12. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before August 31, 1976, for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of noncompliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.

In his May 17, 1977, televised question-and-answer session with Los Angeles area residents, President Carter outlined the U.S. position concerning the presence of the South African Republic in Namibia:

We're trying as best we can to make changes in South Africa. We have just formed, under the leadership of Andrew Young, who's our Ambassador to the U.N., a five-nation proposal to Prime Minister Vorster from South Africa, to try to get them to withdraw the white domination of Namibia, which was formerly a German colony of southwest africa.

We've gone to Vorster now and given him a request a little bit stronger than a request, saying that if you don't do something about Namibia, then we're going to take strong action against you in the United Nations.

13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 744–745 (May 23, 1977). For President Carter's remarks concerning efforts to end racial discrimination in South Africa, see post, Ch. 3, § 6, p. 213.

On May 19, 1977, Ambassador Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, addressed the U.N. sponsored International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia in Maputo, Mozambique. In his statement Ambassador Young emphasized the importance of the goals of freedom and liberation in the Carter Administration's approach to the issues of southern Africa and described the U.S. preference for an early negotiated settlement instead of military conflict in Namibia and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia).

Portions of the text of Ambassador Young's prepared statement follow:

We are in a race against time regarding Namibia and Zimbabwe. The future of those two countries and the fate of their people is certain-liberation. We are here to discuss measures that can hasten the inevitable day of freedom. We all know that among these measures will be continuing military efforts by the liberation forces. They will insist on continuing their struggle as long as fundamental political rights are denied the majority in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

The armed struggle, however, though its final outcome is inevitable, exacts a cruel price from the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Africa needs the leadership that will be lost in a prolonged struo le;

it needs the infrastructure that will be destroyed in extended military conflict. This is why all here-whatever their views—must support efforts to press ahead with any promising approach to an early negotiated settlement. This is why one objective of this conference should be to make it clear that U.N. members, as always, prefer a negotiated settlement where it can be found.

The policies of the U.S. Government toward southern Africa reflect the Carter Administration's commitment to human rights. President Carter made it clear from the beginning that a renewed commitment to our responsibilities in the field of human rights required justice in southern Africa. But our policy in southern Africa also grows out of our policy toward Africa as a whole, a policy based on support for freedom, independence, territorial integrity, and economic development and dignity for all African nations. We believe it is in our national interest to work cooperatively with African nations on mutual economic and political concerns.

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76 Dept. of State Bulletin 55, 56, 58 (1977).

At the close of the Maputo Conference on May 21, 1977, Charles W. Maynes, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, gave a statement on behalf of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, explaining why these Western members of the U.N. Security Council attended the Conference, recognizing the need for progress in Namibia and Zimbabwe, and commending the authors of the Final Declaration and Program for Action while expressing some reservations with some of its provisions.

The text of Assistant Secretary Maynes' statement appears below:

The Western members of the Security Council-Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States-came to this conference for three reasons:

-We wanted to show solidarity with African states on these two key issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe.

-We wanted to seize this unique opportunity to explain our African policies. Since any African policy must begin with southern Africa, we wanted the opportunity to explain to the countries and movements most directly concerned the initiatives we have taken and the strategy we have followed.

-Finally, we wanted to listen to and understand African views. on these critical subjects. We recognize that our assistance will not be effective unless the parties most directly involved understand our purpose and feel free to convey their reactions.

From all three points of view we assess the conference as remarkably successful. The conference marks a new stage in the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe. More than 90 countries came to declare their solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This collective expression of international determination is a sign that the process of liberation is moving to a new and culminating phase.

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We have found others willing to listen to our point of view, and we have benefited from theirs. We see ourselves working for the same goals, even when we choose different means from those preferred by others.

As you all know, over the past several weeks the five Western members of the Security Council have together advanced an initiative to resolve the Namibian problem. Western members of the Security Council informed the South African Government that any settlement in Namibia must be consistent with U.N. Security Council progress toward Resolution 385. We left no doubt that an absence of an internationally acceptable solution would have serious consequences for South Africa.

In the case of the United States, President Carter recently confirmed U.S. policy in more detail. In a statement made in Los Angeles on May 17, 1977, he stated that unless there was progress on Namibia, the United States would be compelled to take strong action in the United Nations.

The position of the Western members of the Security Council is clear. In the light of the initiatives we have taken, we find ourselves unable to associate ourselves with a number of the provisions of the declaration and the program of action. To associate ourselves would prejudice the results of negotiations which have brought about the most promising start to resolve the Namibian problem. We take a similar position regarding the negotiation effort of the British in Zimbabwe. The bulk of the documents, however, represent our views. They also represent a remarkable effort to convey to those who have blocked progress in the past that there is a degree of commitment and a depth of solidarity on these issues which are unprecedented.

We recognize that progress must be made urgently on these problems. We understand that the issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe are entering a new and final stage where one path leads to increased violence and the other to peaceful settlement.

So while we cannot associate ourselves with a number of the provisions of the declaration, we regard it as an important mark in history, one which helps us understand our own responsibilities as members of the Security Council and nations interested in peaceful change and racial progress in southern Africa. We commend the authors, and we praise the organizers of this conference. Both have helped bring the day of freedom closer than it has ever been.

