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U. S. ARMY RECRUITING NEWS

No

APRIL 15, 1923

The War Department General Staff

10 War Department General Staff officer can be highly useful without clearly understanding his status with respect to the Secretary of War and to the Army, and the manner in which the latter is controlled by the Secretary.

War Department General Staff officers are not in the line of command. Under the law (National Defense Act, as amended June 4, 1920) they "render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War" and are charged with preparing "plans for national defense."

The relations of the Secretary of War with the War Department General Staff and the Army, as they are set forth by law, are wholly in accord with the experience of ages, which is that one-man responsibility and oneman command are fundamental to military organization. No efficient Military organization ever was or ever can be commanded by a committee or a council or a staff.

The War Department is a one-man command. And that one man is the Secretary of War. Upon him, under the President, rests the responsibility for the military establishment, and with that responsibility goes power of command.

By Colonel C. D. HERRON, General Staff

Divided Under Four General Heads and For Convenience Lettered G's 1 to 4

closely associated with the Secretary of War and have opportunity to know the general trend of his thought. The first of these is the Assistant Secretary of War, and next, the Chief of Staff who, by the National Defense Act, is "the agent" of the Secretary of War, in carrying into effect plans approved by him. To six others, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff have, by Army Regulations, 10-15, delegated a very definite portion of their power to make decisions. They are the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the five heads of the General Staff Divisions. Each is empowered, within the limits of his own particular responsibilities, to issue orders through

Makes Intelligent Command Possible

the establishment of reversal of precedents, and other matters of special importance; (b) Organization of the Army and plans for national defense, including permanent fortifications; (c) Estimates for all appropriations pertaining to the War Department. The apportionment and allotment of appropriations; (d) Cases involving the establishment, abandonment of military posts or camps or stations or other important changes in their status; (e) Cases involving important policy with reference to the appointment, promotion, assignment, and discipline both of commissioned officers and enlisted men; (f) Important policies relative to the training, educational, and recreational activities of the Army; (g) Recommendations to Congress for legislation; (h) Important correspondence with the heads of other executive departments; (i) Correspondence with the President; (j)

Such a body of men doing General Staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an Army properly for war, in time of peace, as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body: it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procuring and arranging information and working, out plans in detail, and it makes intelligent and effective execution of plans possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme.-Former Secretary of War, Elihu Root.

He is de facto the commander of the Army. To ommand, he must impose is will upon the Army. But, as it is evident that the number of decisions to be made in the War Department is so great that no one man can personally make them all, it might be thought that we have reached the faling point in the one-man rule for command.

Command, however, consists not in any particular acts, or even in the making of decisions, but in the imposition of the will of the commander pon his organization. So that. regardless of the size of the organization r the number of decisions to be made, one man may still command if he has assistants close enough to know his will and loyal enough to be wholly ruled by it. Many can be loyal, but only a few can be so closely associated. In the War Department General Staff there are certain officers who, having been made such assistants, are

The Adjutant General in the name of the Secretary of War.

Law and regulations require certain matters to be handled personally by the Secretary of War. In addition, there are brought to his attention all proposed new policies of a general nature, all major exceptions to existing policies, and all other matters that common sense, or his personal desires, dictate should come to him. All matters having a political aspect are his.

The Secretary of War is the head of the War Department and performs such duties as are required of him by law, or may be enjoined upon him by the President, concerning the military service.

The Secretary of War reserves to himself final action upon important papers relating to the following:

Military matters: (a) Cases involving questions of general policy,

The award of medals; (k) Important matters relating to the transportation activities of the Army.

Matters pertaining to the following non-military activities of the War Departinent. (a) Insular Affairs; (b) The Panama Canal; (c) Inland and Coastwise Waterways; (d) Important matters involving policy relating to river and harbor improvements and civil works.

The Assistant Secretary of War, under the direction of the Secretary of War, is charged with the supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto, and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs. (National Defense Act, Section 5a) His duties are largely quasi-military or non-military and his office is not under the supervision of the General Staff. (A. R. No. 5-5. Orders to Assistant Secretary of War, August 25, 1920. Memorandum November 29, 1921. General Orders No. 9, 1922.)

