T

HE Army War College

was

founded by Elihu Root, the great Secretary of War in the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations. The first mention of an Army War College in a War Department document is contained in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1899. Its first appropriation appears in the Army Appropriation Bill for 1900, and it was established in a General Order of 1901. Upon Mr. Root's recommendation, the present beautiful and substantial War College building at Washington Barracks was authorized by Congress, and plans for the building were approved by the Secretary of War in 1902.

In recognition of the important part played by Mr. Root in its conception and fulfillment, a tablet bearing the following inscription has been placed in the rotunda opposite the main entrance:

"Because of the special interest and effort of Elihu Root, Secretary of War, creator of the General Staff of the Army. this building for the Army was authorized by Acts of Congress, approved June 30, 1902, and April 23, 1904. Architects, McKim, Mead and White. Constructing engineer. John Stephan Sewell, Captain, Corps of Engineers, United States Army. Corner stone

laid February 21. 1903;

The building was dedicated in 1908. In his report as Secretary of War for 1901, Mr. Root speaks of it as "a college * * * established for an advanced course of professional study by Army officers." As such, it has, since its establishment, continued to operate, with short interruptions due to the exigencies of border service and the World War. After the close of the World War it resumed operations in the fall of 1919 with a broadened field and a broadened outlook. Its general mission, restated in War Department instructions from time to time, is now crystallized into the following definite terms:

Mission: To train officers for: (a) High command and staff, to include units higher than the Army Corps; (b) War Department General Staff duty and duty in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War; (c) Corps Area Command and General Staff Duty.

The officers designated to take this training are mature officers, specially selected from those who have shown

future eligibility for the War Department General Staff to graduates of the Army War College.

The course is ten months, running from September 1 to June 30. For instructional purposes the faculty is divided into six divisions; designated. Command, War Plans, G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. Their work is coordinated and supervised by the commandant and assistant commandant.

There is conducted throughout the year a course of lectures on topics related to each of the several courses. These lectures number more than one hundred twenty-five. They are given at times appropriate to the subjects to which they particularly relate. The speakers are recognized authorities and have in the past included the President of the United States, Mr. Baker, Mr. Weeks, General Pershing, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Baruch, and many others foremost in their particular lines.

The Command course, in general, covers tactics, strategy, logistics, and

Plans division of eral Staff, joint A Navy planning, met operations involved formulation of spe plans, surveys of v tegic areas of the States and its pos typical war plans of U. S. Naval war pl second devoted to ac plans against an enemy, comprising th ulation of basic pla their development to statements of the ments of the theatre erations to carry operations proposed basic plans. This runs eight weeks.

A G-1 course weeks is devoted to i ative studies of the principle methods of procurement, classif assignment and replacement of n personnel; of the duties and fur of G-1 in the War Department, area headquarters, and the headqu of units higher than the army and of the solution of G-1 proble individual officers. There is othe work in the development of the plans mentioned under war plans will be referred to later.

The G-2 course, of about eight w includes studies of the war-making tial of the leading nations of the w to include the economic, political sociological as well as the purely tary factors; world survey of impo military raw materials; instructio the duties of G-2 officers in the Department, corps area headquarters at the headquarters of units higher the army corps; and solution of problems by individual officers.

A G-3 course of four weeks is (Continued on Page Fifteen)

THE Τ

HE preamble to the Constitution is a true platform of democracy. In weighing its words, we note that one of the primary objects sought by the framers of the Constitution was to "provide for the common defense." And yet after all their experience this particular provision of the national organization was ignored for more than a century. It is a fact not generally understood that neglect of the common defense in the past has been the cause of most of our dangers as well as the larger part of our burdens, and it may be said with equal truthfulness that regard for this provision in the future is the best assurance not only of national integrity, but of all other blessings sought in the great charter of our liberties.

Within the first year after his inauguration Washington stated his views of our national military policy in these words:

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite."

He visualized a system of defense based upon the idea of an army of the people themselves, armed and disciplined for their own security. Two years later, Congress, in passing the Militia Act, attempted to carry this policy into effect by providing that all citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 should be liable to military service in the event of emergency. The country was divided into military areas based upon population, and in each area officers of the locality were to enroll all able-bodied men for service, and assemble them from time to time for training and inspection.

From the standpoint of a national military organization, this law was almost ideal. Under its terms, supported by an intelligent public sentiment, the tradition and organization of the Revolutionary Army might have been transmitted to posterity. With veterans of experience as officers

Success of the National Defense Plans Dependent Upon Quality

of Our Citizenship

and non-commissioned officers for such a national force, Washington might have established a peace-time military institution adaptable to all the needs of the nation.

But sound as this law was from the standpoint of organization, the system was a complete failure, mainly because Washington was not given the power to secure the appointment of competent officers. The Constitution reserved this authority to the several states and, under the conditions then existing, the states were unwilling to exercise it on the basis of sound Federal standards of efficiency. The rejection of Washington's advice has caused us to risk our national existence in two great wars. Not only did the country enter these wars quite unready, but in all probability they would not have occurred if we had been organized and disciplined as he recommended.

The whole system

failed dismally, especially in the War of 1812, and, even to our day, this wise conception of a national citizen army has been discredited.

Under our new National Defense Act of 1920, we are undertaking to construct a citizen army similar in all essential respects to that which Washington proposed. And in large measure we are succeeding, first because our people, actuated by a new public sentiment born of the experience of the World War, have accepted the principal that no man should be entrusted with military command without being definitely prepared and tested for that responsibility in time of peace, and second, because military service and training carry with them an awakened appreciation of corresponding civic obligations.

