level wastes and to provide for international storage of plutonium, spent reactor fuel, and other sensitive nuclear materials;

(3) to explore possible international arrangements for the provision of nuclear fuel services to help meet the legitimate needs of cooperating states;

(4) to explore the feasibility of establishing international sanctions to be applied against any non-nuclear-weapon state which detonates a nuclear explosive device, or abrogates or materially violates any international nonproliferation controls; and

(5) to strengthen the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and

(c) shall act promptly on legislation to enact a clear statement of goals for United States nonproliferation policy providing guidance and support to these Presidential diplomatic initiatives, and to establish a clear statutory framework for the development and implementation of United States nuclear export policy.

123 Cong. Rec. S 6710 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1977).

On October 19, 1977, President Carter made some remarks at the opening Plenary Session of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Conference urging the representatives of the 40 nations and four international organizations gathered at the Conference to find a means by which nations can cooperate in a safer fashion in the peaceful uses of atomic power. Excerpts from his remarks, in which he urged that an international fuel bank be established, follow:

It's important that we know what potential nuclear fuel cycles are available to us, the quantity and the location of uranium and thorium and other nuclear fuels, the methods used for extraction, the methods used and the costs for enrichment, possible distribution systems, the proper design and use, standardization of powerplants. safety of people who live near them, proper siting considerations, the political objections to atomic powerplants themselves, the possible need for breeder reactors, the handling of spent fuel, the need or absence of a need for reprocessing the spent fuel, and international safeguards that will prevent the development of explosives.

We are eager to cooperate as a nation which is a consumer and also a supplier. We want to be sure that where there is a legitimate need and where there's a mutually agreed upon nonproliferation restraint, that there be an adequate supply of nuclear fuel.

I think an international fuel bank should be established, so that if there is a temporary breakdown in the bilateral supply of nuclear fuel, that there might be a reservoir of fuel to be supplied under those circumstances. And we'll certainly contribute our own technical ability and our own portion of the enriched uranium supplies for that purpose.

We are very eager, also, to help solve the problem of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel itself. We can't provide storage for the major portion of the world's spent fuel, but we are willing to cooperate.

And when a nation demonstrates to us your need for spent nuclear fuel storage, we hope to be prepared to accept that responsibility, working closely with you.

All the costs of the nuclear fuel cycle should be accurately known, as well as possible. And there should be an open-minded approach to this very controversial and very difficult subject.

13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1567 (Oct. 24, 1977).

The Final Communique of the Organizing Conference of INFCE indicated that an evaluation would be conducted along the lines set out in an attached document entitled "International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation: Technical and Economic Scope and Methods of Work." Eight work groups were formed to evaluate the following topics: 1) Fuel and Heavy Water Availability; 2) Enrichment Availability; 3) Assurance of Long Term Supply of Technology; 4) Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, Recycle; 5) Fast Breeders; 6) Spent Fuel Management; 7) Waste Management and Disposal; 8) Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts.

Doc. 41 (Oct. 21, 1977) and Doc. 2/Rev. 3 (Oct. 21, 1977).

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

In keeping with the pledge he made in his Pan American Day Address before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States at the Pan American Union at Washington, D.C., on April 14, 1977, President Carter signed Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on May 26, 1977. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967), which is known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, established the first nuclear-free zone in any populated region of the world. Additional Protocol I (1967) obligates states outside Latin America to apply several of the Treaty's denuclearization provisions to territories within the nuclear-free zone for which they are internationally responsible. President Carter's signature on Protocol I thus signaled his intention to bring U.S. territories in Latin America under the scope of the nuclear-free zone. The United States will not be bound by the obligations of Protocol I until the U.S. Senate gives its advice and consent to the ratification of this Protocol and the President deposits an appropriate instrument of ratification. The principal territories involved are Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba, and the Panama Canal Zone.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was opened for signature in February of 1967, is currently in force for twenty-one Latin American States. Latin American parties to the Treaty are obligated to pro

hibit in their respective territories the manufacture, testing, use, storage, deployment, or possession of nuclear weapons, whether by the parties themselves or by anyone else. In addition, the parties themselves are prohibited from engaging in the testing, use, manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. However, the Treaty does not affect the right of Latin American parties, under international law, to grant transit and transport privileges, such as port visits and overflight rights, to states not located in the nuclearfree zone.

To ensure compliance, each party is obligated to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) covering all of its nuclear facilities. In addition to IAEA inspections provided for in such safeguards agreements, each party is obligated to permit a regional authority to carry out special inspections on its territory if requested by another party.

