Mao, according to his later testimony, "into the second line" of authority while the "conservatives" undertook to lead the country into a period of "Socialist transformation" (1962-65).

Dedicated to the reassertion of central authority over a restive and widely disillusioned populace, elitists including such figures as Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying and the PLA Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, supported by key party and military regional leaders, imposed disciplined resource allocations, and bureaucratic procedures, reinspired elan and tightened belts to accommodate to very real deprivation. The burgeoning professionalism of this period was increasingly evident across the board, culminating in the military with a 1965 plea from Chief of Staff Lo Jiu-ch'ing, for a nationwide weapons competition, serious war preparations against the United States and a forward defense along the Vietnam border.

However, despite the political goal of increased centralized control, regional "mountaintops" of elite privilege and power emerged during the post-"Great Leap" era. Powerful civil and military regional leaders, no longer as trusting of old generational colleagues in Pekingand in other regions-as they had been in the early 1950's, began to hoard both political and economic resources. The withdrawal of Russian assistance in 1960 had left the center's treasury seriously depleted. It was imperative for central leaders to assert greater control over surplus production in the wealthier regions and cities. But the process was no longer easy and not altogether successful. Regional and new bureaucratic interests were clearly threatening older generational and ideological loyalties.

Concerned about these cross pressures in Chinese political life, Mao Tse-tung used 1965 to assemble like-minded "radicals," identify allies, and map a plan for a "Cultural Revolution." Prepared to destroy the elitism of the bureaucracy if necessary, this new movement would aim at a revival of revolutionary ideals and a fulfillment of their promise to the "Nation Builders," that third "generation" who had matured politically after the 1949 liberation. For these people and their Maoist leaders among the first two generations, the answer to the question, "Who shall hold power"? was clear: the Nation Builders.

Like its predecessor, the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution aimed at mass participation in the political process. Unlike the Great Leap period, political objectives were given much greater emphasis than economic objectives. And the intergenerational tensions of the movement combined with ideological zeal to inspire an unprecedented explosion of youthful energy and pseudo-religious fervor. At the local level, adversaries sought to settle old scores. All of the most destabilizing impulses in society were encouraged to surface and reveal the very tentative and tenuous nature of prevailing compromises among generational, regional, bureaucratic, and ideological interests.

In spite of military professional concerns with a double external threat from both the north and south, scarce psychic and material resources were lavished on this internal, epic realinement of values and priorities. In opposition to the comfortable balance of power among regional leaders and between Peking and the provinces, a wave of purges unseated hundreds of key officials, both civilian and military, leaving the military finally in temporary control of a politically fragmented and psychologically shaken Party and administrative structure. Ideological purity suffered substantially as contending

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groups "used the Red Flag to fight the Red Flag"; that is, interpreted Mao's thoughts and central directives to favor their own special interests. Rank amateurs armed principally with enthusiasm invaded thousands of factories and offices to seize power.

Although the most serious excesses of the period had become muted by late 1968, following the formation of the last "Revolutionary Committees" in Sinkiang and Tibet, a realinement of bureaucratic, regional, and ideological interests continued for 3 more years while leaders from the second "Northern Warrior" generation reaped the greatest benefits in career development. The problem of removing the military bureaucracy from local civil management roles was not to be solved quickly. The problem of realining the comparative authority and roles of contending generations, easing out the very young and the very old while retaining the most suitable, if not the best, of the middleaged was politically sensitive, especially since "expertness" was clearly a more promising criterion for retention than "redness."

The widely respected Premier, Chou En-lai, met the challenge with an inspired campaign of personal and institutional cajolery, promise, and threat. It seems likely that future historians will credit Chou principally with the successful, if hazardous, transition to a new era. The most politically hazardous period began in the spring of 1971, when Chou probably persuaded Chairman Mao that a combination of domestic and international factors argued for an opening to the United States. One by one, powerful military regional commanders were called to Peking, some staying for several months presumably to debate this momentous proposed shift in Chinese policy. Personifying the coalition of forces opposing such a move-regional (pro-South, antiNorth), bureaucratic (promilitary, anticivil) and ideological (promodernization, antidevelopment)-Lin Piao, the Minister of Defense, called upon old comrades and Korean war veterans to oppose this apparent lunacy. The September 1971 purge and death of Lin and other close associates effectively ended the transition and ushered in a new period of reconstruction.

