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been amended accordingly. If either government objects, the two governments shall consult but in the absence of agreement between the governments, no change shall be made.

III. MANAGEMENT STANDARDS

(to be developed)

IV. VOTING PROCEDURES

A) On each matter within the jurisdiction of a panel to decide. each side shall cast one vote as a unit. The vote will be cast by the member of that side designated for the purpose by the government which appointed him. Each side shall determine its own rules as to how the voting member shall be authorized to cast the vote of his side.

B) Two votes shall be needed to decide any matter.

V. ARBITRATION

A) An impartial arbitrator (the arbitrator) shall be jointly named by the parties at the time the panel is organized. The arbitrator shall decide issues referred to him by the cochairmen under sections B, C and D. Upon his appointment, the arbitrator shall be entitled to attend all panel meetings in his discretion and shall receive copies of all panel minutes and documents at the time they are issued. The arbitrator shall serve for a term of five years, subject to the right of either side to withdraw its consent to his continued service (apart from pending proceedings) at any time upon 90 days written notice, in which event a successor arbitrator shall be jointly agreed by both sides.

B) In the circumstances described in article II A 1b or in article II A 2b, the dispute over the management measures regarding annex A stocks shall be referred to the two cochairmen who shall attempt to resolve the questions in disagreement. If the two cochairmen reach an agreement within days after the dispute is referred to them, their decision shall become final and binding on both governments. Such a decision by the cochairmen shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion as to the basis for their views. In the event that the cochairmen are unable to arrive at an agreed decision, they shall refer the matter to the arbitrator provided for in section A above.

C) If in the circumstances described in article II B (3) (b) or article II B (4), either side contends that the plan as proposed by the country designated in annex B is clearly erroneous under an applicable management standard set forth in article III, the dispute shall be referred to the two cochairmen, who shall attempt to resolve the questions in disagreement. If the two cochairmen reach an agreement within days after the dispute is referred to them, their decision shall become final and binding on both governments. Such a decision by the cochairmen shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion as to the basis for their views. In the event that the cochairmen are unable to arrive at an agreed decision, they shall refer the matter to the arbitrator provided for in section A above.

D) Any other dispute involving the application or interpretation of the Convention shall be referred to the two cochairmen of the panel concerned, who shall attempt to resolve the questions in dis

agreement. If the two cochairmen reach an agreement within days after the dispute is referred to them, their decision shall become final and binding on both governments. Such a decision by the cochairmen shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion as to the basis for their views. In the event that the cochairmen are unable to arrive at an agreed decision, they shall refer the matter to the arbitrator provided for in section A above. In the event that a decision of a dispute under this section by the cochairmen of one panel is based on an interpretation of the Convention that is in conflict with an interpretation contained in a decision by the cochairmen of the other panel or the arbitrator, either government may refer to the arbitrator for a definitive interpretation.

E) (Here insert agreed arbitration procedures, including timetables for prompt decisions.)

F) The arbitrator's decisions as to the interpretation of this document, as to its violation by either side, and as to the disputes regarding management plans that are referred to him pursuant to sections B and C shall be final and binding upon the parties. Every decision by the arbitrator shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion as to the basis for his views. The arbitrator shall recommend appropriate relief, and the parties shall consult with a view to affording the recommended relief or other relief agreed by the parties. If the parties do not agree on the proper relief to be afforded, the arbitrator shall award relief that shall be binding on the parties.

VI. ACCESS

A) Each side agrees to grant access to fishermen of the other side to exercise the reciprocal fishing rights specified in annexes A, B and C.

B) (A provision relating to permits, licenses and fees for commercial fishermen exercising the reciprocal fishing privileges provided for in the Convention shall be agreed during Phase II.)

C) Recreational fishing by nationals and vessels of each country shall be permitted to continue in all waters of the other country, subject to applicable Federal, State or Provincial regulations and license, permit and fee requirements.

VII. ADOPTION OF COMMISSION DECISIONS

Each side, in accordance with its domestic laws, shall issue regulations implementing management measures which become final and binding pursuant to the Convention.