In his supervision of the procurement of military supplies he deals direct with the supply branches. In supervising military matters, in cases where the policy of the Secretary is involved, the Assistant Secretary of

War corresponds with the branches of the Army through the office of the Chief of Staff. (Organization of the War Dept.-Statistics Branch, 11-21-22.)

The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the military estab- \ Kshment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the Army program. He is the agent of and issues orders in the name of the Secretary of War. (National Defense Act and A. R. No. 10-15.)

The Deputy Chief of Staff assists the Chief of Staff and acts for him in his absence. He reports directly to the Secretary of War in all matters not involving the establishment of important policies. One of his duties is the supervision of the activities of the divisions of the War Department General Staff. (National Defense Act and A. R. No. 10-15.)

There are five assistant chiefs of staff, the number being determined by the fact that the responsibilities of the War Department General Staff are naturally subdivided into five groups. (National Defense Act and Army Regulations No. 10-15.)

Next to the Secretary in line of command, reporting directly to the War Department and issuing orders in their own names, are corps area and department commanders, and commanders of various independent activities, such as the general and special service schools. Each of these commanders has his own separate and distinct sphere of initiative, within which he operates and commands and establishes his policies, subject only to the authority of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. Chiefs of branches likewise have their spheres of activity and initiative, and no chief of branch or territorial commander has any authority over any other territorial commander or chief of branch. Chiefs of branches are not in the line of command, though each commands his own office force.

Orders and decisions which affect his own branch are only within the province of each chief. Those which affect two or more branches emanate from the office of the Secretary and are promulgated by the Adjutant General.

In peace, the War Department, like all other great organizations, conducts most of its daily business in accordance with established policies, by which a multitude of questions are decided and there is order and reason and steadfast movement towards an end. Every subordinate commander. though guided by the policies of his superiors, has his own individual

sphere of initiative, within which he creates policies and grants exceptions to them. For any exceptions to the policy of a superior the subordinate must appeal to the creator of that policy.

It is to be understood that there must be exceptions to all policies in which the human factor is involved. If there were not, the organization would become a mere bureaucracy, cruel, insensate, and inhuman, often defeating its best interests by the uniform application of its own rules and regulations.

The number of questions upon which any one man can pass in a day is necessarily limited. The General Staff system is a comparatively modern method for facilitating command. One of its most important functions is the sifting out of the mass, the really vital questions upon which the commander ought to pass. A measure of the success of a staff is the efficiency with which it selects and presents the key questions to its head, in order that he may not be overloaded and may yet dominate his organization. By such a condensation of a day's business, the Secretary gains the time to consider the appeals guaranteed by Army Regulations to all members of the military service. He has also the time to see any chief of branch who believes that his case should be presented in person, but no one chief of branch can day after day monopolize the Secretary's time. The right of appeal is the leaven of the military system and is absolutely fundamental to morale and efficiency.

Among the ways in which members of the War Department General Staff may facilitate the tasks of those who make decisions are: (1) By turning back any question which falls under an announced policy, or which lies within the sphere of the initiative of a subordinate commander; (2) By an analysis of the question propounded; (3) By the collection of all pertinent evidence bearing on the question; (4) By its presentation in an orderly manner. The really substantial amount of time saved to their chiefs by the presentation of all cases in a standard form is not appreciated by most staff officers; (5) By setting forth in concise form the opinion of the officers most familiar with the case and by recommendations so stated that they can be translated into decisions by a stroke of the pen. (6) Another point not always realized by Staff officers is to what an extent decision is facilitated by a statement that "All concerned have been consulted and concur."

The procurement of concurrences

often requires a vexatious amount time, labor and patience, but no sti is complete or well-founded uniess concerned have been consulted.

In peace, time will usually per the procurement of all desireable c currences; in war, usually not, but either case as many concurrences the time factor permits must be cured. By means of these cond rences the General Staff coordina itself and relieves the Chief of S of that burden.

Concurrences are the due, not of those who must decide, but of th whose affairs are being decided. ] the business of a General Staff off to know whose affairs he is hand and to consult accordingly.

The status of a War Departn General Staff officer-other than seven having special authority—may illustrated by a reference to the org ization of civil courts. There is official of the court known as a feree. He does not really refere the football sense of the word. E an assistant to the judge and is c gated to hear particular cases w the judge is too busy to hear the person. For purposes of collec evidence he has all the authorit the court. He can summon witne and require them to testify. But t his authority ends and when all been heard, the arguments subm and the case closed, the referee mits to the judge, not a decision, b recommendation and a

summar

the evidence. The Judge then de the case upon the evidence submi though influenced, of course, by recommendation of the referee. anxiety of the parties to the case reference to the honesty, intellig thoroughness and professional a of the referee is readily underst also the absolute necessity tha have all these qualities.

