of a country that has many relatively young veterans of military service now in civilian life who could be recalled in case of need, a considerable force of militia organized and available for at least paramilitary duty, and a number of young women with military training. The males in the prime military ages alone reach about 50 million in 1980 according to these projections and 52 to 73 million by the year 2000.

What are referred to in table 4 as the "prime fertility ages" for women, ages 23 to 35, begin with the minimum target age at marriage for women in rural areas and end with an age at which, if the twochild per family limit can be made obligatory, most childbearing would be over in both urban and rural areas. The women in these ages are presumably the prime objects of family planning propaganda and the prime candidates for sterilization. In 1953 they are estimated to have totaled only 57 million, but by 1980 their numbers are projected to reach 102 to 104 million and by the year 2000 from 142 to 170 million. The annual incoming cohorts at age 23 are under 10 million in 1980 but increase to 11 to 15 million by 2000.

GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

If China's demographic prospects fall within the range indicated by the low and high model projections presented here, it is obvious that there are significant differences between the two extremes by the year 2000. The size of the totals varies by about 17 percent of the mean value and the annual population growth rates range from 1.1 percent to 1.7 percent. However, either of these rates is sufficient to give continuing cause for concern in a country with finite resources at an early stage of economic development with an already large population. The pressure of population growth on the growth of food production may not be greatly reduced by the anticipated decline in natural increase rates if the expedients used to increase agricultural output yield diminishing returns. Unless the economy is more immune in the future than it has been in the past to political dislocations, population growth will continue to dissipate a significant portion of the gains from economic growth. The difficulties of funding productive employment for large increments to the labor force while mechanizing labor in both the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors will continue without much relief from demographic change before 1990. Hence even the rather spectacular shifts in fertility projected for these models during the next few years do not portend an immediate and radical remission in the problems that have hitherto been posed by population growth in the PRC.

The possibility of radical shifts in demographic prospects cannot be ruled out absolutely. Although the prospect seems highly unlikely, it is not altogether inconceivable that the PRC might be able to achieve a degree of control over civil affairs that would make zero population growth possible in the near future, although it might mean mandating the one-child family or denying parenthood to a large segment of the population for a generation. There is also the possibility of a catastrophic depletion of the population resulting from either a man-made or a natural disaster. The PRC leaders themselves have from time to

time entertained the idea of a massive slaughter of their population in a war with the Soviet Union. An acute political upheaval or a deterioration in civil order could disrupt the rural economy enough to bring on a serious famine. Lesser but still demographically significant disturbances have occurred since 1949 as a result of political adventures that miscarried or recurrent adverse weather conditions, and there can be no guarantees that neither will happen again in the future.

However, the extreme possibilities do not seem very likely. The most plausible expectation as to the demographic future of the PRC is for a continuing decline in the rate of population growth in the next decade until a certain minimum level is achieved, after which the population will continue to grow to the end of the century at rates that fluctuate with specific political and social developments that cannot be wholly anticipated and with changes in age composition that are already largely determined.

The time may be particularly ripe for discussing technology and science in China and the reasons are manifold. The policy debate in China-not limited only to technology and science-which has been raging in China since the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress in early 1975 has now been settled. Much information on the debate has been available so it is relatively easy to present, in some detail, the issues which have been debated. China is now reorganizing and quickly developing her institutions of technology and science in order to make them better serve the country. In this process China has clearly indicated that increased technological and scientific contacts with other countries and foreign scientists are important. Science. and technology is also one of the "four modernizations" where China has set the goal to achieve full modernization before the end of the century so that the national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world. This should in no way be interpreted that China is going to develop science and technology for its own sake. The development goals of the country are clearly deciding the priorities and allocations within science and technology, even if many foreign observers may initially have made a different interpretation. Science and technology must meet different needs in the Chinese society and we have been given many indications that advanced science and technology may in the past have been temporarily neglected-a situation which is now being rapidly remedied.

One of the problems in technological development has been the gap between China and advanced countries. The noted scientist Chien Hsueh-sen in 1977 discussed the gap between China's science and

*This article is a considerably shortened and more analytical version of a book-length manuscript which is simultaneously being published in England and Sweden ("Technology and Science in the People's Republic of China-An Introduction," Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding, London 1978, and Bo Cavefors Publishers, Lund 1978). The underlying research has mainly been carried out at the Research Policy Program at the University of Lund, Sweden. The estimates of the R. & D. expenditure is based on collaborative work undertaken together with Boel Billgren. I have also been assisted by Lisbeth Rasmusan who has helped me in building up a systematic collection of documents which directly or indirectly relate to science policy and technological achievements in China.

technology and the advanced countries of the world.' In his views and comments, which are personal, he deals with four questions related to the gap. The first is whether or not there exists a disparity between the level in China's science and technology and advanced world levels. There are some things in China he says, which come close to or which surpass advanced world levels. But they represent only a part of the whole, and a relatively small part at that, and in most cases China is relatively backward. Furthermore, he says, among those scientific and technological undertakings in which we have achieved relatively better successes and have surpassed foreign countries in terms of overall results, the technical level of some of the machinery and equipment is not high.

