of the problems confronting us and have agreed on various measures essential for their solution.

Confident that our united strength is the best guarantee of peace and security we are resolved to maintain our joint efforts to perfect it. If the danger of aggression now appears less imminent, we attribute this to the mounting strength of the free world and the firmness of its policies.

We shall remain resolute in maintaining our solidarity and vigilant against efforts to divide us.

With their material and moral resources we are confident that the free peoples can provide both for their security and for their well being. We dedicate ourselves to work together towards these ends.

II.

The North Atlantic Treaty is and will remain the foundation of our common policy. We discussed means of developing the defensive capacity of our Alliance. Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, was present at the conversations on this subject.

In the continuing development of a United Europe, including Germany, we see the best means of achieving greater prosperity, security and stability for its free peoples. We reaffirmed that the European Defence Community is needed to assure the defensive. capacity of the Atlantic Community of which it will be an integral part. Within this framework it will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United Kingdom and United States forces and the forces of the European Defence Community on the Continent of Europe. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the problems facing his Government in regard to the European Defence Community.

We cannot accept as justified or permanent the present division of Europe. Our hope is that in due course peaceful means will be found. to enable the countries of Eastern Europe again to play their part as free nations in a free Europe.

III.

Our three Governments will lose no opportunity for easing the tensions that beset the world and for reassuring all nations that they have no cause to fear that the strength of the West will be invoked in any cause of wrongful violence. On the contrary it is the fundamental principle of the United Nations Organisation, which we serve, that the guarantees against aggression shall be universal in their application.

We are confident that if we remain strong, united and steadfast it will become possible gradually to solve the stubborn problems which have too long been unsettled.

2

In this spirit we have examined the latest note from the Soviet Government. We approved the text of our replies, which should Note of Nov. 26, 1953; Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 853-854.

2 See the American note of Dec. 8, 1953; infra, pp. 1849-1850.

lead to an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. Our hope is that this meeting will make progress towards the reunification of Germany in freedom and the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty and thus towards the solution of other major international problems.

IV.

We reviewed the situation in the Far East. The immediate object of our policy continues to be the convening of the political conference provided for in the Korean Armistice agreement. This would provide the means for reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and for making progress in restoring more normal conditions in the Far East and South East Asia.

In Indo-China we salute the valiant forces of France and of the three Associated States of Indo-China fighting within the French Union to protect the independence of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. We recognise the vital importance of their contribution to the defence of the free world. We will continue to work together to restore peace and stability in this area.

V.

Our meetings have reinforced our solidarity, strengthened our resolve, and fortified our hopes. Confident in our common purposes and united in our views we shall persevere in our policies, whose sole aim is to foster and assure peace.

The London and Paris Conferences, September-October

1954

13. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESS, AUGUST 24, 1954 2

I deeply regret that at the Brussels meeting 3 France did not decide to agree with the other five continental countries which signed the EDC Treaty. That treaty embodies principles which are vital to the perpetuation of peace and freedom in Western Europe. However, we can take comfort from the fact that five of the six signatories stood firm for these basic principles, although they were flexible with respect to their implementation.

I am aware of the fact that the treaty has become highly controversial in France, and I do not minimize the difficulties which lie in 1 Supra, pp. 724-750

2 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 6, 1954, p. 332.

See communiqué of Aug. 22, 1954; supra, pp. 1200-1201. For the details of the Brussels Six-Power Conference of Aug. 19-22, 1954, see Documentation francaise, series Articles et documents, No. 097, Aug. 24, 1954.

the way of ratification. However, I still have hope that, when France confronts the ultimate decision, she will follow her great tradition of idealism, based on a sense of realism, and choose to cement the EDC partnership which is of French conception, rather than stand apart.

14. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESS, AUGUST 31, 19541

The French rejection of the European Defense Community 2 is a saddening event. France thus turns away from her own historic proposal made nearly 4 years ago. That proposal sought a unification of the military strength of continental Europe into a single European army so as to end the era of recurrent European wars, the last two of which became world wars.

The French action does not change certain basic and stubborn facts:

(a) The effective defense of continental Europe calls for a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet all, including the Germans themselves, would avoid national rearmament in a form which could be misused by resurgent militarism.

(b) Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty, including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as part of a collective international order. (c) The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.

To deal with these facts was the lofty purpose of EDC. Four of the six prospective members of EDC had ratified that treaty-Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. A fifth, Italy, was on the point of ratifying it. The United Kingdom and the United States had made far-reaching commitments of association with EDC. France thus disassociates herself not only from her own proposal but from

1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, pp. 363-364.

2 The French National Assembly voted 319-264 against French ratification of the Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community, Aug. 30, 1954.

See the address of Oct. 24, 1950, by the Minister of Defense in the French National Assembly; Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950 (London, 1953), pp. 339–344.

The German Federal Republic completed its favorable parliamentary action on the EDC treaty Mar. 19, 1953; the Netherlands, Jan. 20, 1954; Belgium, Mar. 12, 1954; and Luxembourg, Apr. 7, 1954.

