(c) any other equipment or devices designated by the United States Commission as items to be made available on the condition that the provisions of this paragraph B (2) will apply,

(i) to require the maintenance and production of operating records and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability of such material; and

(ii) to require that any such material in the custody of the Government of Japan or any person under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guarantees set forth in Article X;

(3) To approve facilities which are to be used for the storage of any of the special nuclear material referred to in paragraph B(2) of this Article which is not required for atomic energy programs in Japan and which is not transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Japan or otherwise disposed of pursuant to an arrangement mutually acceptable to the Parties;

(4) To designate, after consultation with the Government of Japan, personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of Japan, shall have access in Japan to all places and data necessary to account for the source and special nuclear materials which are subject to paragraph B(2) of this Article, to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary;

(5) In the event of non-compliance with the provisions of this Article or the guarantees set forth in Article X and the failure of the Government of Japan to carry out the provisions of this Article within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate this Agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices referred to in paragraph B(2) of this Article;

(6) To consult with the Government of Japan in the matter of health and safety.

C. The Government of Japan undertakes to facilitate the application of the safeguards provided for in this Article.

D. The personnel designated by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with paragraph B(4) of this Article shall not, except pursuant to their responsibilities to that Government, disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties under that paragraph.

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was done on July 1. 1968 (TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483; 729 UNTS 161; entered into force for the United States on Mar. 5, 1970).

For the purposes of the U.S.-Japanese Agreement for Cooperation, the Energy Research and Development Administration has assumed the duties of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

U.S.-Saudi Arabia

On October 30, 1977, W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, and Ambassador John C. West, acting jointly for the United States, and Mohammad Aba al-Khail, Minister of Finance and National Economy of Saudi Arabia, signed a Project Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Solar Energy. The Agreement calls for cooperation between the two governments in a jointly-funded program of research, development, and demonstration projects of all types of solar energy systems of mutual interest. The program will include joint research, exchanges of scientific and technical information, seminars and other meetings, visits by specialists of each party to facilities of the other party, and fellowships to individuals for advanced study in solar energy research.

Each government undertakes in article 5 of the Agreement to fund the program at the rate of ten million dollars a year for a period of five years, for a total of one hundred million dollars. Initial funding as specified in article 5 was completed on January 11, 1978, the date the Agreement entered into force. The Agreement is one of a series of agreements concluded under the auspices of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission, which was begun in 1975.

Dept. of State File L/T.

For further information concerning the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation, see the Technical Cooperation Agreement signed on Feb. 13, 1975 (TIAS 8072; 26 UST 880; entered into force May 12, 1975).

International Cooperation

Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) On June 21, 1977, Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State, testified before the Joint Economic Committee concerning the results of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), concluded on June 3, 1977, in Paris. Portions of his testimony concerning progress on energy issues at CIEC follow:

We made progress on all of the Group of 8 energy objectives in CIEC, except for obtaining a CIEC recommendation for an ongoing energy dialogue. The CIEC participants agreed to a general set of guidelines that:

1. Recognize the essentiality of adequate and stable energy supplies to global growth and the responsibilities of all nations, including the oil-exporting countries, to insure that such supplies are available;

2. Call for intensified national and international cooperative efforts to expand energy conservation and accelerate the development of conventional and nonconventional energy supplies during the energy transition period and beyond;

3. Affirm that special efforts should be made to assist oil-importing LDC's [less developed countries] alleviate their energy burdens; 4. Recommend that the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], in the context of a general capital increase, establish as a new priority lending for LDC energy development;

5. Call for new international efforts to facilitate the transfer of energy technology to LDC's wishing to acquire such technologies; 6. Endorse increased international cooperation in energy research and development, which will probably lead to participation by some oil-exporting and other developing countries in ongoing research and development work in the International Energy Agency (IEA); and

7. Recognize the desirability and inevitability of the integration of the downstream processing industries of the oil-exporting countries into the expanding world industrial structure as rapidly as practicable.

As a first try in a North-South context, we consider the energy results to be satisfactory. While replete with caveats, the agreement on supply puts OPEC on record as recognizing that adequate energy supplies are necessary and that oil exporters have a responsibility of meeting energy needs during the transition period that must occur while countries develop alternative sources. The recommendation that IBRD increase lending to LDC's to develop energy resources could have a significant long term impact on the development prospects of oil-importing LDC's by gradually freeing them of the need for high-cost oil. To the extent these countries reduce oil imports over time, the world supply of oil will be greater.

Many OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries are now concerned about their energy prospects when their oil runs out. They have been receptive to the idea of participation in IEA and other industrial-country energy research and development projects to begin their own conversion to alternative energy sources. Any final assessment of the CIEC Energy Commission must include the educational impact its work has had on both the oilimporting developing countries and the OPEC countries. The former have become more keenly aware of the adverse economic impact on them of OPEC price and production decisions. During the course of the work of the commission, some of the oil-exporting countries appeared to become more conscious of the impact of their decisions on the global economy.

77 Dept. of State Bulletin 95–96 (1977).

For further information concerning CIEC, see ante, pp. 710-712; 736-737; 744-747.