The 4 years from late 1971 through 1975 were not years of unimpeded progress for pragmatic, professional bureaucrats, despite Chou En-lai's efforts to build a national consensus about the values of cost effectiveness and competence. Opposition to a steady erosion of "radical" political gains during the cultural revolution was inevitable. Indeed, the politics of the entire postcultural revolution period may be seen as a conflict among interpretations of that era. Opposition notwithstanding, four trends received encouragement during this period. Members of the southern revolutionary generation who had always worked most closely with Yeh Chien-ying, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiaop'ing and the so-called Second and Third Field Army factions received renewed support, greater authority and a widening stage on which to exert their waning energies. Their closest proteges among the younger Northern Warrior generation who were ideological or bureaucratic allies enjoyed predictable benefits in assignments to key ministries and military commands.

In regional terms, the northern orientation of the Northern Warriors was encouraged by Chou En-lai and exerted a steady influence on policy toward the U.S.S.R., the United States, defense, resource allocations between development and military modernization, and such issues as Taiwan (delay on any decision), central-regional power

distribution (increasing central authority) and foreign economic policy, especially toward the United States and Japan. New appointments to key provincial and military regional posts and shifts among military regional commanders confirmed a trend toward increased central authority.

In bureaucratic terms, rewards for increased specialization and professionalism were encouraged, first by Chou En-lai and then by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, after he was restored to a position of national authority in the autumn of 1973. The removal of senior military leaders from civil administrative posts signaled younger military leaders to focus their energies on professional interests. The return of the most competent party administrators and educators to posts from which they had been purged reflected the elitist preferences of Chou and Teng for experience, competence and hierarchy.

In ideological terms, the waning importance of Maoist slogans and revolutionary, inspirational "Maoism" became evident to even the most inexperienced American businessmen, who discovered that only brief, superficial lip-service to Maoist dicta would often precede serious negotiations carried out along lines of predictable national interest. Statements of principle were thus not allowed to interfere excessively with practical considerations in rebuilding avenues of contact and trade between China and the West.

Needless to say, these developments were not allowed to proceed without complaint and even bitter opposition from those whose generational, regional, bureaucratic, or ideological interests were suffering. A succession of "campaigns" in the press and in party circles inveighed against Confucius, the military, those who would undo the "great gains" of the cultural revolution, the new "capitalist-roaders" and so forth. Soon after the death of Chou En-lai in January 1976, these pressures apparently reached such a crescendo as to demand some accommodation. In a move that surprised most China specialists (most of them having expected Teng Hsiao-p'ing to become premier immediately), Teng was removed from all offices. For the next 8 months, radical values and slogans appeared to be dominant. American visitors in 1976 were often surprised at the vehemence of anti-American postures, especially on such issues as trade preferences and Taiwan. An evident muting of professionalism, especially among the military, and an emphasis on the militia and People's War reflected a seeming return to Maoist principles of defense.

Suddenly, in unprecedented haste, the death of Mao in September 1976 was followed by the arrest of his wife and three of the principal leaders of the radical, more youthful elements of Chinese politics. The new premier, Hua Kuo-feng, a northerner and the personification of new trends among bureaucratic, regional, and generational interests. outlined immediately above, moved cautiously to reinstate Teng Hsiao-p'ing, worked out apparently acceptable lines of authority and priorities with the most powerful military leader, Yeh Chien-ying, and embarked on a further rationalization of the Chinese political system. That process was still in train in mid-1978. Its pace, style, and short term consequences for a host of policy issues would be deeply dependent upon the success of the Chinese economy. Indeed, it was likely that the next turn in the drama of Chinese domestic politics would be fundamentally dictated by Chinese economics; for the post1971 "Consumer Generation" was demanding an increasingly large

share of the benefits of the economy. Against those demands, leaders would have to measure the claims from a professionalizing military, a hungry industrial plant and a lagging agricultural system. Whether or not those competing claims for resources could be satisfied while also sustaining a relatively stable compromise among jealous political interests remained the nexus of the political challenge for Hua and his colleagues.

CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES

Opposition interests in China bided their time in 1978 while the Hua regime tackled seven major political issues, three on the home front and four abroad.

