situation. In each case, the analysis was the same. Since it profoundly affected all our conclusions, it should be reported first.

As we saw it, in the years since the war, the 18 Western European countries had made great economic progress. This had played an essential part in strengthening their social and political structures and preventing the subversion of their free institutions. While this had been going forward, the Soviet Union had been devoting so much of its resources to military purposes that a dangerous situation was developing.

If the free nations did not look to their defenses, and do so speedily, the maintenance of peace and security might not be possible. It was also plain that provision of the necessary defense would require a very large economic and financial effort. Therefore, the continued development of production and productivity was essential to underpin the defense effort and to maintain and extend the hard-won social and political gains.

In the face of these equal and equally compelling needs for increased defense and strengthened economies, the free nations have come, therefore, to another time of decision. The world does not stand still. It is up to us whether we go forward or fall back, and falling back, risk not only all the progress we have made but total failure.

Most of us had hoped that with the completion of the reconstruction phase, each nation would be free to work out its own problems within the framework of the security which would be assured by the United Nations. We now see that to go forward we must pursue the course of cooperative association-including partnership in the North American and Western European community of nations, for none of the complex and baffling problems which lie ahead will yield to purely national action.

We recognized that the task before the Atlantic community is to build a common defense, to create a successfully functioning economic system, and to achieve unity of action on the major problems of foreign relations. Our meetings in Paris and London demonstrated a new and basic understanding that success in this task will require close, cohesive, and sustained efforts on a partnership basis in all these fields.

TALKS WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS

My talks with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman ranged over a multitude of problems in all parts of the world and reflected throughout the deep appreciation of the need for common and mutually supporting poli

cies.1

In Europe, it has long been clear that no real progress will be possible until France and Germany work out their age-old differences. During the conferences, Mr. Schuman announced the proposal of the French Government for joint utilization of the coal and steel resources of France and Germany,2 proposals which are open to all other European

1 See communiqués of May 13 and 18, 1950; infra, docs. 5 and 6. 2 Proposals of May 9, 1950; Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1950, pp. 936-937.

countries willing to participate on an equal basis. This proposal is a momentous and courageous act, made on the initiative of the French Government. The plan is still to be perfected, and its details must be developed with great care so that it will help to strengthen and expand the European economy. If it is developed for that purpose, it will open the door to a new era in Europe.

Germany's reentrance into the free Western community, which is the established policy of the three Governments in occupation of Western Germany, should be greatly helped by the new climate created by the French proposal and by other actions taken at the meetings.

Germany has been a member for some time of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation commonly referred to as the OEEC-and we are hopeful that she will soon join the Council of Europe.2

A declaration of our common policy was issued by the three Ministers and promptly welcomed by Dr. Adenauer, the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, as another long step forward on this road.3

We agreed as well upon proposals under which the inhabitants of the Soviet zone of occupation could rejoin their fellow countrymen in a democratic and united Germany, and these have been forwarded by the three Western High Commissioners to the Soviet representatives in Germany with an offer to negotiate on the framing of an electoral law to allow free elections in all Germany.*

Our statement expressing our determination to maintain our rights in Berlin, together with our actions in that city in recent months, may have had some influence on the relative quiet which prevailed in Berlin on Sunday."

A declaration was also made on the repatriation from the Soviet Union of the many German prisoners of war still detained there."

All in all, the results of our discussions on Germany were most encouraging and, we believe, laid the basis for successful work by the joint group established to consider ways of easing the difficulties for ourselves and the German people resulting from the continuance of the technical state of war.

With respect to Austria, the three Ministers announced that our Governments will soon appoint civilian high commissioners." This is a further step in restoring Austria to a peacetime status and is one which can be taken now despite the continued and callous blocking of the peace treaty by the Soviet Union.

In the same appreciation of the need for common action, we found that the British Government was ready to move ahead with the Euro

1 See convention of Apr. 16, 1948; supra, pp. 992–1000.

2 See statute of May 5, 1949, as amended: supra, pp. 1001-1012.

3 Declaration of May 14, 1950; infra, pp. 1709-1711.

4 See letter of May 25, 1950, from Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (on behalf of the U. S. High Commissioner) to Gen. V. I. Chuikov, Soviet Commandant for Berlin; infra, pp. 1780-1781.

Statement of May 13, 1950; infra, p. 1737.

Declaration of May 13, 1950; infra, p. 2060. 'Declaration of May 19, 1950; infra, p. 1822.

pean Payments Union in an attempt to reconcile the requirements of their own position with the need for substantial progress in the liberalization of trade and payments among the European countries. U. S. CONCERN IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

During these meetings, the continuing interest of the United States in European affairs was expressed to the other governments and also our genuine desire to work on the economic problems ahead in cooperation with Canada and the Western European countries. There has been some concern in Western Europe that, despite the North Atlantic Treaty, the concern of this country with European affairs would slacken after 1952.

Various projects related to these problems have been going forward on both sides of the Atlantic. In this country, as you know, the President has appointed Mr. Gordon Gray to study what adjustments this country needs to make if it is to achieve a balance in its international accounts at high and stable levels of trade.1 The Canadian Government has been actively considering these problems from its point of view, and the OEEC countries have been steadily working on this same range of problems in their organization.

