that the consummation of EDC was "urgent," of "paramount importance," "necessary," "needed" and "essential." But these weighty utterances seem not to have sunk in. Let me, therefore, mention three of the factors which make EDC essential.

1. There is the immediate problem of the so-called "forward strategy" in Western Europe. This means a plan, and a will, to defend the entire area of the prospective EDC countries rather than to contemplate from the beginning the abandonment of advanced positions in Germany, which might make the rest untenable. In pursuance of this strategy, a substantial part of the United States Army occupies advanced positions in West Germany. However, without the EDC, it is not legally permissible to draw on German strength for the defense of German soil. Equally, of course, it is not acceptable that the United States should continue in the role of being a principal defender of Germany, while the Germans themselves look on as mere observers. The "forward strategy" was initiated in September 1950 on the assumption that there would soon be German participation in the common defense. If that prospect disappears, then the basic strategy of NATO will have to be reexamined.

2. There is not merely the problem of providing German contingents, but of doing so in a form reasonably acceptable to Germany's neighbors. EDC meets this problem by limiting German forces and providing that the Germans who are armed will form part of a sixpower army. They will not be subject to a German General Staff and they cannot be used for national purposes. This gives assurances to France and other nations, including the Soviet Union, which have a legitimate concern that Germans shall not be rearmed under conditions which would make possible a recurrence of such invasions as they have suffered from German militarism.

3. There is the problem of permanently sealing the breach between France and Germany.

Twelve years ago, as the United States formally entered into World War II, I wrote:

Continental Europe has been the world's worst fire hazard. . . . Now the whole structure is consumed in flames. We condemn those who started and spread the fire. But this does not mean when the time comes to rebuild that we should reproduce a demonstrated fire trap.2

To my mind this is the dominant consideration. It takes precedence over getting German divisions under NATO, important as that is. The essential is to end, once and for all, the suicidal strife which has long plagued the Western World. It has so weakened it, both materially and in prestige, that Western civilization can now be seriously challenged by a materialist civilization, which, behind a thin veneer of sanctimonious theory, actually reproduces the human degradation of dark ages.

1 See the communiqué of the Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Sept. 26, 1950; infra, pp. 1607-1608.

2 "Peace Without Platitudes," Fortune, January 1942, p. 87.

"ALTERNATIVES" TO EDC

It is said that there must be alternatives to EDC. Of course, if EDC fails, there will be things to be done. We are not blind to that. But I do not see "alternatives" in the sense of other practical ways of accomplishing the three EDC goals I mentioned.

Let us, by way of illustration, take the "alternative" which is most mentioned, that is, to restore sovereignty to the West German Republic and then to make it a member of NATO.

That is simply said, but hardly done; at best it accomplishes merely the first of the three purposes of EDC. It would bring German soldiers into NATO.

But how about the second goal, of doing this in a way to reassure France and Soviet Russia? It would recreate a German national force which could be withdrawn for national purposes at the will of a German general staff. This is not reassuring.

How about the third goal, of creating organic unity in Western Europe which will assure an ending of its suicidal strife? This great goal will be lost in the rebirth of nationalism.

But supposing we decided, as we might, to try this way. Let us not imagine that the procedure would be simple or expeditious. First, it would call for renegotiation of the present four-power convention designed to restore West German sovereignty. That is because, as I pointed out, the present convention depends upon the coming into force of EDC. The renegotiation of that treaty under present circumstances might not be easy, nor is it clear that the four powers would again readily find themselves in agreement.

If, however, this hurdle can be overcome, there would then be the problem of bringing West Germany into NATO. This would require first of all willingness on the part of West Germany to apply for NATO membership. This willingness cannot be assured. Many Germans strongly oppose the re-creation of a German national army with a German General Staff.

There

There would then be the problem of securing the necessary amendment of the NATO treaty by each of the 14 member nations. are many in France who wonder whether a French Parliament which rejected German rearmament under the severe limits of EDC would ratify an amendment to NATO which would entitle West Germany to arm without those limitations. France has in this matter legal power of veto.

There are, of course, many other suggested "alternatives." I would not want to be understood as rejecting any of them. But all of them, as President Eisenhower has said, are "feeble." Also, they all would take time, a factor which cannot now be ignored.

Powerful forces are now here to draw together the six nations of the proposed European Defense Community, and Britain and the United States are prepared to pledge to this Community their firm support. But unless unity is achieved soon, this historic moment may pass[,] and different and divisive forces may take command.

1 Convention of May 26, 1952; S. Execs. Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9-22.

Already there is evidence of this in Europe. The Soviet Union is playing the dangerous game of seeming to support France and Germany against each other. Soviet propaganda is recreating in France the fears of Germany. It is creating in Germany resentment against France, on the ground that its indecision is prolonging an occupation of Germany which already has lasted for nearly 9 years since the armistice. Chancellor Adenauer already last week found it necessary to plead with the German people to be patient. The fact that that plea was necessary should be a warning sign that we do not have time to burn.