In the National Guard and the Organized Reserves we are building the framework of an army of the people, a disciplined people, such as Washington had in mind. Its officers

at present are veteran soldiers with military experience in the World War. As we cannot always have these patriotic men with us, we shall through our national voluntary training system gradually prepare younger men to replace them. The completion of this basic organization will assure permanent provision for our national security for the first time in our history, and moreover, such a provision will without doubt become a compelling influence for world peace.

The conception of a free people organized and disciplined for their own defense implies a people trained for all of the duties of democratic citizenship. When we examine the national objectives stated in the preamble to the Constitution, we are led to believe that if we train our people for the duties of common defense, we also, to a large extent, prepare them to meet their obligations toward the other objectives stated therein. That is to say, through such opportunity there is occasion not only to improve physically, learn military teamwork, develop initiative and leadership, but to receive instruction in the ideals of sacrifice and service for our common Americanism embodying the spirit of country.

The responsibility of the War Department to provide for national defense, as thus briefly outlined, involves the maintenance of a small regular army whose duty it is to prepare plans, train the citizen forces, and also to meet minor emergencies as they arise. But there can be no adequate force to meet great emergencies unless the citizens themselves recognize their individual obligation by preparing and holding themselves in readiness for service whenever necessary.

The success of our national defense plans then depends upon the quality of our citizenship. In this the War Department is vitally interested, but it can have no active control or direction of the general education of citizens for, in harmony with our institutions, all training for (Continued on Page Twelve)

"W

HY are we getting recruits?" A very reasonable question; one that should not require an answer to any well informed citizen, but one to which the answer is necessary because of not only the large number of citizens who do not understand, but also because of a very active and well financed propaganda . adverse to all military activities, the evident object of which is to affect adversely all such activities by the government. In the closing days of the last session of Congress there was read into the records of the United States Senate evidence of a recent donation of fifty thousand dollars, cash, by a prominent woman in New York City, for the purpose of promoting active propaganda within religious organizations against activities of the United States government, intended to protect this country against its public and private enemies. However skeptical one may be as to the effects of such a donation for such a purpose, it is at least a curious coincidence that shortly afterward an active propaganda was observed in many places by clergymen and religious organization workers, the general slogan of which is "No More War", and the general tendency of which is opposed to all forms of military activity. Another curious coincidence, if it be only a coincidence, is that in the Army recruiting declined 40 per cent in the first month of this propaganda (February 1923). and the first 12 days of March showed a still greater decrease in enlistments for the Army.

In view of the reasonable inquiry, apparently based upon genuine ignorance of the reasons why recruiting is necessary at the present time, and in view of the significant decline in recruiting production noted in February and March, 1923, and still in evidence this attempt is made to answer the question, and to arouse patriotic citizens to active support of their Government.

"Why are we getting recruits?" Because a steady supply of new men is necessary to maintain the existence of the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, and these utilities are a lawful part of the United States Government, absolutely necessary and essential to its success, and required by law to be maintained by voluntary enlistments.

This reply may, perhaps, be explained to some advantage.

Kansas City Recruiting Officer
Calls Upon the Country to
Support Defense Law

Let us leave out of the question, for
the moment, any discussion of the
reasons for this government policy.
Congress has fixed the numerical
strength for each of the military util-
ities of the Government; the Army,
the Navy, and the Marines. It has
made a law that these utilities shall
be maintained by voluntary enlist-
ments. These enlistment contracts
are made day by day, as applicants
present themselves, and are accepted
after due examination, and each en-
listment contract expires by time limit.
at the end of its period. The man is
discharged "by expiration of service".
His place must be filled, if the utility
is to continue in existence. In addi-
tion, there are a certain number of
unexpected vacancies, occasioned by
deaths, and by separations from the
service due to other causes, day by
day. It follows, therefore, that we
must secure from day to day a suffi-
cient number of enlistments to replace
these men, and the officers who are
responsible for this duty are not at
all concerned as to the reasons why
Congress has seen fit to establish the
Services on this basis, or why Con-
gress has seen fit to maintain such
utilities at all. Their duty is to get
the men, be voluntary enlistments.
day by day, to maintain the authorized
numerical strength of their respective
services.

In the Army, the authorized strength is about 125,000 men, each man enlisted under a 3-year contract;

Wants Cooperation

and as these contracts were made day by day three years ago and so on, it follows that something more than one third of them will expire every year, say 45,000, with perhaps some 3,000 other casualties, or about 4,000 vacancies per month will occur, right along, month after month. Hence the Army must secure at least about 4,000 men per month, by voluntary applications for enlistment, if the law is to be complied with and an Army maintained at the numerical strength fixed by Congress. The same conditions apply in exactly the same way to the Navy and to the Marine Corps, each contingent being fixed by the current vacancies in each of the branches of the Service.

The citizen who is satisfied to accept the laws of his country and loyally support its institutions will find the foregoing reply fully sufficient. He will take the stand that these services are part of the Government, and therefore entitled to his active interest and support, regardless of any private opinion he may hold as to the need for them, or the wisdom of maintaining such utilities at all in time of peace; and the loyal citizen will say nothing, nor do anything, calculated to obstruct or hamper the government in any of its legitimate activities. He may believe the policy should be changed, and he may work earnestly for such a change as in his judgment will be most desirable; but he will not, and cannot (if he is a loyal American) attempt to nullify the Acts of Congress on which these services are based, nor obstruct the efforts of those officials who are charged with the duty of recruitment. The loyal citizen will go further.

He will not only not obstruct. by word or act; but he will actively help, as far as his opportunities go, to maintain these functions of the government-even if he believes the policy should be changed-until such time as a different policy shall be duly authorized by law. A loyal American can do no less.

But it is not only the "Regular" forces of the Army, the Navy and the Marines, which must be maintained; it is the whole policy of the Government in the matter of National Protection Against Armed Enemies. Since 1920 this nation has had a military policy, and one founded upon (Continued on Page Twelve)