76 Dept. of State Bulletin 58-59 (July 11, 1977).

The text of the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia and Program of Action for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia appears in 76 Dept. of State Bulletin 59-65 (July 11, 1977). The Maputo Conference adopted a "Declaration" and "Program of Action" which, with respect to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), called for (1) an independent Zimbabwe under nondiscriminatory arrangements for majority rule; (2) assistance by all U.N. members to the "National Liberation Movement" of Zimbabwe in its "struggle for independence"; and (3) strict enforcement of current sanctions and the expansion of such sanctions in the areas of aircraft transit, mercenary recruitment, emigration, and the maintenance of Rhodesian offices abroad. With respect to Namibia. the documents called for (1) frce elections under U.N. supervision and control in

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accordance with relevant U.N. decisions; (2) assistance by all U.N. members to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), as the "sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people, in its struggle "against the forces of colonialism and racism"; (3) enforcement of Decree No. 1 of the U.N. Council for Namibia, which prohibits exploitation and export of Namibian natural resources; (4) the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa ; and (5) all states to “endeavor to dissuade South Africa from pursuing the separation of Walvis Bay from Namibia."

For further information concerning U.S. initiatives in Southern Rhodesia, see post, Ch. 13, § 1, pp. 892-896.

For further information concerning a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, see post, Ch. 14, § 6, pp. 934-936.

East Timor

On July 19, 1977, George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, testified before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives on the legal aspects of Indonesia's military intervention in East Timor in December 1975, and the subsequent incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia in July 1976. Portions of his testimony concerning the permissible uses of force under the United Nations Charter and the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination follow:

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In an ideal situation, the process of decolonization of East Timor would have proceeded in an orderly fashion with Portugal preparing for an early transfer of power pursuant to a plebiscite or other act of self-determination by the people of East Timor conducted in an atmosphere of free political activity. Unfortunately, the situation did not develop that way, and Portugal, preoccupied wtih political upheaval at home and in its African colonies, abandoned in fact its administration of the territory in August 1975 and left the struggle to the warring local factions.

From that period until at least November 1975, Indonesia recognized Portugal as retaining legal authority and responsibility for the future of East Timor. It also held discussions with some of the Timorese parties. In late November 1975, Fretelin, a faction which had gained control of the former Portuguese arsenal and, consequently, military primacy over much of the territory of East Timor, declared itself the government of an independent "Democratic Republic of East Timor." This declaration was not accepted by members of the other factions in East Timor and vigorous fighting continued. Indonesia then intervened militarily.

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During the period from December 1975, until June 1976, it was the policy of the United States to favor a resolution of the problem of East Timor by the Timorese and other concerned parties themselves. We supported Security Council Resolution 384 as well as United Na

tions General Assembly Resolution 3485 of December 12, 1975, also calling for respect for the right of self-determination of the people of East Timor. We remained hopeful that the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would offer a promising course, but due to a number of factors it was inconclusive and again called on the parties to work out a solution. We abstained on Security Council Resolution 389 of April 22, 1976, largely because the Security Council did not accept an amendment which would have acknowledged steps taken by Indonesia to begin withdrawal of its forces from East Timor, but at the same time the United States Representative reaffirmed "our support of the right of the people of East Timor. . . for . . . self-determination."

On July 17, 1976, Indonesia formally incorporated East Timor as its 27th province. This followed unanimous approval by the People's Council of East Timor on May 31, 1976, of a petition asking Indonesia to accept integration of East Timor into Indonesia. According to information we have received from Indonesian authorities, the People's Council consisted of 28 members, the majority of whom were said to have been tribal chiefs and other traditional leaders selected through meetings of local leaders, with the representatives from Dili, the capital city, said to have been chosen by direct elections. We actually know very little about the selection process for these delegates, although the process itself took place at a time of military occupation by Indonesia during which considerable fighting was still going on.

The United States Government did not question the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia at the time. This did not represent a legal judgment or endorsement of what took place. It was, simply, the judgment of those responsible for our policy in the area that the integration was an accomplished fact, that the realities of the situation would not be changed by our opposition to what had occurred, and that such a policy would not serve our best interests in light of the importance of our relations with Indonesia. It was for these reasons that the United States voted against United Nations Gencral Assembly Resolution 31/53 of December 1, 1976, which rejected the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia and recommended that the Security Council take immediate steps to implement its carlier resolutions to secure exercise by the people of East Timor of their right of self-determination.

I think it is important to state that I do not view United States policy in the case of East Timor as setting a legal precedent for future cases. The fact is that decisions whether or not to treat an entity as part of another entity are most often taken as political decisions on the basis of all the circumstances of the particular case in what is perceived as the national interest. An important factor to be considered, obviously, is our commitment under Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter to promote respect for human rights, including the right of self-determination. However, the question remains what we are required to do if this right is not observed as we might wish in a situation in which we believe that efforts by us to change the situation would be futile and injurious to other national interests of the United States. We do not believe that