July 1, 1968; TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483; entered into force for the United States March 5, 1970] which has now been signed by approximately a hundred nations. But we must go further.

We have seen recently India evolve an explosive device derived from a peaceful nuclear powerplant, and we now feel that several other nations are on the verge of becoming nuclear explosive powers. The United States is deeply concerned about the consequences of the uncontrolled spread of this nuclear weapon capability. We can't arrest it immediately and unilaterally. We have no authority over other countries. But we believe that these risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of reprocessing capabilities of the spent nuclear fuel from which explosives can be derived.

Plutonium is especially poisonous, and, of course, enriched uranium, thorium and other chemicals or metals can be used as well. We are now completing an extremely thorough review of our own nuclear power program. We have concluded that serious consequences can be derived from our own laxity in the handling of these materials and the spread of their use by other countries. And we believe that there is strong scientific and economic evidence that a time for a change has come.

Therefore, we will make a major change in the United States domestic nuclear energy policies and programs which I am announcing today.

We will make a concerted effort among all other countries to find better answers to the problems and risks of nuclear proliferation. And I would like to outline a few things now that we will do specifically.

First of all, we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power programs.

From my own experience, we have concluded that a viable and adequate economic nuclear program can be maintained without such reprocessing and recycling of plutonium. The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, for instance, will receive neither Federal encouragement nor funding from us for its completion as a reprocessing facility.

Second, we will restructure our own U.S. breeder program to give greater priority to alternative designs of the breeder other than plutonium, and to defer the date when breeder reactors would be put into commercial use.

We will continue research and development, try to shift away from plutonium, defer dependence on the breeder reactor for commercial use.

Third, we will direct funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs to accelerate our research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve direct access to materials that can be used for nuclear weapons.

Fourth, we will increase the U.S. capacity to produce nuclear fuels, enriched uranium in particular, to provide adequate and timely supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that need them so that

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they will not be required or encouraged to reprocess their own materials.

Fifth, we will propose to the Congress the necessary legislative steps to permit us to sign these supply contracts and remove the pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels by other countries that do not now have this capability.

Sixth, we will continue to embargo the export of either equipment or technology that could permit uranium enrichment and chemica! reprocessing.

And seventh, we will continue discussions with supplying countries and recipient countries, as well, of a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that will permit all countries to achieve their own energy needs while at the same time reducing the spread of the capability for nuclear explosive development.

Among other things-and we have discussed this with 15 or 20 nstional leaders already-we will explore the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program so that we can share with countries that have to reprocess nuclear fuel the responsibility for curtaining the ability for the development of explosives.

One other point that ought to be made in the international negotiation field is that we have to help provide some means for the storage of spent nuclear fuel materials which are highly explosive, highly radioactive in nature.

I have been working very closely with and personally with some of the foreign leaders who are quite deeply involved in the decisions that we make. We are not trying to impose our will on those nations like Japan and France and Britain and Germany which already have reprocessing plants in operation. They have a special need that we don't have in that their supplies of petroleum products are not available.

But we hope that they will join with us-and I believe that they will-in trying to have some worldwide understanding of the extreme threat of the further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 502–504 (April 11, 1977).

During the question-and-answer session with reporters following his prepared remarks, President Carter was asked whether he favored regional reprocessing centers and whether he would be prepared to cut off supplies of any kind of nuclear material to countries pursuing a nuclear option. He responded:

Well, I can't answer either one of those questions yet. I have had detailed discussions with Prime Minister Fukuda, with Chancellor Schmidt, and also with Prime Minister Callaghan, for instance, just in recent days about a joint approach to these kinds of problems.

Obviously, the smaller nations, the ones that now have established atomic powerplants, have to have some place either to store their

spent fuel or have it reprocessed. And I think that we would very likely see a continuation of reprocessing capabilities within those nations that I have named and perhaps others.

We in our own country don't have this requirement. It's an option that we might have to explore many, many years in the future.

But I hope that by this unilateral action we can set a standard and that those countries that don't now have reprocessing capability will not acquire that capability in the future. Regional plants under tight international control obviously is one option that we would explore. No decision has been made about that.

If we felt that the provision of atomic fuel was being delivered to a nation that did not share with us our commitment to nonproliferation, we would not supply that fuel.

Id. 504.