The Treaty specifies that it will enter into force for those states that have ratified it once the following requirements have been met: (1) ratification of the Treaty by all Latin American States in existence in 1967; (2) adherence to Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty by all states eligible to adhere; (3) conclusion of the safeguards agreements with the IAEA. However, states that have ratified the Treaty are given the option to waive these requirements and thereby to become bound by the Treaty before the requirements are

met.

At the present time, twenty-one Latin American States have ratified the Treaty, waived the requirements for entry into force, and are therefore bound by the Treaty. Two states, Brazil and Chile, have ratified but not waived those requirements. Two other states, Argentina and Surinam, have signed but not ratified. Still two other states, Cuba and Guyana, have not signed the Treaty.

While only Latin American States are eligible to become Contracting Parties to the Treaty, there are two Additional Protocols to which states outside Latin America are eligible to adhere. Additional Protocol II (1967) obligates nuclear weapon states to respect the Latin American nuclear-free zone and not to contribute in any way to acts involving a violation against any party to the Treaty. The United States ratified Protocol II in May of 1971. At present, the People's Republic of China, France, and the United Kingdom have also ratified, but the Soviet Union has not.

U.S. adherence to Protocol I, which would be accomplished, would ban the testing, use, storage, or deployment of nuclear weapons in the indicated U.S. territories. U.S. adherence to Protocol I would not affect the right of U.S. naval vessels to call at ports in those territories.

nor would it affect freedom of navigation on the high seas surrounding Latin America. Of the other states eligible to adhere to Protocol I, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have done so, while France has not.

For the text of President Carter's Pan American Day Address, see 76 Dept. of State Bulletin 453-457 (1977).

For the text of President Carter's remarks upon signing Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on May 26, 1977, see 13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 823 (May 30, 1977).

Nuclear Transfers

Section 12 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (Public Law 95–92), approved August 4, 1977, amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, by prohibiting, unless the President makes certain determinations in writing to Congress, a broad range of economic and security assistance to certain countries which detonate a nuclear explosive device or which make nuclear enrichment or reprocessing transfers to third countries without prescribed safeguards.

The text of sec. 12, which amends Ch. 3 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by striking out sec. 669 and inserting in lieu thereof new sections, follows:

SEC. 669. NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT TRANSFERS.-(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export Control Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance, providing military or security supporting assistance or grant military education and training, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country which, on or after the date of enactment of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977, delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country, unless before such delivery—

(1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; and

(2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards system of such Agency.

(b) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under such subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that—

(A) the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests; and

(B) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so. Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting such determination in each particular case.

(2) Any joint resolution which would terminate or restrict assistance described in subsection (a) with respect to a country to which the prohibition in such subsection applies shall, if introduced within thirty days after the transmittal of a certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection with respect to such country, be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601 (b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

SEC. 670. NUCLEAR REPROCESSING TRANSFERS AND NUCLEAR DETONATIONS.-(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export Control Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance, providing military or security supporting assistance or grant military education and training, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country which on or after the date of enactment of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977—

(1) delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to any other country or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country (except for the transfer of reprocessing technology associated with the investigation, under international evaluation programs in which the United States participates, of technologies which are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing); or

(2) is not a nuclear-weapon state as defined in article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which detonates a nuclear explosive device.

(b) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under such subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Repre sentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. The President shall transmit with such certification a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.

(2) Any joint resolution which would terminate or restrict assistance described in subsection (a) with respect to a country to which the prohibition in such subsection applies shall, if introduced within thirty days after the transmittal of a certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection with respect to such country, be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

91 Stat. 620.

Sec. 3 of art. IX of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reads in pertinent part as follows: "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."

Sec. 601 (b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 provides for an expedited procedure for the U.S. Senate to consider a resolution.

Sec. 14 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977 contains the following prohibition concerning assistance for nuclear powerplants:

None of the funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for the fiscal year 1978 may be used to finance the construction of, the operation or maintenance of, or the supply of fuel for, any nuclear powerplant under an agreement for cooperation between the United States and any other country.

91 Stat. 622.

Strategic Arms Limitation

On March 30, 1977, President Carter reported to a news conference on the U.S. strategic arms limitation proposals made by Secretary Vance to the leaders of the Soviet Union in Moscow at the end of March 1977. After indicating, inter alia, that the Soviet Union had not accepted "at least at this point" a U.S. proposal to make substantial reductions in the number, development, and deployment of various missile systems, President Carter stated that the United States and