He then goes on to discuss the second question whether China should gradually narrow the disparity and catch up with and surpass the advanced world levels. The speed and direction have been critical issues and Chien Hsuah-sen's views are not always very illuminating. In essence he says that socialist economic construction and the national defence requires the narrowing of the disparity.

On the third question whether China is able to catch up with and surpass he is equally vague by referring to the superiority of the country's socialist system. He points to the contradiction between the socialization of science and technology and private ownership under the capitalist system-a contradiction which cannot be resolved. Consequently, according to Chien's views, this has placed an obstruction in the path of the development of science and technology in market economies. If we look at the temporary development of science and technology in advanced industrialized countries this can only be partially correct. However, Chien answers the third question in the affirmative and says that, in the final analysis, the interests of the individual, the collective and the State are in accordance with one another in China. If we accept, at least some of, the criticism leveled at the political opponents, the "gang of four," this situation has not been prevailing in China in recent years.

In his final question Chien Hsueh-sen discusses how to bring the superiority of the socialist system into full play and enable China's science and technology to catch up and surpass the advanced world levels. Even here the article lacks specificity but the substance can be seen in the many reforms and measures which have been announced and implemented since the article was published.

The somewhat gloomy views of Chien Hsueh-sen on the present situation are reiterated in a statement by Fang Yi, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences who, at the end of December 1977, says that "China's science and education are in such a state that virtually everything needs to be done." In order to deal with the situation the party central committee and the state council has made a number of major decisions and taken effective measures which are listed here.2

1. A state commission of science and technology has been set up. Its responsibilities will be the overall planning, coordination,

1 "Science and Technology Must Catch Up With and Surpass Advanced World Levels Before the End of the Century," Red Flag, 1977, No. 7, by Chien Hsuch-sen BBC FE/5563/B11/6.

2 Comrade Fang Yi on heartening progress in China's science and education, Hsinhua News (Stockholm), 1977, No. 314 (Dec. 31). Fang Yi was making a report on the situation in China's science and technology on Dec. 27, 1977, at the seventh session of the standing committee of the fourth national committee of the Chinese people's political consultative conference.

organization and administration of the country's scientific and technological work.

2. A system of directors assuming responsibility in research institutes under the leadership of the party committees has been approved. The leadership of many scientific research institutions and a number of universities and colleges has been reorganized and strengthened.

3. A program for the development of science and technology and that of education is being drafted.

4. The administrative system has been changed in order to make full use of local and central initiatives. Some of scientific research institutions which were transferred or discharged have been restored and others are under consideration.

5. Science conferences or teachers' meetings have been held in a number of places to award those with outstanding achievements and to exchange experience. The restoration of titles for technical personnel has been carried out in order to encourage improvement in professional skill, assess technical proficiency and strengthen the system of specific responsibilities.

6. Academic and working conferences have been held to implement the principle of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools contend." The national scientific and technological association has been revived and various scientific societies have resumed their work.

7. A new system for enrolling students in universities and colleges has been implemented and large numbers of promising students have come forward.

8. The compilation of a new set of standard textbooks for the whole country is being carried out under the responsibility of the ministry of education. The principle followed is to condense the teaching material and do everything in order to provide the young people with the latest scientific and technical knowledge.

9. While keeping to the principle of independence and selfreliance China will strive to learn advanced science and technology from foreign countries and promote international academic exchanges.

10. Scientific and technical personnel will be guaranteed at least five-sixths of the week for professional work.

11. Science and education will have their funds, coming from the state budget, appropriately increased in order to accelerate and expand development.

12. Science and education will receive more publicity and more efforts will be made to spread scientific knowledge.

An attempt will be made in the following to relate all these changes to the existing situation and the needs in China. Here we have to remember that China is a country with a still dominant majority of her population and manpower in agriculture. We are also looking at a continental country with manpower resources far exceeding any other country. At the same time China has set up structures in science and technology which on one hand are designed to facilitate her economic development strategy and on the other hand be one of the instruments in moving toward socialism and-in Mao's conceptioncreating a new man. Consequently, it has been considered necessary to make a fairly detailed presentation of policy issues and the science