VIII. ENFORCEMENT

Each side shall enforce such regulations against all persons in its 200-mile zone, and may prosecute any violations to the extent permitted by domestic law. (Include provisions relating to inspection, reporting and exchanges of reported data.)

IX. SCIENCE

A) Each panel may establish a scientific committee.

B) There shall be a complete exchange of relevant scientific information between the two governments.

C) Each panel shall coordinate the collection of statistics and make proposals to the governments for cooperative research pro

grams. Each panel shall also facilitate joint consideration of the status of the stocks listed in annexes A and B.

X. ANNUAL MEETINGS

A) The panels shall meet not later than the fifteenth of September in each year, and as often as necessary thereafter, in order to develop proposals for the management of annex A and B stocks for the following year, and to consult regarding annex C stocks. All proposals for annex A and B stocks shall be issued three months before the beginning of fishing season for each stock.

B) The panels shall meet at such other times as they or the governments may agree.

XI. PROVISION ON PORT PRIVILEGES

XII. PROVISION ON CONSEQUENTIAL CHANGES TO OTHER AGREEMENTS

XIII. PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL UPON NOTICE XIV. RATIFICATION

The Convention shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional processes of both countries.

ANNEX A

Annex A would list: (1) the transboundary stocks on both coasts that are agreed candidates for full joint management; (2) the agreed entitlement to a portion of the allowable catch of each such stock that fishermen of each country would be allowed to catch; and (3) provisions for access into the zone of the other country as may be appropriate.

ANNEX B

Annex B would list: (1) the stocks on both coasts that are candidates for jointly agreed management based on proposals submitted by the designated country with the primary interest; (2) the agreed entitlement to a portion of the allowable catch of each such stock that fishermen of the other country would be allowed to catch; and (3) provisions for access into the zone of the other country as may be appropriate.

ANNEX C

Annex C would list: (1) the stocks on both coasts that are agreed candidates for management by the coastal state, subject only to consultation with the other state; and (2) the agreed entitlement to a portion of the allowable catch of each such stock that fishermen of the other country would be allowed to catch in the 200-mile resource zone of the coastal state.

The authority of the International Pacific Halibut Commission is specified in the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed on Mar. 2, 1953 (TIAS 2900; 5 UST 5; 222 UNTS 77; entered into force on Oct. 28, 1953).

The negotiators' proposals for dealing with hydrocarbon resources called for establishment of "share-access zones" in boundary areas. Each country would be responsible for licensing and development in its portions of the zone but would

follow an agreed timetable for exploration and, if appropriate, for development. Each country would be entitled to one-half of the oil and gas production from the entire zone. The country producing the larger share would sell at world market prices the other amounts necessary to balance the account.

Portions of the negotiators' recommendations concerning hydrocarbons follow: IV. HYDROCARBONS

16. As to offshore hydrocarbon resources, the negotiators agreed on the text of "Proposed Principles for Offshore Hydrocarbon Shared-Access Zones" (Attachment II). As is evident from this text, many of the necessary elements for a definitive agreement have now been resolved, including: (1) the basic concept of zones in the boundary areas in which each country would licence drilling in its portion of the zone; (2) the right of the country with the lesser production in the zone to purchase from the other country sufficient hydrocarbons to bring its share up to one-half the total production of the zone; (3) the desirability of agreed developmental timetables in each zone; (4) the removal of impediments to transactions under shared-access zone arrangements; (5) the responsibility of the surplus country in making available for purchase the quantities of hydrocarbons necessary to carry out the purpose of the Agreement; (6) the intent to keep separate the determination of the obligations of the surplus country as regards oil versus those as regards natural gas.

17. A number of elements will be taken up during Phase II of the negotiations, including: (1) the question of whether hydrocarbons should be made available for purchase from production of the shared-access zones or from other sources; (2) the question of determination of agreed minimal levels of production in each zone before the shared-access mechanism becomes activated; (3) clarification as to the noncumulative character of the rights of purchase for the deficit country; (4) specific procedures for disputes settlement as concerns shared-access zone arrangements.

