On October 14, 1977, representatives of the United States and Canada signed a Joint Report concerning negotiations on maritime boundaries and related resource issues, which, inter alia, recommended the establishment of a joint fisheries commission for the cooperative management of fish stocks of common concern and a procedure for binding arbitration of outstanding differences. The Governments directed the negotiators of the Joint Report, Ambassador Marcel Cadieux for Canada and Ambassador Lloyd N. Cutler for the United States, to continue their negotiations with a view to recommending detailed terms for a comprehensive settlement.

The fisheries commission proposed by the negotiators would be composed of separate Atlantic and Pacific Coast panels with members appointed by the two governments. Each fisheries panel would review annually and, as appropriate, recommend to the two governments regulatory measures for the stocks of fish under joint management. If either of the two governments did not agree with the panel recommendations, a procedure would be established for prompt conciliation and, if necessary, binding arbitration of outstanding issues. Differences over interpretation and application of the agreement would also be subject to the arbitration procedure.

Dept. of State Press Release 478 (Oct. 21, 1978).

Portions of the Joint Report of Ambassador Cadieux and Ambassador Cutler to the Governments of Canada and the United States follow:

I. 1. On August 1, 1977, the Governments of Canada and the United States appointed special chief negotiators to conduct maritime boundary and resource negotiations. The chief negotiators were instructed to report by October 15, 1977, on the principles of a comprehensive settlement encompassing delimitation of maritime boundaries, appropriate complementary fishery and hydrocarbon arrangements and other related matters. The terms of reference also directed the chief negotiators to develop the substance of a comprehensive settlement for submission to governments by December 1, 1977. This Joint Report of the chief negotiators to their governments sets forth principles recommended by them for a comprehensive maritime boundaries and resource settlement.

3. The two negotiators consulted with their respective fishing communities on both coasts. .

4. During the first phase of the negotiations, the two sides directed their attention to the basic principles of long term resource

arrangements for fisheries and hydrocarbons as a basis for reaching detailed agreement on these issues and on boundary delimitations during the second phase.

II. FISHERIES

5. The two sides agreed on a text of "Proposed Principles for a Joint Fisheries Commission to be Established by Convention between Canada and the United States" (Attachment I). The nego tiators agreed that these principles should be the basis for further discussion of the substantive details of such an arrangement during the more detailed negotiations to be carried out in the next few months.

6. The agreed approach involves the following:

7. General Framework

There would be three categories of fish stocks covered in the Agreement, to be listed in annexes A, B and C to Attachment I.¦ These Annexes would also contain agreed entitlements to these stocks as defined in the annex for fishermen of either country, as appropriate. The stocks listed in each annex would be managed on a different basis.

8. Annex A stocks would include transboundary stocks to be subject to joint management by a Fisheries Commission (see 13 below). The Commission would annually recommend appropriate regulatory measures for these stocks under procedures including provisions for disputes settlement described in section V.

9. Annex B stocks would be stocks considered appropriate for jointly agreed management as a unit. Management of such stocks. as defined in the annex, would be based on proposals submitted by the country with the primary interest, as designated in the annex. In these cases, the Commission would recommend to governments agreed regulations following the submission of proposals by the country designated in the annex. In making such proposals, the I proposing country would be obligated to observe certain criteria, or management standards. The management standards would relate to such matters as criteria for determining optimum sustainable yield, the avoidance of adverse impact on other fisheries, and the need for nondiscrimination in regulations. These management standards have not yet been fully developed. If agreement were not reached, the proposals of the country of primary interest would take effect subject to the review procedure described below.

10. Annex C stocks would be those occurring clearly off the coast of only one country. For these stocks, the coastal state would manage the fishery, but consultations on stock assessment and regulations would take place within the Commission forum.

11. Under the aegis of the Commission, the two countries would coordinate the collection of statistics, carry out cooperative research. jointly assess the status of category A and B stocks, and discuss the disposition of their respective "surpluses" to third countries or to one another.

12. The two sides agreed that further discussion is required with regard to the disposition of surpluses and the areas in which entitlements may be fished.

III. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

13. Fisheries Commission

A Fisheries Commission would be established consisting of an Atlantic coast and Pacific coast panel. Each panel would consist of twelve members, six members appointed by each side. In addition, there would be two impartial cochairmen on each panel (who might, for example, be retired judges from the senior domestic courts of each side or other distinguished persons), one appointed by each side subject to the concurrence of the other. The cochairmen would attend and preside over meetings of each panel, but would not be members of their delegations and would not be entitled to vote with the members of the panels on the adoption of regulations. The major responsibility of the cochairmen would be to act as conciliators and arbitrators should a dispute arise concerning the interpretation and application of the Agreement or the adoption of regulations for the management of certain stocks of fish, as set out below in paragraphs 20 and 21.

14. The Commission would also have power to recommend to governments the addition of particular stocks to annex A, B or C, or the transfer of stocks from one annex to another, or changes in the agreed reciprocal fishing entitlements set out in annexes A, B and C.

