LONDON CONFERENCE

The principal task of the London conference was to find an acceptable basis for German association with the free nations of the West and for a German contribution to Western defense. Under the 1952 agreements, the Federal Republic was to be associated with NATO only indirectly through membership in the EDC. At London we decided to seek full German membership in NATO. However, this needed to be supplemented by some reproduction of those aspects of EDC which removed the field of armament from exclusively national competence. This was achieved by enlarging the five-power Brussels Pact organization to include the German Federal Republic and Italy and giving that organization control of the armaments of the continental European members.2

It was essential that these controls should not interfere with the creation of adequate defensive forces by NATO. So at London we agreed that the level of peacetime contributions by the various members of the Brussels Pact to the forces under the NATO Supreme Commander, Europe (SACEUR) should, within certain agreed limitations, be worked out in NATO. The Brussels Pact nations in turn agreed not to maintain on the European Continent peacetime armaments in excess of those required for the forces they would contribute to NATO for its defensive purposes, plus their police forces, which were also subject to limitation by the Council of Western European Union. They also agreed to establish machinery for verifying these levels of armaments and for dealing with infractions of the levels. Furthermore, it was envisaged that the political and economic functions of the Brussels Treaty Organization would be strengthened, thus providing a broad basis for closer cooperation among the member countries.

The acceptance of these arrangements was greatly facilitated by additional commitments made by the Federal Republic and by the United Kingdom. The Federal Republic undertook voluntarily to forego the right to manufacture weapons of mass destructionatomic, biological, and chemical and not to manufacture guided missiles, larger warships and submarines, and strategic bombers, except upon request of SACEUR and with the agreement of the Brussels Treaty Council acting by a two-thirds vote.3

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The British Government undertook to maintain on the European Continent ground and airforce units equivalent to those now assigned to SACEUR and not to withdraw them against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty powers. This British commitment constituted an historic departure from traditional British policy. Finally, it was agreed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic that the occupation regime in Western Germany would be brought to an end by the Bonn Con

1 See Part IV of the Final Act of the London Conference, Oct. 3, 1954; supro doc. 16.

2 See Part II of the Final Act of the London Conference.

3 Ibid.

'See Part III of the Final Act and Annex II.

vention, amended to take account of developments since it was made in 1952.1

The agreements in principle reached at the London conference then had to be developed in detail and drawn up in appropriate formal instruments. A further conference was, therefore, convened in Paris in late October to review the new texts and to sign them. They were, in fact, signed in Paris on October 23.

THE SAAR

At the same time, a Franco-German agreement on the Saar was signed. The French Government had long considered it essential that such an agreement be part of the overall arrangements regarding German relations with the West. Discussion on this subject had been proceeding for several years. But it was only on the last day of our meetings at Paris that agreement was finally reached between Chancellor Adenauer and President Mendès-France. The agreement provides that, pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the Saar will be given a European status. A European commissioner, responsible to the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union, will supervise the carrying out of the agreement and will be in charge of foreign affairs and defense matters.

The monetary and customs union between France and the Saar will continue. But Germany will eventually be given a position in trade matters similar to that of France. The arrangements are subject to the approval of the Saar population, to whom the agreement will be submitted in a referendum. The agreement contains provisions designed to insure that the referendum will afford an opportunity for a free expression of the views of the Saarlanders.

The French Government and the German Federal Government have agreed to ask the United States and the United Kingdom to give assurances respecting the Saar agreement. These assurances would be expressions of intention, indicating our general willingness to support the arrangements to which I have referred. No treaty obligations would be involved on our part.

The Saar arrangement is one of the most important byproducts of the plan for Western European Union. Like the Trieste settlement, it gives promise of disposing in amity of an age-old, explosive source of trouble.

U. S. POSITION

All of the documents signed at Paris are now before the Senate for its information. Most of these either do not involve the United States as a party or are purely administrative in character. But two treaties do call for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. These are the protocol amending the Bonn Convention, restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, 3 and the protocol

1 See Part I of the Final Act; supra, doc. 16.

2 Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 174-179. 3 Supra, pp. 483-485.

admitting the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.1

The arrangements expressed in these two treaties involve substantially the same obligations on the part of the United States as those which the Senate accepted in 1952 in terms of the original Bonn Convention' and the NATO extension protocol.3

The revisions of the Bonn Convention are for the purpose of bringing it up to date and expressing more fully the status of equality being accorded to the Federal Republic. The obligations of the United States are not enlarged.

The existing rights of the Allied Powers with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole-that is, our status vis-a-vis the Soviet Unionare maintained as under the original conventions. We also retain our right to station forces in Germany, in agreement with the Federal Republic. Its agreement was given at Paris and has been approved by parliamentary action. The text has been submitted to the Senate for information.

The admission of the German Federal Republic to NATO will not impose on the United States any additional commitment beyond what would have been assumed by the protocol which the Senate approved in 1952. In both cases the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty is extended to the Federal Republic, and the latter assumes corresponding responsibilities.

As an essential contribution to the overall result, the President has made a declaration expressing our policy of active and continuing participation in the Atlantic security system represented by NATO. This was done after consultation with leaders of both houses of the Congress. The statement reaffirms our interest in NATO and our determination to continue active participation in the arrangements which have been established thereunder. In particular, this statement. contained an assurance, based on the language used in Senate Resolution 99 in 1951,6 that the United States will "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists." Also, the statement reiterates the United States view that the North Atlantic Treaty is of indefinite duration, announces our intention to cooperate with NATO and the Council for Western European Union on force levels and armament controls, and repeats our willingness to share information on the utilization of new weapons as authorized by the Congress.