18. The current stage of progress on hydrocarbons has been achieved largely through a Working Group set up to deal with these aspects of the negotiations. The actual delineation of possible shared-access zones has been touched upon by the Working Group, but agreement has not yet been reached as regards the number, size or configuration of such zones. This matter will be further pursued during Phase II of the negotiations, along with the drafting of developmental timetables for the shared access zones that may eventually be established. The two sides agreed there should be at least two shared-access zones, in the Gulf of Maine and Beaufort Sea regions, and the Canadian side is of the view that it would probably be desirable to have such a zone for the region off Juan de Fuca Strait as well.

ATTACHMENT II

PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR

OFFSHORE HYDROCARBON SHARED-ACCESS ZONES

1. In accordance with the principles set out below, each country would assure to the other country the right to purchase hydrocarbons 1 to the extent required to allow each to receive an amount equal to one-half of the volume of hydrocarbons produced in each shared-access zone (to be described in annex A).

2. Each country's rights to hydrocarbon resources of each shared-access zone would remain unchanged on its side of the agreed boundary-development and management of hydrocarbon resources in the shared-access zone would take place in accordance with the national laws and regulations of the country within whose jurisdiction the resource is located except as otherwise specifically provided by the Agreement.

3. The two governments would agree on a general timetable (to be described in annex B) for hydrocarbon development of each shared-access zone. Each government would make its best effort to develop these resources in accordance with the agreed timetable. In the event either country determined it was unable to meet that timeable or believed the other country had failed to meet the timetable, it would inform the other country and the two governments would consult with a view to making any adjustment in the operation of the access regime that might be necessary to carry out equitably the purpose of the Agreement. If an adjustment could not be agreed upon in a reasonable time, usually

257-179 O-7959

three months, by the governments in consultation, they would refer the issue for impartial settlement in accordance with paragraph 10. Should it be determined by agreement or arbitration that one country had failed unreasonably to meet an agreed developmental timetable, it would forfeit in whole or in part its rights of purchase under the Agreement in respect of that shared-access zone until the situation was rectified.

4. If the volume of hydrocarbons produced from a shared-access zone by one country exceeded the volume of hydrocarbons produced from that zone by the other country by more than an agreed minimum during the calendar year, dur ing the succeeding year the country with the larger production from that zone would make available for purchase by the other country a volume of hydrocarbons in an amount equal to half the difference.'

5. Any transaction under the Agreement would be exempt from any form of export restriction. and deliveries pursuant to the Agreement would be in addition to exports which would have been permitted in absence of the Agree ment.

6. The price and origin of hydrocarbons sold pursuant to the Agreement would be negotiated freely between buyer and seller. However, in the event that either country believed an additional quantity of hydrocarbons should be made available, but had not been, for purchase pursuant to the Agreement. the two governments would consult with a view to discharging the respon sibility of the surplus country to make available for purchase at the world market price of oil or the equivalent commodity value of gas any quantity of hydrocarbons necessary to carry out the purpose of the Agreement, and the government of any surplus country would undertake responsibility for making up any remaining deficit.

7. It would be the responsibility of the country with an obligation to make hydrocarbons available for purchase to inform the other country of arrangements made to effectuate the commitment and of sales made pursuant to those arrangements.

8. Sales made pursuant to the Agreement would be free of any export charges or other taxes except income taxes and royalties.

9. For the purposes of this Agreement, obligations to make oil available for purchase would be determined separately from obligations to make natural gas available for purchase.

10. Any dispute arising in respect of the interpretation or application of the Agreement would be resolved by consultation, or failing agreement, by impartial procedures for dispute settlement. (Specific procedures for dispute settlement should be developed for inclusion in the Agreement.)

Further consideration is to be given to the question of whether hydrocarbons should be made available from the shared-access zones or from other sources.

2 Further consideration is to be given to the question of determination of agreed minimums for each zone and of whether clarification is needed as to the noncumulative character of the rights of purchase.

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The International Court of Justice

On October 25, 1977, Robert L. Rosenstock, U.S. Representative to the Sixth Committee (Legal) at the United Nations, made a statement on the review of the Charter and on the strengthening of the role of the organization in which he urged that renewed consideration be given to the utilization of the International Court of Justice

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