At home, a compromise resolution of the issue of power between central and provincial leadership remained to be found. To leave matters as they had been in early 1977 would be to relinquish central authority over such matters as local and regional internal security policy and key appointments. However, to attain greater central authority might require further purges of incumbent followers of "The Gang of Four." This issue is only marginally complicated by the ongoing shift of power from pre-World War II leaders to post World War II leaders. Thanks to the purges of the cultural revolution and the subsequent realignment of power among generational interests, by 1978 many local, regional and national elements of the political game in China were already substantially in the hands of post-World War II "northerners."

However, if Hua fails to move effectively in 1978-79 to exert more disciplined control over still unruly or independent-minded provincial leaders and military regional commanders, the achievement of effective resource mobilization, including effective taxation and economic planning, improved incentives for both factory workers and farmers (see below), and effective mobilization of China's best qualified youth for technical education could be thwarted. In 1978-79, nationwide working compromises over those subissues would remain a function of the ability of the center to work its will on lower level political leaders. To the extent that the central, and relatively pragmatic, coalition under Hua and Teng fail to persuade or coerce regional leaders to adopt and apply their own informing principles and bureaucratic procedures, continued regional instability might be expected, with negative consequences for productivity and a unifying national consensus under civil control.

In the face of domestic political and foreign military threats, the issue of the role of the military in China's domestic political system was moving toward resolution in 1977 but still remained of critical importance in the second year (1978) of the post-Mao era. If Teng Hsiao-p'ing could have his way, in keeping with his lifelong attitude toward the proper role of the professional military in the social order, the criteria of professional competence and combat effectiveness would probably govern a revolutionary purge of the oldest generation in favor of the group we have called the Northern Warriors. Calculated to streamline the entire military establishment and sharply reduce the manpower surplus of revolutionary military "generalists" in favor of more technically competent "specialists," such a purge would also define clearly the restricted role of the military in domestic politics. This crucial phase in the modernization of the military high command

would have to precede any significant hardware modernization designed to improve the PLA's ability to shoot, move, and communicate. But such a housecleaning would forever put to rest any illusions about the PLA as a people's army since it would publicly accent its competence in military technical, not political ideological, terms.

Given the obligations of both Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to senior military leaders, especially Yeh Chien-ying, "modernization' and a more restrictive role for the military may continue to face serious problems of timing. It is noteworthy that the relatively small number of military representatives from the provinces to the latest Peoples National Congress (February 1978) could evidence an emerging consensus among senior civil and military leaders about military noninvolvement in local politics.

Needless to say, should that consensus fail to materialize-possibly on grounds that Chairman Mao would have disapproved of such a limited role for the PLA, once touted as the "great school of revolution"--then prospects for political stability might suffer. It seems likely that the relatively well qualified officers of the Northern Warrior generation of military leaders might prefer the professional role envisaged by Teng Hsiao-p'ing. But Teng's own generation, still dominant at the very top of the civil and military hierarchy, could delay reform and even insist on a return to a more influential role for the military should social and political cohesion in China appear to be threatened by developments in the economy and in the third domestic political issue of incentives.

At the heart of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the issue of political and material rewards and how they should be allocated. "Who shall hold power?" was the burning issue for debate and evoked bitter and violent confrontations between "haves" and "have nots." Should a privileged class, especially the sons and daughters of an influential elite, be given preference in educational and job opportunities? Or should the principle of egalitarianism govern admission to such opportunities? While both the center versus the regions and the role of the military are issues that reflect the continuing debate along regional and bureaucratic lines, with ideological overtones, this issue is primarily ideological, with generational, regional, and bureaucratic

overtones.

Apparently determined to reform the process of selection for higher education and job assignments along lines of competence rather than along lines of class "justice" and ideological fervour, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Hua Kuo-feng moved firmly in this arena through 1977 and made their preferences very clear. Unless a substantial reform in 1978-80 in the entire incentive structure-starting with education, continuing with professional and trade assignments and ending with material and status rewards-is initiated over the next 2 years, the pragmatists will probably have to accept disappointments in rates of economic specialization, scientists and technological innovation, and economic modernization-unless shortfall in requisite skills could be imported. However, if radical "achievements" during the 1966-68 cultural revolution on behalf of deprived "have nots" among China's 700 million rural dwellers were abruptly reversed, the new 1977-78 policy apparently favoring urban and better educated youth, the radical opposition would have a tailor made issue and a potentially irresistible following with which to counter prevailing conservative initiatives.