Should address the exploratory stage of deep seabed mining in detail but treat most generally the framework for a regulatory regime for exploitation, with the date for entry into force of such a regime left open;

Should not be specific with regard to the assignment or allocation of mining sites for exploitation;

Should not require that processing plants be located in the United States;

Should not offer U.S. mining companies financial protection against adverse effects of a treaty concluded subsequent to the passage of legislation and expenditures by those companies; and Should assure that all provisions of the legislation leave undisturbed the concept of high seas freedoms.

These elements provide the framework within which the administration would be able to support ocean mining legislation. As I indicated a moment ago, some of these views coincide with provisions contained in S. 2053 and S. 2085 which, in the first place, are clearly designed to be interm legislation pending the entry into force of an international agreement. S. 2053 refers to a Law of the Sea Conference or other multilateral agreement, while S. 2085 envisages only the former. We prefer the formulation in S. 2053.

Second, the bills contain provisions that minimize the chances for conflict with designatee reciprocating states engaged in deepseabed mining. They also provide for environmental safeguards and the means to assure timely action to avoid and avert damage to the ocean biosphere, although, in our view, the enforcement provisions in S. 2053 should be strengthened. S. 2053 provides for sharing the proceeds of deep seabed mining with the international community, while S. 2085 does not.

While we recognize that seabed mining legislation must address both exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals, the administration favors dealing in detail only with the former. Given the expected pace of deep seabed mining development, it is neither necessary nor wise now to prescribe a regime for exploitation in specific

terms.

S. 2053 contains an apparent internal contradiction with respect to the concepts of high seas freedoms and sovereignty. For example, while S. 2053 in one place disclaims assertions of sovereignty or sovereign rights over areas of the deep seabed, the subsequent provisions for exclusivity of mining site rights could be misinterpreted to derogate from the disclaimer. S. 2085 does this as well but is also in our view deficient in that it describes deepseabed mining as being a high seas freedom but only until agreement on a treaty.

Provisions that can be characterized as site-specific could be perceived to undercut our claim that we are proceeding to mine on the basis of high seas rights. These rights do not permit the extension of sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction to the high seas. The administration urges that the provisions in question be reshaped to be consistent with the unequivocal statement in S. 2053 that commercial recovery of hard mineral resources from the deep seabed is a freedom of the high seas.

The administration opposes any legislative requirement with respect to the location of processing plants and seeks the excision of the relevant provision from S. 2053. It could in some circumstances impose an economic burden on U.S. mining companies and, in general, it is contrary to basic principles of free international trade. The same argument applies to that bill's provision for U.S. preferential rights to processed resources. I would also like to point out that inclusion of these requirements will, by definition, make reciprocal legislation by other nations an awkward and difficult proposition. I note that S. 2085 does not contain the restrictions.

Finally, I come to the matter of investment guarantees against injury suffered by virtue of entry into force with respect to the United States of an international agreement. The administration firmly opposes such a provision, which figures prominently in both bills. Representatives of departments directly involved in the substances of seabed mining and investment incentives have already testified before you on this question. I will confine myself to a few comments under the headings of necessity and justification.

It is my judgment that the spring 1978 session of the Conference-if indeed we get that far-will reveal finally whether a comprehensive treaty has a future. If not, industry will have nothing to fear from that quarter. If progress does indicate that agreement is within reach, industry will be able to judge for itself from the texts, the prospects for economically attractive ventures. Seabed mining is, after all, not just around the corner. Nor are our pipelines and stockpiles of the minerals involved issues for timerelated concern. In short, the purported need for investment guarantees seems related neither to timing nor to national resource problems.

Second, I question the very concept of indemnifying U.S. citizens against losses incurred as a consequence of an international agreement that both the President and the Senate believe to be in the overall national interest. I have considerable difficulty as well in reconciling the notion of guarantees for seabed miners with the denial to higher priority sectors-for example, energy-of such protections. And finally, the inclusion of guarantees placed upon the negotiator an obvious additional burden.

Sen. Doc. No. 95-78, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 381-384 (1977).

Search and Rescue

On March 9, 1977, the Office of Senator Jacob K. Javits sent a letter to Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., forwarding for reply a letter from a constituent expressing concern over a newspaper report that a U.S. Coast Guard ship was trailing in international waters a Panamanianregistered freighter suspected of trafficking in the illegal importation of marijuana while awaiting the permission of the ship's captain to board. On April 8, 1977, Assistant Secretary Bennet wrote Senator

Javits that Terry L. Leitzell, attorney adviser in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs, had responded directly to the inquiring constituent on that same date in pertinent part as follows:

Under existing international law, vessels on the high seas are normally subject to the jurisdiction of only their flag State. However, there are certain specified exceptions to this general rule. For example, article 23, paragraph 3 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas provides that the enforcement vessels of a coastal State may undertake hot pursuit and arrest of a vessel which is outside its territorial sea if that vessel was acting as a mother ship in team with other vessels which were delivering goods to shore. In particular, a vessel standing in the high seas and delivering marijuana to other vessels which are delivering it inside our territorial limits may be pursued and arrested. We do, of course, also attempt to apprehend the vessels coming to shore in such instances.

case

A second exception is that boarding may be legally undertaken at the request of or with the permission of the flag State. In [this] both of these exceptions were considered but were not utilized. A fire broke out on the vessel and the master requested the Coast Guard to board the vessel and to assist them. In spite of Coast Guard efforts, the fire continued and the boat sank.