After discussions with Mr. Pearson of Canada and Mr. Stikker, the Chairman of the OEEC, it was thought that a new working relationship between Canada, the United States, and the OEEC would be a desirable means for working out solutions of common economic problems. We are hopeful that the OEEC will issue an invitation to establish this relationship.

2

We can no longer afford the luxury of regarding these problems as purely national in character. The additional economic strength which will flow from a cooperative approach is required to meet the cost of defense, to maintain and improve standards of living, and to provide essential assistance to other free nations of the world in their development. A new attitude is required of each of us, for we must work out solutions to these problems which will strengthen the community as a whole and advance the welfare of us all.

Success in this venture will be of the greatest practical significance, both for the economic benefits it can bring to every one of us and because the security of free institutions is directly related to their economic health and vitality.

There were many other evidences of the necessity of avoiding purely unilateral treatment of problems which affect more than one state even though one may have a primary concern in their solution.

MEETING SECURITY PROBLEMS OF ASIA AND NEAR EAST

In Paris, there was a most satisfactory discussion with Mr. Schuman on the situation in Indochina.3 Mr. Schuman recognized that the problem of meeting the threat to the security of Vietnam,

1 See Mr. Gray's report of Nov. 10, 1950; Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies (Washington, 1950).

2 See infra, doc. 6.

See infra, p. 2365.

Cambodia, and Laos is primarily the responsibility of France and the Governments and peoples of Indochina. On our part, I was able to inform Mr. Schuman of the assistance which the United States could provide toward the achievement of security and the development of a healthy nationalism in these associated states of Indochina.

In London, the initiative of the Commonwealth conference at Sydney for a program of economic development in South and Southeast Asia was discussed, and Mr. Bevin was informed that this Government will attempt to coordinate its efforts in that area with the efforts of the Commonwealth, in order that our actions will be mutually supporting.

By strengthening the economy and the defenses of the Atlantic community, we believe that we are making a direct contribution to the security and welfare of all free nations.

Mr. Bevin and I reaffirmed the concern of our Governments with the security and welfare of Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

Together with Mr. Schuman we agreed on a firm policy toward arms shipments and security for the Arab States and Israel which should greatly assist in promoting peace and stability in that important area.

2

In South and Southeast Asia, a great development has been taking place; never before in history have so many peoples acquired national independence in so short a period of time. The United States and other members of the Atlantic community were glad to see this happen; we worked for it, we assisted it, and, in our meetings, we recognized our large responsibility for helping it succeed. The great need of these newly independent peoples is for a period of peace and quiet in which they can concentrate on the difficult problems of establishing their political and economic institutions. The success of our efforts in the Atlantic community will greatly assist in giving them this opportunity.

Time does not permit me to discuss in detail any of these matters or the other issues we considered. I do wish to emphasize the basic understanding on objectives, of the dangers and threats which confront us, and of the requirements for action, and the businesslike atmosphere of the meetings. These may not at first glance appear dramatic, but this is, in my opinion, the most dramatic fact that could be reported. It is news of a quiet, practical, and immense significance. DEFENDING NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

Finally, there is the problem of defending the North Atlantic area, which was the subject of the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council. The 12 member countries had previously recognized the need for a common defense against a common threat. The North Atlantic Treaty had its origins in this realization.

First of all, it should be made plain that there was nothing which any of the 12 Foreign Ministers had to say which indicated that there is any immediate threat of war.

1 See infra, pp. 2338-2344.

2 Statement of May 25, 1950; infra, p.12237.

It was our unanimous view that this is not the problem. The problem is to meet a threat which, in view of the known program of the Kremlin, will exist unless we act now to prepare our defenses against aggression.

It was made unmistakably clear in all our discussions that our common purpose in preparing our common defenses is a peaceful one. We hope never to need them. But so long as any dictatorship builds powerful armed forces, so long must democracies, if they are to be left in peace, evidence their determination to defend themselves by maintaining adequate forces in being and an adequate state of preparedness. Mr. Lange, the Foreign Minister of Norway, summed up this thought when he said: "Peace will never be secure in a world where democracies are weak and dictatorships alone are strong."

The work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the first year of its existence has shown that the task of defense is so large, its cost in labor and material resources so high, and the problem of security so indivisible that only a combined effort will be adequate.

The work of this meeting of the Council, which grew out of its review and full approval of the work of the Defense Ministers and the Finance Ministers and of their progress to date in planning a combined effort, was twofold. It was necessary, first, to establish the principles which will guide our common defense effort. Secondly, the Council concluded that the requirements of the combined effort were such that additional control machinery was needed to enable the Council to do its job efficiently and effectively.1

COUNCIL TASKS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY DEPUTIES

The job is a full-time one and requires on a full-time basis the services of the best men that the members can assign to it. The Council therefore decided that each Government should appoint a deputy to its representative on the Council in order that the Council can function continuously in giving direction to the work of the Organization. The deputies are to select from among themselves an outstanding man as Permanent Chairman, who, in addition to presiding at meetings of the deputies, will be responsible for directing the Council's work.

The Council decided that the following five tasks should be undertaken by the deputies:

(1) to coordinate the various planning activities related to defense;

(2) to recommend the measures necessary to carry out these plans;

(3) to consider common political problems related to the objectives of the Treaty;

(4) to promote and coordinate public information on Treaty questions;

1 See the Council's resolution of May 19, 1950 (Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1950, p. 831); also infra, pp. 1604-1606.