application of equal opportunity of trade and the impairment of China's sovereignty and integrity. In short, the Open Door Doctrine has hitherto not been effective and binding. But now, as an outcome of the Washington Conference, the Powers have not only reaffirmed, reasserted, revitalized, specified and amplified the Doctrine, but also solemnly undertaken not to violate its principles, regardless of the observance by the other Powers, thus abandoning the original reservation or qualification which rendered the Doctrine ineffective and non-obligatory.

Moreover, to secure the successful application of the Doctrine, whenever a situation arises which involves the application of the provisions, the Powers agree that there should be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned. As a further means of dealing with the questions that may arise in connection with the execution of the provisions relating to the equal opportunity of trade, they resolve that there should be established in China a Board of Reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid provisions may be referred for investigation and report. The detailed plan for the constitution of the Board is to be formulated by the Special Conference provided in the Treaty of February 6, 1922, with reference to the Chinese Customs Tariff.56 Thus, the third condition of the coöperation of the Powers interested in the observance of the Open Door Doctrine is fulfilled.

In conclusion, reference must be made to the New International Banking Consortium. This is a living and physical personification of the Open Door doctrine. It embodies the leading principles of the policy. It aims, by an international pooling of interests, to maintain the equal opportunity of trade. It aims, moreover, to preserve, as far as feasible, the territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity of China. Regarding the three conditions necessary for the successful application of the Open Door policy, it already enjoys two-the direct par

ticipation of the United States and the coöperation of the Powers interested. Its remaining need is the coöperation of China herself, which, under favorable conditions, can be obtained by proper approach and fair dealing. The success, therefore, of the new Consortium spells the success of the Open Door doctrine, while the failure of the new Consortium means the failure of the Open Door policy.55

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Morse, Internatl. Rel. of the Chinese Emp., Vol. 3, p. 350, et seq.; U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., pp. 86, 121.

2. W. F. Mannix, Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 280. 3. U. S. For. Rel., 1908, p. 64, et seq.

4. U. S. For. Rel., 1912, p. 88 et seq.; MacMurray, 1911/2. 4A. U. S. For. Rel., 1912, p. 94, Note Verbale, Feb. 24, 1911. 5. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, p. 345.

6. John Hay's Letter to Paul Dana, dated Mar. 16, 1899, W. R. Thayer, The Life of John Hay, Vol. 2, p. 241.

7. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 128 et seq.

8. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 132, Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Sept. 6, 1899.

9. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 141-142, Count Mouravieff to Mr. Tower, dated Dec. 18-30, 1899.

10. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 142, John Hay's Instructions to Ambassadors at the Capitals of the Powers Addressed. 10A. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 30, Art. V.

10B. Ibid., p. 29.

11. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 132.

12. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 136, Lord Salisbury to Mr. Choate, Νον. 30, 1899.

13. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1906/2.

14. MacMurray, 1913/11, and 1915/10.

15. MacMurray, 1895/5.

16-20. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2., p. 30, Art. IV.

21. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 132, Mr. Hay to Mr. Choate, Sept. 6, 1899.

22. Ú. S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 141, Mr. Hay to Mr. Tower, Sept. 6, 1899.

23. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 12.

24. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 32.

24A. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 29, Art. I.

24B. Ibid., p. 30, Art. VI.

25. U. S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 1, Circular Telegram Respecting the Territorial Integrity of China, Jan. 13, 1905.

26. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 243-245, Jan. 6, 1910.

26A. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 29, Art. I.

27. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 12.

28. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., ibid, p. 32.

28A. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 29.

29. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 203-205, the Sec'y of State to the Russian Ambassador, Apr. 9, 1908.

30. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 243-245, Statement given to Press, Jan. 6, 1910.

31. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, App. A, p. 361 et seq.

32. U. S. For. Rel., 1901, App., Affairs in China, p. 12.

33. U. S. For. Rel., 1913, p. 170-171, Statement Issued to Press by President Wilson, March 18, 1913.

34A. N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1916, p. 17.

34B. N. Y. Times, July 30, 1918, p. 13.

35. Millard, Our Eastern Question, App. L, pp. 452-456.

36. Hearings before the Comm. on For. Rel., U. S. Sen., 66th Cong., First Ses., on Treaty of Peace with Germany, pp. 225-226. U. S. For. Rel., 1908, pp. 510-512.

37. U. S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 129, 132, etc.

38. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 26.

39. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 234-235, the Sec'y of State to Ambassador Reid, Nov. 6, 1909.

40. Thos. W. Lamont, Preliminary Report on the New Consortium for China, pp. 5-6.

41. Hearings before the Committee on For. Rel., op. cit., Sen. Document No. 106, p. 225.

42. Hearings before the Comm. on For. Rel., ibid, p. 224. 43. Hearings, ibid., p. 226.

44. Vide infra, Part 3, The Policy of Japan in China, chaps. on the Policy of Paramount Influence, and the Policy of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.

44A. Sen. Doc. 126, 67-2, p. 223, 6th Plenary Session.

45. W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China, p. 263.

46. U. S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 26.

47. W. W. Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 263-264.

49. W. R. Thayer, The Life of John Hay, Vol. 2, p. 369.

51. Millard, Our Eastern Question, p. 357, The Annual Report

of the American Association of China, on Dec. 29, 1914.

52. U. S. For. Rel., 1910, pp. 243-245, Statement given to Press

by the Department of State, Jan. 6, 1910.

53. N. Y. Times, July 30, 1918.

53A. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 29, Art. II.

53B. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 29, Art. III.

54. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 30, Art. VI.

55. Sen. Doc. 126, 67-2, p. 170, 6th Plenary Session.

56. Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, p. 37, Resolution Regarding a Board of Reference for Far Eastern Questions.

eign Power to hold Korea therefore is, as the Japanese statesmen put it, to allow that Power to hold a dagger at the heart of Japan. For measures of self-defense, therefore, she must maintain the independence of Korea.

Holding such a policy, Japan's first object of attack was naturally China, who claimed suzerainty over Korea. To free Korea from the control of China was therefore one of the cardinal principles of her foreign policy. As we have seen,2 as early as 1876, she had concluded a treaty with Korea recognizing the independence of that state, thus ignoring the suzerainty of China. Again, in 1884, to settle the collision between the Chinese and the Japanese troops in Korea, a convention was arranged that, in case of despatching troops to Korea, previous notice in writing had to be given each to the other, thus successfully limiting the suzerain rights of China, and meanwhile asserting Japan's joint influence over Korea. Finally, in 1894, when, on account of the Tonghak Rebellion, the forces of the two states were brought face to face in Korea, and although the rebellion had already been suppressed by the Korean soldiers, and China had already suggested a simultaneous withdrawal, Japan nevertheless refused to retire. On the contrary she insisted on coöperating for the reformation of the internal administration of Korea, to which China refused to accede. Conflict could have been avoided, had Japan so desired, but she had already determined on her policy which was to extinguish the suzerain claims of China, achieve the independence of Korea, and attain a footing of national equality with a defeated China. Thus resolved, and the incident of Kowshing having offered the pretext," she forced the war.

Having demonstrated her national prowess, she made good use of her victories to consolidate her own position of national equality. By the treaty of Shimonoseki, apart from the recognition of Korean independence, the cession