15. During the second phase, the negotiations will address the categorization of the fish stocks, management criteria and reciprocal entitlements for inclusion in a long term fisheries agreement, as well as interim arrangements for the 1978 season. The two sides also agreed to look into the possibility of incorporating the existing International Pacific Halibut Commission into the new structure being developed for bilateral fisheries relations.

V. DISPUTES SETTLEMENT

19. The two sides agreed that there should be a dispute settlement procedure in the resource agreements to be negotiated.

20. With respect to the fisheries agreement, it was agreed that there should be one procedure for the settlement of all disputes under the Agreement, whether they be economic or policy disputes or legal disputes concerning the interpretation of the Agreement. 21. Any such dispute or any other dispute concerning the interpretation of the Agreement would be referred to the two cochairmen who would endeavor to settle it. If their conciliation efforts fail, they would endeavor to agree between themselves and their agreement would become final and binding on both governments. If they do not agree on a settlement, they would refer the matter to a previously agreed neutral arbitrator.

22. The arbitrator would be empowered to decide disputes concerning the management of annex A stocks. With respect to disputes

concerning annex B stocks, the arbitrator's jurisdiction would be limited to the case where a proposed plan submitted by the country designated in the annex is clearly erroneous under an applicable standard set forth in the Agreement. The arbitration would be conducted under an agreed timetable designed to produce a decision before the start of the fishing season to which the dispute relates.

ATTACHMENT I

PRINCIPLES FOR A JOINT FISHERIES COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED BY A CONVENTION BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

I. MEMBERSHIP

A) The Commission shall consist of an East coast panel and a West coast panel. The two panels may conduct joint sessions from time to time in order to consider problems of common concern. B) Each panel shall consist of twelve members, six members appointed by each side.

C) In addition to the twelve members on each panel, there shall be two impartial cochairmen who shall be jointly agreed by both sides. The cochairmen shall not be nationals of the same party and shall not be part of their respective delegations. They shall attend all meetings and shall alternate in the chair and shall perform the functions described in article V.

D) Panel members shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing side. The cochairmen shall serve for a term of five years, subject to the right of either side to withdraw its consent to the service of either cochairman upon 90 days prior written notice, in which event a successor cochairman shall be jointly agreed by both sides prior to the expiration of that 90-day period.

II. POWERS

Each panel shall have the following powers:

A) With respect to annex A stocks, each panel shall have power to propose annual management measures designed to achieve the optimum yield within the 200-mile zones of both countries. Such management measures shall be brought into force in the following

manner:

(1) If a panel agrees on the management measures to be proposed to the two governments, then:

(a) If neither government objects within days of the transmittal of the proposals, the proposals shall become final and binding on both governments.

(b) If either government objects, the procedure set forth in article V shall be utilized, and the decisions of the cochairmen or of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon both governments.

(2) If a panel does not agree on the management measures to be proposed, it shall report to the two governments on the measure of agreement and disagreement. The two governments shall consider the matter, in consultation with each other and with their respective members on the panel. After days, the panel

shall reconvene unless the two governments have first reached agreement on the management measures to be applied, in which case those measures shall become final and binding upon both governments and shall be transmitted to the panel for its records.

(a) If the panel reaches agreement upon reconsideration, the management measures so agreed shall be proposed to the two governments in accordance with the procedures set out in paragraph 1.

(b) If a panel does not reach agreement, the procedure set forth in article V shall be utilized, and the decision of the cochairmen or the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon both governments. B) With respect to annex B stocks, each panel shall endeavor in good faith to agree on the annual management measures designed to achieve the optimum yield of the stocks. Such management measures shall be developed in the following manner:

(1) The country designated in annex B shall present its proposed management plan to the panel.

(2) The panel shall consider the proposed plan in the light of the management standards set forth in article III.

(3) If the panel agrees on any proposed plan or any modifications thereof, the plan including any such modifications shall be recommended to both governments.

ments

(a) If neither government objects, the management measures in the plan shall become final and binding upon both governdays from the receipt of the recommendation. (b) If either government objects, the plan as proposed by the country designated in annex B shall apply and be binding upon both governments, subject to the review procedures described in article V.

(4) If the panel does not agree on a proposed plan or any modifications thereof, the plan as proposed by the country designated in annex B shall apply and be binding upon both governments, subject to the review procedure described in article V.

C) With respect to annex C stocks, each panel shall serve as a forum for consultation on the annual management measures proposed by the coastal state. These consultations shall be held before the measures are implemented, except where conservation considerations require their immediate implementation on a provisional basis pending the outcome of consultations.

D) Each panel shall have power to propose to both governments the addition of stocks to annex A, B or C, or the transfer of stocks from one annex to another. If neither government objects, the proposal shall become final and binding on both governments days from the receipt of the proposal and the annex shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly. If either government objects, the two governments shall consult but in the absence of agreement between the governments, no change shall be made.

E) Each panel shall have power to propose to governments changes in the reciprocal fishing entitlements set out in annexes A, B and C on the basis of new circumstances arising after the date of the Convention. If neither government objects, the proposal shall become final and binding on both governments days from the receipt of the proposal, and the annex shall be deemed to have