Atomic Energy

Safeguards and Export Controls

On June 28, 1977, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a memorandum and order In the Matter of Edlow International Company, agent for the Government of India on Application to Export Special Nuclear Materials (License No. XSNM-845, Docket No. 70-2131), directing the Assistant Director for Export-Import and International Safeguards to issue a license to the Edlow International Company upon a finding that the license met all the relevant standards under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Three organizations had filed joint petitions with the NRC on March 2, 1976, for leave to intervene and for a hearing on the application to export special nuclear material to be used to fuel the Tarapur Atomic Power Station located near Bombay, India.

In arriving at its decision, issued by Marcus A. Rowden, Victor Gilinsky (concurring), and Richard T. Kennedy, the NRC found in

part that the proposed export of special nuclear material would take place under the Agreement between the United States and India for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy signed on August 8, 1963 (TIAS 5446; 14 UST 1484; 488 UNTS 21, entered into force on October 25, 1963), and that the export would not be inimical to the health and safety of the United States nor to the U.S. common defense and security. The NRC rejected petitions from the National Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the Union of Concerned Scientists contending that authorization to export such materials would be subject to the Agreement signed on January 27, 1971, by the United States, India, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States-India Agreement of August 8, 1963, or that such an authorization would violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) done on July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483; 729 UNTS 161; entered into force for the United States on March 5, 1970).

Excerpts from the memorandum and order follow:

I. Background

On November 5, 1975, Edlow International Company, as agent for the Government of India, filed License Application No. XSNM-845 with the Commission seeking authorization to export 463.64 kilograms of U235 contained in 18371.4 kilograms of uranium enriched to a maximum of 2.71 percent. The special nuclear material sought would be used to fuel the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) located near Bombay, India.

On March 2, 1976, joint petitions were filed with this Commission on behalf of three organizations (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; The Sierra Club; and the Union of Concerned Scientists) for leave to intervene and for a hearing on this application.

This Commission believes that withholding action on the present license pending a definitive resolution of the spent fuel issue, or other issues raised in the negotiations, would be inconsistent-not only with this nation's general policy of being a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel-but also with the encouraging responses thus far received from the Government of India on the particular problem of spent fuel disposition at Tarapur. Moreover, failure to act on this license would be contrary to the executive branch judgment that the supply of this reactor fuel to India would substantially assist the U.S. in its forthcoming negotiations with India.

[U]nder the statute, there are three separate factors which the Commission must consider in the instant matter: (1) whether an agreement for cooperation would apply; (2) whether the export would be inimical to the health and safety of the American public; and (3) whether the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States. We will address each of these factors in turn.

1. Agreement for Cooperation

The proposed export would take place under the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States and India, signed at Washington, D.C., on August 8, 1963, TIAS 5446...

2. Health and Safety

If petitioners' concern pertains to the impact of this export on the public health and safety of citizens of India living in that nation, this is not a contention the Commission has jurisdiction to decide. See Edlow Opinion, 3 NRC 563, 582, and Babcock and Wilcox, supra. If petitioners' concern relates to the impact of this single fuel export on the public health and safety of citizens of the United States, the impacts of U.S. nuclear export activities were examined in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on U.S. Nuclear Export Activities (ERDA 1542, April 1976). That Statement concluded that the impact on U.S. public health and safety of U.S. nuclear exports, including fuel shipments such as the one requested here, are negligible. The Commission sees no circumstances in which the export of the special nuclear material covered by this license application would affect the health and safety of the U.S. population.

3. Common Defense and Security

In our Edlow Opinion of May 7, 1976, we stated that in making our “determination whether a given export pursuant to an Agreement for Cooperation is inimical to the common defense and security of the United States, the Commission must base its decision on whether the safeguards and assurances given by the recipient government . . . insure that United States' supplied fuel is not diverted from the use for which it was authorized." Edlow Opinion at 3 NRC 588.

Agreement for Cooperation

India.

[T]his export would be covered by the Agreement for Cooperation with This Agreement, among other things, provides that India may not reexport special nuclear material provided to India by the United States, unless prior United States' approval is received. See articles VII (A) (2) and II(F).

It also provides that special nuclear material supplied to the Government of India may not be reprocessed unless there is a joint determination of the parties to the Agreement that safeguards may be effectively applied. See article II (E). ... [T]he Department of State has advised that: "The Government of India has been advised that the U.S. is not prepared to make a determination that this Tarapur Indian reprocessing facility (PREFERE) can be effectively safeguarded." See Letter from [Peter] Tarnoff [Executive Secretary of the Department of State] to [Lee V.] Gossick [Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission], dated June 8, 1977... (emphasis in the original). Therefore, because reprocessing of U.S.-supplied material will not be permitted by the U.S. Government in the foreseeable future, we need not reach the determination whether safeguards and physical security measures would be adequate at that reprocessing facility.

[T]he executive branch advises that there is no legal basis under the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation or the U.S.-India-IAEA trilateral safeguards agreement for permitting concurrent application of both U.S. bilateral and IAEA safeguards. In fact, the trilateral agreement specifically provides for imposition of IAEA safeguards in lieu of U.S. bilateral safeguards. State Department Supplemental Response, Appendix A at p. 10. India and the IAEA consented to be bound by the provisions of the bilateral and trilateral agree ments (respectively) in specific contemplation of the fact that U.S. bilateral safeguards would not be concurrently applied.

Recipient's Nonproliferation Policy

Article VII of the Agreement for Cooperation provides that the Government of India guarantees that no material, equipment or device transferred to the Government pursuant to the Agreement, or any special nuclear material produced at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station shall be used for atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other