See the Association Agreement of Apr. 13, 1954, between the United Kingdom and the proposed European Defense Community (Memorandum__ Regarding United Kingdom Association with the European Defence Community; Cmd. 9126; 1954) and the statement of U. S. policy respecting the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued Apr. 15, 1954 (supra, pp. 1198-1200).

her prospective partners who had stood united at the recent Brussels conference.

The U.S. postwar policies beginning in 1946 were framed on the assumption that Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members and defensible against aggression from without. The imperative need for that unity was recognized by the leading statesmen of all the free nations of Europe. The United States joined the North Atlantic Treaty defensive alliance with the Western European countries. We assisted these countries to recover from the weakening of World War II. Both on the economic and military side we made massive contributions. We stationed the equivalent of six divisions in Europe. We furthermore made our leading military figures available to assume high positions in the military organization designed to defend Western Europe.

The French negative action, without the provision of any alternative, obviously imposes on the United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies, particularly those in relation to Europe. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council of Ministers has itself twice declared with unanimity that the EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned.' Furthermore, such review is required by conditions which the Congress attached this year and last year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.2

The Western nations now owe it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies in their power to restore sovereignty to that Republic and to enable it to contribute to international peace and security. The existing treaty to restore sovereignty is by its terms contingent upon the coming into force of EDC. It would be unconscionable if the failure to realize EDC, through no fault of Germany's, should now be used as an excuse for penalizing Germany, The Federal German Republic should take its place as a free and equal member of the society of nations. That was the purport of the resolution which the U.S. Senate adopted unanimously last July, and the United States will act accordingly.

The United States stands ready to support the many in Western Europe who despite their valiant efforts are left in grave anxiety. We need not feel that the European idea is dead merely because, in one of the six countries, a present majority seems against one of its manifestations. There is still much on which to build, and those foundations should not be shaken by any abrupt or any ill-considered action of our own.

It is a tragedy that in one country nationalism, abetted by com1 See, especially, the North Atlantic Council's communiqués of Feb. 26, 1952 (infra, pp. 1620-1624), Apr. 25, 1953 (infra, pp. 1631-1633), Dec. 16, 1953 (infra, pp. 1633-1636), and Apr. 23, 1954 (infra, pp. 1636-1637), and the Council's resolution of Apr. 24, 1953 (Department of State Bulletin, May 11, 1953, pp. 674-675).

2 See section 540 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953 (PL 118, 83d Cong., 1st sess., approved July 16, 1953; 67 Stat. 152) and section 105(b)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (PL 665, 83d Cong., 2d sess., approved Aug. 26, 1954; 68 Stat. 835). See also infra, pp. 3082 and 3108, respectively.

3 Resolution of July 30, 1954; infra, p. 1732.

munism, has asserted itself so as to endanger the whole of Europe. That tragedy would be compounded if the United States was thereby led to conclude that it must turn to a course of narrow nationalism. It is a matter of elementary prudence that the United States should review its dispositions and planning in the light of the new situation now created. We are fortunately so situated that we do not need to identify ourselves with what to us seem self-defeating policies. We have flexibility to adjust our own policies to take account of developments elsewhere. In doing so, we shall be governed by the realization that we cannot in isolation find safety for ourselves.

When the NATO Ministerial Council came to adjourn last April to meet next December, I pointed out that if the EDC failed of realization that would create an emergency situation which would call for a special meeting of that Council. That condition has arisen, and the United States believes that there should promptly be a special meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council,' as well as early consultations with Chancellor Adenauer. We shall move accordingly.

15. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESS, SEPTEMBER 18, 1954 3

I return from a 2-day trip to Europe. I conferred in Germany with Chancellor Adenauer and at London with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden."

When the French Parliament failed to ratify the treaties to create the European Defense Community and to restore sovereignty to Germany," I felt that my duty was to meet promptly with Chancellor Adenauer. He has sought wholeheartedly to associate Germany with the free West. He has wanted Germany to contribute to the security of the free West. But he has been zealous to find ways whereby German rearmament would be so integrated into a single European force that it could never again serve German militarism.

I found the Chancellor holding steadfast to the lofty concept of European unity. However, he feels that it is no longer possible to withhold sovereignty from Germany until European unity is achieved; also that there can no longer be deferred the preliminary steps which will permit Germany to exercise the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

I informed the Chancellor that his views in these respects were fully shared not only by President Eisenhower but by the Congress

This special meeting of the North Atlantic Council was subsequently held in Paris, Oct. 22, 1954; see infra, pp. 1637-1639.

2 Talks between Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer were held in Bonn, Sept. 16-17, 1954; see The communiqué of Sept. 17, 1954 (Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 27, 1954, p. 434).

3

Ibid., p. 435; see also Secretary Dulles' statements of Sept. 15 and 16, 1954

(ibid., p. 434).

See communiqué of Sept. 17, 1954; ibid., p. 435.

5 See communiqué of Sept. 17, 1954; ibid.

The French National Assembly voted not to ratify the EDC treaty Aug. 30,