My statement at London, outlining United States policy in these respects, followed as it was by Sir Anthony Eden's restatement of

3 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

* See the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, supra, pp. 610-612.

5 See President Eisenhower's message of Mar. 10, 1955, to the Prime Ministers of the countries participating in the Western European Union; supra, pp. 989–991. • Infra, pp. 1526-1528.

British policy, constituted the turning point in a conference which, up to then, had no clear sense of direction.

My statement, most of which was incorporated in the Final Act of the London conference, which is before you, made clear that such Presidential assurances, when given, would be only policy statements, not binding either as treaties or even in the sense that future Presidents would be legally committed thereby. However, the assurances describe policies which have been developed through bipartisan cooperation over a period of years. They reflect what now seems to be the fundamental and enduring interest of the United States in European unity and Atlantic security. They will, I am confident, continue to serve our national interests.

I believe that the arrangements before you carry out faithfully the desires of the Senate, as expressed in its resolution of July 30, 1954.2 They will restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, and they will enable that Republic to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, these results will be achieved within a framework of unity for Western Europe, which, on the one hand, assures strength and, on the other hand, gives large assurance against an abuse of that strength.

OTHER EUROPEAN PROBLEMS

The conditions which these agreements will create will, I hope, lead to a solution of other European problems.

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The reunification of Germany and the conclusion of the German peace treaty continue to be basic objectives of our policy. For 8 years now these objectives have been sought in repeated conferences with the Soviet Union. The first of those conferences was held at Moscow in the spring of 1947,3 and the latest of such conferences was held at Berlin last year. These conferences have come to naught because the Soviet Union has used them as occasions to maneuver against unity in the non-Communist part of Europe. Once, however, that unity is an irreversible reality, then conferences could be held with greater hope. The Soviet Union will no longer have the possibility of perverting these conferences into maneuvers against Western European unity. It may, perhaps, at long last, be possible to get down to the actual business of unifying Germany.

Furthermore, the arrangements for armaments control' set a pattern which might be adapted for wider use in Europe, if the Soviet rulers have a genuine desire to regulate and control armaments. They talk often and loudly about limitation of armament, but in fact they have

1 For the full texts of the statements by Secretary Dulles and the British Foreign Secretary, see annex II to the Final Act of the London Conference; supra, pp. 1484-1487.

2 Infra, p. 1732.

3 The Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mar. 10-Apr. 24, 1947; see Secretary Marshall's report in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 97-106.

The Berlin Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Jan. 25-Feb. 18, 1954; see supra, pp. 85-90, and infra, pp. 1850-1871.

s See Protocols Nos. III and IV to the Brussels Treaty; supra, pp. 979–989.

never made any practical proposals. In contrast, there has here been quietly developed an effective system of controls and limitations. These apply to six fully sovereign nations, with a total population of over 160,000,000, possessing large industrial power and inheriting great military traditions. This constitutes an example without precedent. The whole world can usefully note it and profit from it. Perhaps adaptation and extension of this pattern of control of armament and of armament production can be usefully discussed between the East and West.

The necessary legislative action for ratification of the Paris Agreements has been completed by 10 of the 15 nations, including France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and seven others. No reservations have been attached to the approval of the agreements in any case. Five parliaments have still to act-Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United States. It appears that action in the European countries will be completed in a short time.

The early entry into force of the agreements, which now can be envisaged, will be greatly in the interest of the United States. Indeed, any substantial delay would seriously injure the interests of the United States.

In 1952 the United States Senate acted before France acted,3 and France never did act favorably on those treaties. This time it seemed the part of wisdom for the United States not to be out in front. Now this deliberate deferring of United States action makes it the more important that there should be prompt action.

1 As of the date of Secretary Dulles' statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the following members of NATO had completed their parliamentary action on the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany: the British House of Commons voted favorably for ratification, Nov. 19, 1954 (the House of Lords took similar action, Nov. 24, 1954); the Norwegian Storting, Nov. 25, 1954; the Icelandic Althing, Dec. 16, 1954; the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Dec. 23, 1954 (the Senate, Mar. 11, 1955); the French National Assembly, Dec. 30, 1954 (the Council of the Republic, Mar. 27, 1955); the Greek Parliament, Jan. 18, 1955; the Portuguese National Assembly, Jan. 25, 1955; the Canadian House of Commons, Jan. 27, 1955; the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Feb. 16, 1955; and the West German Bundestag, Feb. 27, 1955 (the Bundesrat, Mar. 18, 1955). Of this list, the countries which were also signatories of the protocols to the Brussels Treaty took parliamentary action on the protocols at the same time they considered the NATO protocol on Germany. The Belgian Chamber of Representatives approved the NATO protocol on the accession of Germany, Jan. 20, 1955 (the Senate, Apr. 6, 1955); the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States General, Mar. 30, 1955 (the First Chamber, Apr. 28, 1955); the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, Apr. 6, 1955; and the Danish Folketing, Apr. 19, 1955. The parliaments of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg voted in favor of the Brussels Treaty protocols on the dates indicated. The United States Senate advised and consented to ratification of the NATO protocol, Apr. 1, 1955.

3 The United States Senate adopted a resolution, July 1, 1952, recommending, with an interpretation, U. S. ratification of the 1952 text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. The validity of this convention depended upon the simultaneous adoption by its members of the Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community. The French Government delayed final parliamentary action on the EDC Treaty until Aug. 30, 1954, on which occasion the National Assembly voted not to recommend ratification of the treaty.