We have reached one of those points where the perfect is the greatest enemy of the good. No doubt the EDC treaty is less than perfect. However, it does decisively pose the fateful choice. It has become the symbol of Europe's will to make it possible to achieve a unity which will dependably safeguard our Western civilization and all that it means in terms of human dignity and human welfare.

Of course, if EDC fails, we shall do something. But what we then do may be quite different from what we had hoped would be possible. It may involve our tactically picking our way through a maze of manifold perils, as of old.

I have confidence that the United States is strong enough, resourceful enough, and wise enough to preserve its vital interests even in the face of a failure of the EDC and the European unity it symbolizes.

We need not, however, end upon any somber note. I do not believe that there will be failure to achieve European unity. My belief derives from the fact that the peoples of Europe do in fact possess qualities which make it imperative that Europe should be saved.

Europe is important for many reasons. It is strategically located and it has industrial power. But above all, Europe is important because of its people. They possess to a unique degree the qualities which ennoble a civilization which bears the deep imprint of Christianity. That is a fact which it is, I think, appropriate to mention as we approach Christmas Day.

What are those qualities? In individuals they are minds trained to reason clearly and serenely, vision to see far and truly, hearts which comprehend the Fathership of God and the fellowship of man, and, finally, capacity to act rather than to be merely contemplative.

In government, the quality we respect is willingness to trust, in great matters, to the response of individuals possessed of the qualities I mention.

I have hopes in the response to be made regarding European unity, because I have faith in our civilization and in its human products. Delays and difficulties so far encountered are above all due to the fact that the issues have been obscured, so that the people do not see and think and comprehend and act.

1 Speech of Dec. 22, 1953; New York Times, Dec. 23, 1953.

That murky period is coming to an end. As the day of decision irrevocably approaches, so does comprehension grow. Therefore we can have high hopes.

I have dealt in my talk with NATO because a report on that organization is due the American people. But also we can find elsewhere good ground for hope.

Our society of freedom has gained a clear moral initiative over the forces of reaction.

After years of futile and evasive debate on the part of the Soviet Union about atomic weapons, it has at least indicated a willingness to talk confidentially, and we hope seriously, about this problem. After months of attempted evasion, the Soviet Union finally, it seems, will meet and talk, again we hope seriously, about the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria. We have not yet had any formal reply to our invitation to meet at Berlin on January 4,1 but the Soviet statement received yesterday speaks of "the forthcoming conference in Berlin."

The coming year will be a year for great decision. There lie ahead European unity, a possible recession of the horror of atomic warfare, and a beginning of an ending of the unnatural division of Europe.

In Korea we look forward to the first year of peace since 1949. The problems are many and grievous, but our hopes are high. We can, therefore, in all honesty look forward to the happier New Year, which I wish you all.

[RADIO INTERVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, APRIL 4, 1954] 3

1

[REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT, MAY 17, 1955] *

4

1 See the American note of Dec. 8, 1953, to the Soviet Union; infra, pp. 18491850.

2 Note of Dec. 21, 1953, regarding President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" program: Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 18, 1954, pp. 80-82.

3 Ibid., Apr. 12, 1954, pp. 561-562.

Made over television from the President's Office; An Historic Week Report to the President, May 17, 1955 (Department of State publication, Series S, No. 34; 1955).

Tripartite Consultations, 1950-1953

[See also London and Paris Conferences, infra, pp. 1470-1504. For the texts of documents regarding Ministerial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, see Section B, infra, pp. 1594-1660. Documents concerning bilateral meetings between United States leaders and Western European statesmen are printed in Section C, infra, pp. 1660–1707.]

5. COMMUNIQUÉ BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE (LONDON), MAY 13, 1950 1

The three foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and the United States concluded today their discussions which began on Thursday. These discussions dealt with various problems in many parts of the world where the interests of their countries are engaged. Their main and common purpose has been directed toward reducing the risks of war and establishing the conditions of a lasting peace in accordance with the desire of all peoples. In the view of the ministers this requires a closer coordination in the employment of their joint resources to underpin their economies in such a manner as to permit the full maintenance of their social and material standards as well as the adequate development of the necessary defense measures. The ministers are confident that the peoples of the free world who command by far the greater part of the industrial and technical resources of mankind can achieve both of these aims.

The strength of the free world will never be used for aggressive purposes. The ministers find it necessary to restate this fundamental truth in the face of the calculated campaign of misrepresentation of our purposes and policies conducted by the only militaristic and aggressive power in the world.

Faith in freedom should not be taken for granted, but should be built into a dynamic force and steps should be taken to increase public understanding of the exact nature, methods and dangers of the threat to its existence.

The ministers agreed upon the main lines of their policy in all parts of the world. Consideration was given to their policy regarding Germany and they agreed upon a general declaration in regard to it. This is being communicated immediately to the German Federal Government and will be published on Monday, May 15.3

The ministers reaffirmed their long declared desire for an early Austrian treaty and hope to have a further exchange of views on this subject in the next few days.4

The ministers surveyed the situation in Southeast Asia in the light

1 New York Times, May 14, 1950, p. 3.

2 May 11, 1950.

See the declaration of May 14, 1950; infra, pp. 1709-1711.

See infra, p. 1882.