tation. It was not to connote political domination, or territorial aggression, or preferential privileges, or any antagonism to the principles of the Open Door Doctrine. It meant simply a special relation between Japan and China due to geographical proximity and the dependence of the former upon the latter for national prosperity and existence.38 ... With our own national existence largely dependent on that of our neighbor, we are naturally interested in that country to a greater extent than any of the countries remotely situated. "To say that Japan has special interests in China is simply to state a plain and actual fact. It intimates no claim or pretension of any kind prejudicial to China or to any other foreign nation. "We do not seek any territory in China, but we do seek a field of economic activity beneficial as much to China as to Japan, based always on the principle of the open door and equal opportunity." Concluding, it may be said that Japan's policy of paramount influence was dictated by her desire to acquire the largest sphere of influence, to displace Western preponderating influence, and to maintain her own special position; that she sought to execute the policy through the establishment of the largest sphere of influence, the attainment of trade predominance, the propagation of her new culture, and the maintenance of her special position; but that with the conclusion of the Nine Power Treaty, which outlaws the practice of the spheres of influence, exclusive privileges and unfair discriminations, she relinquishes these practices, and seeks to execute the policy through the attainment of trade predominance, the propagation of her new culture, and the maintenance of her special position. NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 1. Siebert and Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy and The World, p. 17, 39. 2, 3. Kawakami, Japan and World Peace, pp. 161-162. 4. MacMurray, 1905/18; W. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China, p. 313. 5, 6. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 19; MacMurray, 1915/8; Sino-Japanese Negotiations, p. 49 et seq. 7. MacMurray, 1915/8; Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 55 et seq. 8. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915,, p. 22. 9. Ibid., pp. 69-70. 10. Vida supra, chapter on the Policy of Economic Exploitation. 11. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 22. 12. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 13. Millard's Review, May 1, 1920, p. 445 et seq., the resolution of the inter-allied technical board. 14, 15. Millard's Review, May 22, 1920, p. 574. 16. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 307. 17, 18. H. K. Tong, article on The Inter-Allied Watch Dog of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Millard's Review, June 26, 1920, p. 211 et seq. 18A. Articles III and IV, Nine Power Treaty, Sen. Doc. 124, 67-2, pp. 29-30. 18B. See Chapter XXIV, The New International Banking Consortium, p. 402. 18C. Sen. Doc. 126, 67-2, p. 755, p. 194. 19. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 192. 20. MacMurray, 1898/2. 21. Hornbeck, op. cit., p. 264. 22. Ibid., p. 265 et seq.; U. S. For. Rel., 1906, p. 162 et seq.; 1907, p. 130 et seq. 23. U. S. Commerce Reports, Feb. 20, 1915, Report of Consul General P. S. Heintzleman, Dec. 21, 1914, p. 716 et seq; Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, p. 267. 24. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, pp. 274-275. 25. Ibid., p. 275. 26. For the manipulation of Chinese currency in Manchuria, see H. K. Tong, article on Driving American and European Business out of Manchuria, Millard's Review, June 29, 1918, p. 168; Violating the "Open Door" in Manchuria, Millard's Review, July 20, 1918, p. 294. 27. Art. III, Sen. Doc. 124, p. 29, 67-2. 27A. Sen. Doc. 126, 67-2, p. 223. 28. J. O. P. Bland, article on A Goal for Japanese Ambition, Asia, February, 1921, p. 147. 29. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations, 1915, p. 22. 30. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session, Senate Document No. 106, on the Treaty of Peace with Germany, p. 225. 31. Vide infra, chapter on the Policy of Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. 32. Hearings, op. cit., p. 229 et seq. 33. Ibid., p. 233. 34, 35. Ibid., p. 230; Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 148; Letter of Russian Ambassador at Tokio, Oct. 22, 1917. 36. Millard, Democracy and the Eastern Question, p. 149; The Shantung Question, op. cit., p. 15; Krupensky's Third Dispatch, Nov. 1, 1917. 37. Kawakami, Japan and World Peace, p. 161. 38. Sen. Doc., 126, 67-2, p. 223. XIV THE POLICY OF POLITICAL CONTROL As we have already seen, Japan's whole policy turned on two fundamental problems-the problem of the increasing population of Japan and the question of China. Out of the first the policy of economic exploitation and the policy of territorial expansion developed, manifesting partly also in the policy of paramount influence. Out of the second, the Chinese question, there arose her policy of paramount influence and that of political control which constitutes the theme of our present chapter and the "Asiatic" Monroe Doctrine which will be discussed in the next chapter. Japan's policy of political control was largely an outgrowth of the conditions in China. Ever since the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the control of the Central Government had relaxed and weakened, and the provinces had practically become independent states. Armies were maintained by the various provinces, over which the President had little control. As a result, the provinces could declare their independence, almost at will. Thus, over the issue of the constitutionality of the dissolution of the Parliament in 1917, the provinces split into North and South. Again, taxes, other than those under foreign supervision were, in the main, collected by the provinces, which could refuse to remit quotas as requisitioned. As a consequence, the provinces failed to send remittances, and the Central Government was compelled to live on loans. As it did not enjoy the confidence of the people, it was forced to resort to foreign financial aid. In doing so, it mortgaged one asset after another, thereby placing the country under the danger of foreclosure. Added to this was the corruption of some of the leading officials who in exchange for the rich commission they could gain from the loans passing through their hands, did not hesitate to contract foreign loans, regardless of future consequences. Such a combination of situations— civil war, foreign borrowing, and official corruption— could not but give rise to the apprehension of possible bankruptcy and Western control. If the conditions existing in China were free from foreign influences, Japan would probably have been less anxious. As it was, the Western Powers had made China a happy hunting ground for gaining concessions and exploiting natural resources. They would not hesitate, save for the rise of Chinese nationalism, to make the country a second Africa or Egypt. And yet, in face of the foreign menace, China remained divided, incapable of resisting alien aggression, and headed toward the abyss of bankruptcy and foreign control. To the mind of Japan, granting the continuance of existing conditions, and provided no new factors of salvation should arise, foreign control would be China's well-nigh inevitable fate. As was said, "If this unhappy condition is permitted to continue much longer, the outside Powers interested in China will sooner or later combine their influence to establish international supervision over that country.” 1-2 As Besides, had China been located far away and had she not been of the same racial and linguistic family, Japan would not have been so much impelled to action. it is, China is situated at the door of Japan and is of the same family in race and language. Should China ever pass under Western control, thus losing her independent existence, Japan would be left all alone in the world-to face the increasing domination of the West. What is worse, Japan's destiny and welfare are intimately related to those of China. Japan depends upon her for the supply of basic materials, particularly coal, iron and steel, for a market for her manufactured products, and for mutual coöperation against the Western |