Dept. of State File Nos. P77 0037-0427 and P77 0126–1809.

The Convention on the High Seas was done on Apr. 29, 1958 (TIAS 5200; 13 UST 2312; 450 UNTS 82), and entered into for the United States on Sept. 20. 1962.

The U.S. Delegation Report for the Sixth Session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, May 23-July 15, 1977, indicated that there was "broad agreement on the Straits Articles" though there was "a very small number of states" desiring modifications. The only new article to emerge from the Sixth Session under the heading Straits Used for International Navigation contained a provision dealing with Research and Survey Activities. The new provision, set forth in article 40 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, reads as follows:

During their passage through straits, foreign ships, including marine research and hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities without the prior authorization of the States bordering straits.

Informal Composite Negotiating Text as printed in Vol. VIII of the Official Records of the Conference (U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 and ADD.1).

For the text of the previously agreed upon provisions concerning straits used for international navigation, see the 1976 Digest, Ch. 7, § 6, pp. 369–372.

On September 16, 1977, President Carter sent to the U.S. Senate a letter of transmittal requesting its advice and consent to ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal which he signed with General Omar Torrijos Herrera, Head of Government of the Republic of Panama, at the headquarters of the Organization of American States on September 7, 1977. Set forth below are portions of the President's letter of transmittal, which outlines the purposes of the two treaties:

When ratified, the Treaties will establish new arrangements for operating and defending the Panama Canal, and for ensuring its continuing neutrality and accessibility to all shipping. These objectives will be achieved through a new, cooperative relationship between the United States and Panama under which the United States will continue to operate the Canal until December 31, 1999. After this period of preparation, Panama will assume control of Canal operations, with the United States sharing permanent responsibility for maintaining the Canal's neutrality.

The Treaties serve the essential interest of the United States in an efficient and safe Canal. They permit a new relationship with Panama based on friendship and mutual respect. Moreover, they remove a major obstacle to the betterment of our relations with the countries. of Latin America and the Caribbean area, and will substantially improve our standing with other nations, particularly those of the developing world.

I believe that these Treaties are fair to both countries, consistent with our heritage, and right for our times. They protect United States interests in the Panama Canal for the future better than the 1903 Convention which they will replace. Undue delay in ratification could cause serious problems for our foreign relations and jeopardize our long term interests in the Canal and in the Hemisphere. Accordingly, I urge the Senate to give these Treaties early and favorable consideration.

The United States and Panama signed the Isthmian Canal Convention on Nov. 18, 1903 (TS 431; 33 Stat. 2234; 10 Bevans 663; entered into force on Feb. 26, 1904).

President Carter's letter of transmittal forwarded to the Senate the report of the Department of State concerning these two treaties. This

report included a letter of submittal from Secretary Vance to President Carter dated September 15, 1977, describing the negotiating history of the treaties and their basic provisions, a schedule of all of the documents related to the treaties, a summary of the terms of these treaties, as well as the text of the treaties themselves. The letter of submittal, schedule of documents, and summary appear below:

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

In my view these Treaties will protect fully the United States' interests in the future operation and security of the Panama Canal. They will provide a basis for futher improvement of our relations with Panama and the other nations of the Hemisphere. Moreover, the Treaties protect not only the interests of the two signatories, but also the interest of world commerce in a Canal which functions efficiently and is permanently open to vessels of all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis.

It will be recalled that negotiations with Panama looking toward a new, mutually satisfactory relationship began in 1964. Following demonstrations in Panama in January of that year and a threemonth suspension of diplomatic relations, the two countries, with the cooperation of the Organization of American States, agreed on April 3, 1964, to a Joint Declaration in which they undertook to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between them without limitations or preconditions of any kind. On September 24 of the following year. President Johnson and President Robles of Panama announced agreement to negotiate a new treaty based on certain principles, including abrogation of the 1903 Convention, recognition of Panama's sovereignty over all its territory and provision for the possible construction of a sea-level canal. President Johnson reached the decision to negotiate with Panama after consulting with Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and other leaders of both major political parties.

Draft treaties were completed in 1967 but were not signed. In 1970 the Government of Panama formally rejected those treaties and proposed new negotiations. Additional negotiations in 1971 and 1972 failed to produce agreement. Negotiations resumed in late 1973. In February 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger initialed with Panama's Foreign Minister Tack a Joint Statement of Principles to guide the negotiations, which were similar in content to those established by Presidents Johnson and Robles as guidance for the 1965-1967 negotiations. This Administration endorsed these basic concepts earlier this year, and the Treaties which Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz have negotiated and I am submitting to you reflect those principles.

Under the new Panama Canal Treaty, the United States will operate the Canal and have primary responsibility for its defense until December 31, 1999. The Treaty grants to the United States all of the rights necessary for the operation, maintenance and defense of the Canal, including the use of specific land and water areas necessary