In a message to the U.S. Congress dated April 27, 1977, President Carter requested the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act. After commending Congress for its previous initiatives to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, President Carter outlined ways in which the Administration's bill differed from pending proposals:

1. It defines the immediate nuclear export conditions which we can reasonably ask other nations to meet while we negotiate stricter arrangements. The proposals currently before Congress would impose criteria that could force an immediate moratorium on our nuclear exports, adversely affecting certain allies whose cooperation is needed if we are to achieve our ultimate objective of nonproliferation.

2. It defines additional nuclear export conditions which will be required in new agreements for civil nuclear cooperation. In particular, we will require as a continuing condition of U.S. supply that recipients have all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. I view this as an interim measure and shall make it clear to all potential recipients and to other nuclear suppliers that our first preference, and continuing objective, is universal adherence to the NonProliferation Treaty.

3. For the near future, it attempts to tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation through renegotiation of existing agreements to meet the same standards as those we will require in new agreements. I believe that this approach will better meet our nonproliferation objectives than will the unilateral imposition of new export licensing conditions.

4. It increases the flexibility we need to deal with an extremely complex subject. For example, instead of requiring countries that want our nuclear exports to foreswear fuel enrichment and reprocessing for all time, it allows us to draft new agreements using incentives to encourage countries not to acquire such facilities. It also permits me to grant exceptions when doing so would further our basic aim of nonproliferation. All new cooperation agreements would, of course, be subiect to congressional review.

13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 611 (Apr. 27, 1977).

President Carter stressed that the Administration "bill is intended to reassure other nations that the United States will be a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment for those who genuinely share our desire for nonproliferation.” Id.

A fact sheet concerning the proposed bill issued on April 27, 1977, by the White House announced the following additional Administration policy in making recommendations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on export licensing:

The bill establishes for the first time a statutory requirement forbidding the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from granting a license to export nuclear materials or facilities until it has been notified by the executive branch of its judgment that the issuance of a license "will not be inimicable to the common defense and security." This judgment will be reached by the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

In arriving at these judgments, the executive branch will adhere to the following policies not detailed in the Act:

-continue to embargo the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants;

-avoid new commitments to export significant amounts of separated plutonium except for gram quantities for research and analytical uses;

-avoid new commitments to export significant quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) except when the project is of exceptional merit and the use of low enriched fuel or some other less weapons useable material is clearly shown to be technically infeasible;

-require direct Presidential approval for any supply of HEU greater than 15 kilograms (the approximate amount needed for a bomb);

-undertake efforts to identify projects and facilities which might be converted to the use of LEU instead of HEU.

-take steps to minimize inventories of weapons useable uranium abroad.

Id. 612.

The Presidential message, bill, and section-by-section analysis of the bill appear in Message from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide a more efficient and effective control over the proliferation of nuclear explosives by amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as amended, and for other purposes, H.R. Doc. No. 95-131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was approved on Mar. 10, 1978. See P.L. 95-242, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

On April 28, 1977, the U.S. Senate approved Senate Resolution 94, which commended President Carter for his efforts to seek international cooperation to curb nuclear proliferation. The text of the resolution, which was introduced by Senator Charles H. Percy, follows:

Whereas the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices poses a grave threat to continued international progress toward world peace. and development;

Whereas the detonation of nuclear explosives, even by developing countries, underscores the urgency of this threat;

Whereas the Senate of the United States ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which committed the United States "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. . .

Whereas non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed to accept international safeguards to prevent "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices";

Whereas the proposed transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to non-nuclear-weapon states would enhance their ability to construct nuclear weapons;

Whereas the accumulation of spent reactor fuel, containing potential weapons-grade material, under the sovereign control of nonnuclear-weapon states raises immediate dangers of further nuclearweapons proliferation;

Whereas the continued indigenous development of nuclear facilities (including reprocessing and enrichment) beyond the reach of existing international controls emphasizes the imperative need to increase the scope, comprehensiveness, and effectiveness of international safeguards and other controls on the use of nuclear technology;

Whereas international efforts to control proliferation historically have failed to keep pace with world nuclear development, and

Whereas there is a pressing need for more concerted United States leadership to raise international awareness of the magnitude of the proliferation threat and to seek effective international action to curb proliferation: Now therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate of the United States

(a) commends the President of the United States for his stated intentions to give diplomatic priority to the pursuit of nonproliferation measures;

(b) endorses and strongly supports active consultations and negotiations with world leaders on the highest level

(1) to curb the spread of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities to non-nuclear-weapon states and otherwise discourage the diversion of nuclear equipment or materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(2) to achieve acceptance of international safeguards on all nuclear activities by non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as seek international cooperation to improve the packaging and handling of high