man later promoted to the Politburo-at such a critical time is testimony both to the political stability of the province and to the political trustworthiness of Peng's successor, Hsü Chia-t'un. One province in this quadrant presents an interesting contrast to the earlier examples. During the mid-1970's, Heilungkiang was led by Liu Kuang-t'ao (a radical leader who was only recently purged) yet still achieved favorable annual GVIO growth rates during the turbulent years of 1974 and 1976. Part of the explanation-as in the case of Shantung-may have been Peking's tight control of the Ta-ch'ing oilfield. In late 1976 and early 1977, however, when the Hua administration stepped up the intensity of the campaign against the "gang of four," production in Heilungkiang began to slow down. The drop in monthly GVIO at that time suggests strongly that the interference in the affairs of Heilungkiang by the moderate leadership in Peking had roughly the same disruptive effect on radical-led Heilungkiang as the radical-inspired interference during 1974 and 1976 had on moderate-led Provinces such as Hunan and Shensi.

D. A Politically Unstable Province With Strong Growth

Tsinghai, a sparsely populated province in Northwest China, is the only politically unstable province to have shown strong annual growth during the years 1974-77. Although there is not a great deal of information on worker unrest in Tsinghai during the mid-1970's, a number of reports provide revealing insights into the factional conflict and other political problems in the province. For example, shortly after Mao's death in September 1976, a Tsinghai CCP plenum was held at which it was announced that a "tiny group of class enemies that spread rumors to create confusion, disrupted public order, instigated a stoppage of work and production, and engaged in other sabotage" was currently active throughout the Province.35 No new revelations were made, however, until the ranking CCP secretary Chang Chiang-lin was purged in March 1977 as a follower of the now-discredited "gang of four." Chang was accused of disrupting Tsinghai's highways-a serious charge since highways are Tsinghai's main mode of transport-and by implication, of disrupting Tsinghai's economy as well.36 In addition, Chang was accused of stirring up

34 FBIS, Nov. 3, 1976, H-7-H-8; and FBIS, Jan. 21, 1977, H-4—H-7.

25 FBIS, Sept. 27, 1976, M-2.

"FBIS, May 25, 1977, M-6.