The position of the War De ment General Staff officer is ak that of the court referee. For Secretary of War or for one o seven General Staff officers to v he delegates portions of his auth the War Department General officer investigates questions to b cided. He consults all inter parties, collects all pertinent evid analyzes and presents it to the authority in a form somewhat lik five-paragraph tactical order o field and, to the War Department as useful in its way. With the dence he submits his recommend so formulated that only the sign of the proper chief is necessa translate it into a decision upon the Army may act.

(Continued on Page Fifteen)

Recruiting for the C. M. T. C.

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C

HIEF of interest to the public among the activities fostered by the National Defense Act of 1920, the Citizens' Military Training Camp movement or C. M. T. C. as known to its iriends, is now a lusty infant just starting in its third year. It has had the normal children diseases, but on the whole, has thrived amazingly, all things considered.

In the last year's camps in this corps area, a great many things were learned that were not learned at the 1921 camp, which all tended to make the larger camps of 1922 an improvement over the camps of 1921. From the procurement standpoint, i.e., the procurement of men attending the camp, this corps area was in possession of a list of about five thousand disgruntled applicants who had applied for the 1921 camp, who could not go on account of lack of appropriations, and a "live" prospect list of about a thousand, who had graduated from the 1921 camp. From this as a basis, questionnaires were sent out to both classes of men, to find out how many of them would be willing to apply for this year's camp. About 80% replied to the questionnaire, about half of this percentage stating they were not interested in attendance. To the balance, about 2500, applications were sent. Of this number not more than 50% returned the applications or were qualified. As this Corps Area was charged with the procurement of 3,000 applicants, the twelve or fifteen hundred secured from former prospects did not make a very large start. Pro

curement was commenced through all possible civilian channels, including of course, the Military Training Camps Association, on a quota basis, based on military population of states and counties. The state representatives of the Military Training Camps Association got to work and one by one filled their state quotas, led by Florida. In all, over five thousand bona-fide applications were secured.

In January of this year a review of the questionnaire campaign of 1922 seemed to indicate that the questionnaire did no real good for several reasons, (a) men interested would fill out and send in an application with or without the questionnaire, (b) the returns from the questionnaires were very misleading, many men stating they would attend camp on the questionnaire, who failed to fill out an application; (c) Many men mistook the questionnaire for an application, causing confusion and correspondence, and (d) It was believed that the less it was necessary to communicate with an applicant on things which did not actually have to do with getting him to camp, the more likely he was to pay attention to instructions sent him. As a result of the above-mentioned conclusions, no questionnaire is used for this year's procurement.

Procurement is proceeding this year upon a definite basis of priorities. Candidates are divided into four classes, (a) graduates of former camps, (b) men specifically recommended by officers of the Army of the United States, (c) R. O. T. C. men recommended by the P. M. S. & T's and

(d) men not in any of these classes.

Thirty days is given for priority of men in class (a), from March 20th. Class (b) commences March 25th for thirty days, concurrently for the most part with class (a). About March 25th, a survey of vacancies left will be made and quotas assigned R. O. T. C. units according to their R. O. T. C. strength. Two weeks will be given P. M. S. & T's for their recommendations. About May 10th, any vacancies left will be assigned to the applicants who did not come within the priority classes.

All Reserve Officers and National Guard Officers have been requested to secure one candidate each. The response so far has been very gratifying. Many officers of both the Reserve and National Guard have written in requesting privilege of nominating from two to one hundred candidates.

Applications received during the preliminary priority periods, i.e. before May 10th, from men to whom priority does not belong, will be filed and numbered in order of receipt. At the end of priority periods these applications will be considered, and those accepted will be deducted from those the civilian agencies will be asked to help in procuring.

A surplus of men finally accepted is intended in order to insure as nearly as possible discounting the loss of men by last-minute refusals. A reasonable number of alternates will be picked from each state.

A great difficulty encountered here last year was in the large proportion of men rejected for physical reasons (Continued on Page Sixteen)

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